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PREFACE

The first essay in my dissertation (co-authored with Karen Conway) examines the
effect of the taxation of social security benefits on elderly labor supply. In 1983, the
federal government and thirteen states passed legislation that taxed the social security
benefits of the high income elderly for the first time. The 1983 policy, which required
individuals with 'combined incomes' over $25,000 ($32,000 for married filers) to include
up to half of their social security benefits as federal taxable income, has been largely
ignored by economists. Because the income thresholds have never been indexed for
inflation, this policy reaches more individuals each year and has become of even greater
importance with the elimination of the earnings test in 2000.

In addition, it has

implications for other social security policies, such as the earnings test and Delayed
Retirement Credit (DRC), as well as 'forward-looking' measures used in dynamic
models. Results from our econometric analysis indicate that the high income elderly
(especially women) were the most affected and that their labor force participation
increased as a result, as predicted by our conceptual framework. Using data from 2005,
we show that the failure to index the income thresholds for inflation, the removal of the
earnings test, and the addition of a second set of thresholds in 1993 all magnify the scope
of the 1983 policy, making it more relevant today.
The second essay considers the effect of public health insurance benefits on
individual labor supply. Between 1993 and 1995 Medicare increased the coverage of
iv

immunosuppression medication for kidney transplant recipients from one year post
transplant to three years post transplant. Because these medications cost an average of
$10,000 per year, this policy change provides a large, exogenous source of variation in
public insurance benefits depending on the year in which an individual receives a
transplant.

While other government insurance programs are either means tested or

targeted at very specific groups, such as low income women, children, the elderly, or the
disabled, Medicare's coverage of individuals with end stage renal disease (ESRD) is
universal.

This universal eligibility provides a unique opportunity to explore labor

supply responses to the provision of public insurance among a large number of men and
women of prime working age and of all income levels. I find that Medicare's increased
medication coverage led to a significant decrease in labor force participation, particularly
with respect to the number of part time workers. The responses of men and women are of
similar magnitude.

These results suggest that labor supply reducing income effects

should be taken into account when considering the possibility of expanded public health
insurance coverage, particularly for individuals with chronic conditions, such as diabetes,
or high expected medical expenditures, such as the elderly.
Along with labor supply effects, policy makers must be concerned with the
determinants of enrollment in public programs.

Reducing the number of uninsured

individuals requires that those eligible actually enroll in the program. Despite increases
in Medicaid eligibility levels throughout the late 1990s, many children remain uninsured.
Language barriers or a lack of information about the program may prevent individuals
from enrolling in programs for which they are eligible. This paper tests the hypothesis
that individuals with stronger social networks are more likely to enroll in public programs
v

due to the presence of "network effects." The intuition behind this hypothesis is that
individuals with greater numbers of contacts belonging to their racial or ethnic group
should be more likely to be able to obtain information about eligibility levels and
enrollment procedures. Using Medicaid enrollment data from the Current Population
Survey (CPS) and housing pattern measures from the U.S. Census Bureau, I test for the
existence and importance of network effects in explaining geographic differences in
enrollment among racial and ethnic population subgroups. The results suggest that social
networks appear to explain some of the variation in enrollment rates for individuals who
speak only Spanish. These results are sensitive to the choice of model specification, and
no significant network effects are found when networks are defined by race or ethnicity
rather than language.
These three essays add to our understanding of how individuals behave in
response to changes in public insurance programs. Essay #1 studies the taxation of
Social Security benefits- a widely overlooked, yet increasingly important federal policy
that has also been adopted by several states. Essay #2 uses an unexplored policy that
affects a more demographically heterogeneous sample than the existing literature to
attempt to improve our understanding of the effects of government provided health
insurance on individual labor supply decisions.

Essay #3 investigates the role of

information sharing in promoting enrollment in Medicaid. As the fraction of the elderly
population increases, and as some politicians propose national health insurance plans,
understanding the effects that these programs have on the economic decisions made by
households is important for making policy decisions in the future.

vi
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ABSTRACT
BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO PUBLIC INSURANCE PROGRAMS: THREE
ESSAYS
by
Timothy F. Page
University of New Hampshire, September, 2008

Evaluating the effectiveness of public programs requires an understanding of how
these programs affect the choices of individuals and households.

For example, the

program design of Social Security and Medicare may affect how much people work.
While these effects are not intended goals of the programs, proper evaluation of these
programs requires analyzing costs and benefits from all sources, even those that may be
unintended. Given the growing number of uninsured individuals, currently 47 million,
policy makers are considering an expanded role for government in the provision of health
insurance. With any expansion may come secondary effects, such as those on labor
supply, which must be accounted for and considered when deciding on the proper
structure and parameters of the policy. Although the goal of expanding current public
health insurance programs would be to cover more individuals, this goal might not be
achieved if the public were not well informed about eligibility and enrollment
procedures.

The three essays in my dissertation consider how the Social Security,

Medicare, and Medicaid programs affect the decisions made by households with regard
to retirement, labor supply, and program enrollment. The results of these studies provide
xiii

useful information for evaluating current programs that will be useful for guiding future
public policy decisions.

PART 1: THE LABOR SUPPLY EFFECTS OF TAXING SOCIAL SECURITY
BENEFITS: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER
SOCIAL SECURITY POLICIES (WITH KAREN CONWAY)

THIS PAPER HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS

1

INTRODUCTION

With a rapidly aging population and a social security program with questionable
fixture solvency, understanding the link between social security and the labor supply
behavior of the elderly becomes increasingly important. However, the labor supply
effects of the social security program are difficult to study empirically because it is
federally administered and the program rules have not changed much over time, both of
which limit the possible sources of exogenous variation with which to study its
behavioral effects.1

In this paper, we investigate an overlooked, additional source of

variation ~ the 1983 legislation that began taxing social security benefits.
The 1983 legislation required social security recipients with incomes over
$25,000 ($32,000 for married filers) to include up to half of their benefits as federal
taxable income; thirteen states followed the federal government. These thresholds have
never been indexed for inflation.2 This policy therefore has two potential sources of
variation, across time and across states, and it also has implications for the incentive

1
As discussed shortly, these sources have been limited to the 1977 amendment that changed the calculation
of benefits (Krueger and Pischke 1992), changes to the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC, Pingle 2006) and
changes to the earnings test (e.g., Friedberg 2000 and Haider and Loughran 2007). Some studies,
especially early studies and the more recent 'forward-looking' models of retirement such as Coile and
Gruber (2006), use variation across individuals. Because this variation is primarily due to differences in
earnings histories and marital status, it is potentially endogenous.
2

In 1993 a second set of higher thresholds ($34,000/44,000) were added beyond which up to 85% of
benefits could be subject to tax. To simplify the analysis and also keep to the spirit of a 'before' and
'after' natural experiment, we focus on the 1983 legislation and the effects it had on the labor supply of
elderly individuals during that period. We explore the potential effects of the 1993 policy change, as well
as the elimination of the earnings test in 2000 and the effects of inflation, on current individuals in chapter
6.

2

effects of other aspects of social security policy. Furthermore, the recent removal of the
social security earnings test and erosion of the income thresholds due to inflation has led
the policy to becoming increasingly important over time. Surprisingly, however, this
policy has received little attention from economists and, to our knowledge, we are the
first to study its behavioral effects.3
We first provide a conceptual framework that shows the labor supply effects of
taxing social security benefits and how such a tax interacts with other aspects of social
security policy such as the earnings test and the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC). Our
framework identifies four groups of elderly individuals that are affected in different ways
by the 1983 policy. One is a 'control' group whose potential income is not sufficient to
reach the threshold levels without having all of their social security benefits already
'taxed away' by the earnings test imposed during that time. It is therefore not possible
for these individuals to be affected by the policy. At the other end of the income
distribution are the elderly whose nonlabor income alone requires them to pay taxes on

3

Butrica et al. (2006) calculates the impact of the federal tax policy on the elderly's implicit tax on work
but does not investigate the possible labor supply (or other) effects of the policy or the fact that some states
also began taxing social security benefits. The authors simulate the effects of repealing this policy and
find large reductions in the implicit tax on work. As discussed shortly, Sevak and Schmidt (2006) examine
the labor supply effects on the elderly of state income taxation more generally but do not focus specifically
on the tax treatment of social security benefits. In an earlier study, Chernick and Reschovsky (1985)
describe the effects of the policy on individuals of different income levels. Although they do not test for
labor supply effects explicitly, they argue that the taxation of benefits may lead to an overall increase in
labor supply due to income effects on high income households and the relatively small impact on aggregate
wages for lower income households. That is, since so few households are in the "phase in" range of the
policy where the marginal wage is reduced, the overall impact of the implicit tax on earnings will be small
relative to the total elderly population and any decrease in labor supply resulting from this wage reduction
could be outweighed by the predicted labor supply increases from those experiencing only a strict benefit
reduction. These predictions are consistent with our findings- labor supply increases among the high
income elderly, and we find no evidence of labor supply reductions among the lower income elderly. Our
study goes beyond the analyses in Butrica et al. (2006) and Chernick and Reschovsky (1985) by describing
the effects of the policy on labor market incentives and testing explicitly for its labor supply effects.

3

the maximum one-half of their benefits regardless of whether they work or not. The
theoretical prediction for this 'treatment' group is clear - the policy induces an income
effect that should increase labor supply. There is no effect on wages for individuals in
this group, so these individuals do not face a substitution effect. The two intermediate
('treatment') groups are defined in a similar manner, but with competing effects on labor
supply as the policy also has the potential to reduce their marginal wage.
To study the policy empirically, we use data from the March supplements to the
Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1981 to 1986. The CPS is a large,
nationally representative dataset containing information on income, labor market activity,
and demographics. We focus on the time period surrounding the point when the policy
was first introduced to obtain the most reliable estimates of the policy's labor supply
effects.4 The NBER's TAXSEV1 calculator, described in Feenberg and Courts (1993), is
used to describe the actual and potential impacts of the social security benefit taxation on
the incomes of affected individuals and to verify the changes in their budget lines
predicted by our conceptual model. We also include women in our analysis. While most
economic studies of the social security program focus solely on men, the 1983 policy

4

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) introduced many changes to the tax code, so measuring the effects
of the 1983 policy change would be more difficult with a longer time frame. For this reason, we restrict
our analysis to the 1981 to 1986 period. In addition, Bertrand et al (2004) caution against using long
panels of data surrounding policies that change very little over time. Studying the policy effects for more
recent years and including the 1993 policy would substantially complicate the analysis, but is a worthwhile
extension of this research.

4

affected a disproportionately high number of women.5 Thus, our study provides more
comprehensive insights into elderly labor supply behavior.
Our descriptive analyses, including labor force participation trends for the
different groups and 'bunching analyses' of incomes similar to those in earnings test
studies (e.g., Friedberg 2000 and Haider and Loughran 2007), all suggest that individuals
appear to respond to the policy. This finding is further supported by our difference-indifferences econometric analysis that estimates the effects of both the federal and state
policies on labor force participation and hours worked. Consistent with our conceptual
framework, our estimates suggest that the federal policy led to a substantial increase in
the labor supply of the high income elderly, particularly women, whereas the other
groups show little response. The estimated effects of the state policy, however, are
counterintuitive and persistent to specification checks. We suspect these findings are due
to the small number of observations receiving this dual treatment and their apparent
differences with comparable individuals in nontreated states even before the policy is
implemented.
The policy's current impact is likely even stronger. Data from the 2005 CPS
reveal income clustering around the thresholds introduced in 1983 and the second set of
higher thresholds added in 1993. This analysis of more recent data also demonstrates that
a much larger proportion of individuals are likely affected by this policy as inflation and
the elimination of the earnings test has all but removed the 'control' group and has
pushed more and more individuals into the higher income 'treatment' groups. As the
5

This is a consequence of treating spousal earnings as exogenous. While a common assumption in the
labor supply and social security literatures (e.g., Mroz 1987, Eissa 1995, Friedberg 2000), it is nonetheless
questionable and we explore its validity later in our analysis.

5

labor supply incentives of social security continue to be debated, our research suggests
that the taxation of benefits is an important policy to consider.

CHAPTER 1
1. BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PREVIOUS RESEARCH

The policy of taxing social security benefits can be viewed as both a tax on
income and a reduction in net social security benefits. Studying the effects it has on labor
supply therefore draws from and has implications for both strands of research.
Researchers have studied labor supply responses to social security benefits in several
different ways. Early studies consider the effects of social security benefits or social
security wealth6 on retirement (e.g., Fields and Mitchell 1984, Gordon and Blinder 1980)
with mixed findings. More recent studies emphasize the need to incorporate 'forwardlooking' measures such as the 'accrual effect' - i.e., the potential accrual of future
benefits if one delays retirement, as discussed, for example, in Coile and Gruber (2006)
and Gustman and Steinmeier (2007) - and frequently find stronger labor supply
responses.7
Social security is a federal program with a benefit structure that has changed little
over time. As a result, most of these studies must rely primarily on individual-level
variation that results from differences in earnings histories, marital status and other
factors that may have independent effects on labor supply and may be endogenous. One
important exception is Krueger and Pischke (1992), who use the only notable change in

6

"Social security wealth" refers to the present discounted value of all future social security benefits.

7

Most of these studies are limited to men. For studies that consider the retirement decisions of women, see
McCarty (1990) and Vistnes (1994), and for joint retirement decisions by couples, Coile (2004).

7

program rules, the 1977 amendment that significantly reduced the social security wealth
of the 'notch' cohort.

Friedberg (1999) went back in time to the 1950's to the

predecessor to social security, the Old Age Assistance (OAA) program that varied across
states, to find another source of variation in benefits.
The taxation of social security benefits, especially with the lack of indexed
thresholds, plays a potentially important role in such models and also could provide new
sources of exogenous variation (both over time and across states). It reduces net social
security wealth for high income households and may disproportionately diminish accrual
benefits, such as delaying retirement and increasing post-retirement income and benefits
makes it more probable that such benefits will be subject to tax. As we demonstrate
shortly, the additional annual tax burden is in some cases quite substantial. Incorporating
the effects of taxing benefits could therefore be a worthwhile extension to these 'forwardlooking' retirement studies and an additional source of variation.
The lack of independent variation in benefits has led researchers to focus on other
aspects of social security policy that have changed, notably the earnings test (e.g.,
Friedberg 2000 and Haider and Loughran 2007) and more recently the Delayed
Retirement Credit (DRC, Pingle 2006).. The DRC creates an incentive to delay receipt of
social security benefits and is therefore linked with the accrual effect in forward-looking
studies. The DRC was instituted in 1972 and gave a 1 percent bonus to social security
benefits for every year that receipt is delayed past age 65 until age 70. It was increased to
3 percent in 1982, and the 1983 amendments that resulted in benefits being subject to tax

8

also raised the DRC for individuals turning age 65 in 1990 or later. Pingle (2006) takes
a reduced form, difference-in-difference approach similar to ours in studying the labor
supply effects of this policy change and finds that the increased incentives raised
employment.
Taxing social security benefits

has the same (apparently unexplored)

ramifications for the effects of DRC as it does for the accrual effect; the incentives
provided by increases in the DRC are likely dampened by the increased probability that
such benefits will be subject to tax, especially over time. Conversely, the DRC has little
impact for our empirical analysis because of the timing of the policies' changes. While
enacted in 1983, the legislated increases in the DRC do not affect the birth cohort we
study (ages 65-69 in 1981-1986). The increase to 3% in 1982 could potentially affect our
analysis, however, and we therefore investigate the impact that dropping 1981 has on our
results.
The policy that has changed the most and received the most attention in the labor
supply literature is the earnings test (e.g., Honig and Reimers 1989, Friedberg 2000, and
Haider and Loughran 2007.) The earnings test removes social security benefits at a rate
of $1 for every $2 (or more recently, $3) of earnings above a specified threshold
amounts. Therefore, once an individual earns enough to reach the earnings test threshold,

8

The amendment raised the DRC in 0.5% increments based on birth cohort with a maximum of 8% for
those born in or after 1943. See Pingle (2006) for more details of the policy. The 1983 legislation
introduced other modifications to the social security program as well. As explained in Gustman and
Steinmeier (1985), the 1983 legislation also included a provision to gradually increase the full retirement
age to 67 beginning in the year 2000. Duggan et al (2007) investigate both this change and the increased
penalty for claiming benefits early and note that neither policy change affected individuals born in or
before 1937; therefore, individuals in our sample are unaffected. The legislation also removed the earnings
test for individuals over age 70 and reduced the earnings test penalty to 33 cents for every dollar of
earnings for individuals ages 65 to 69 beginning in 1990. Again, none of these changes affects our sample.

9

the implicit marginal tax on earnings increases dramatically. For individuals ages 65 and
over, the earnings thresholds were $5,500 in 1981 and $7,800 in 1986 (Haider and
Loughran 2007). The earnings test was completely eliminated for all individuals reaching
full retirement age in 2000 and now only applies to those who draw their benefits early.
Our study is closely linked with the earnings test and its literature in several ways.
The 1983 legislation also eliminated the earnings test for those workers age 70 or over;
this informs our decision to focus only on those aged 65-69. The other change it made —
reducing the penalty rate to 1/3 - affects workers turning age 65 in 1990 (and therefore
not included in our analysis). The fact that earnings test rules did not change between
1981 and 1986 for individuals in our sample is important.
However, the earnings test itself, even though essentially unchanged, interacts
with the taxation of benefits in two interesting ways, as we demonstrate in Chapter 2.
First, the earnings test enables us to identify workers who could not possibly have been
subject to the tax - our 'control' group. Due to their low levels of nonwage income, in
order to reach the taxable thresholds, these workers would have had to earn so much
earned income that their social security benefits would have already been 'earningstested' away.

We also explain how taxing benefits acts to reduce the effect of the

earnings test for high income earners (because their benefits would have been subject to
income taxes anyway), yet to our knowledge no earnings test research has recognized this
link.
The earnings test is the most similar social security policy to the one we consider
here because it not only represents a reduction in potential social security benefits for
elderly workers, but it is also a tax on earned income. The two policies therefore lend
10

themselves to similar empirical approaches, including the 'bunching analyses' of both
Friedberg (2000) and Haider and Loughran (2007) that we perform, and borrow heavily
. insights from the labor supply and taxation literature. While Friedberg (2000) takes more
of a structural approach, using piecewise linear, maximum likelihood to estimate her
labor supply equations, our econometric approach is more similar to the reduced form
approach of Haider and Loughran (2007) and follows the natural experiment, differencein-differences approach in the recent taxation and labor supply literature, such as Eissa
(1995) and Eissa and Liebman (1996).
Finally, a recent study of labor supply and income taxation of the elderly is
relevant. Sevak and Schmidt (2006) use 1998, 2000 and 2002 data from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) for men and women aged 65-84 to estimate labor force
participation and hours equations that include the potential wage, after-tax nonlabor
income and the state plus federal marginal tax rate as key regressors. While the tax
treatment of social security benefits is reflected in this marginal tax rate, the effects of the
policy are not explicitly considered. Furthermore, the timing of their analysis precludes a
'before and after' look at the policy.

However, the large estimated labor supply

responses strongly suggest that the elderly are responsive to economic incentives and
therefore are consistent with the sizable effects we find.9
In sum, the taxation of social security benefits provides us with an unexplored
source of variation with which to study a policy that otherwise does not vary much. This
policy has strong implications for other aspects of social security policy, likely

9

They estimate that a 10% increase in the return to work results in a 7.9% (4.9%) increase in the labor
force participation of men (women) and a 5.3% (6%) increase in hours worked.
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diminishing the accrual effect and the effects of the DRC and earnings test for high
income individuals. Fortunately, no other policy changed substantially during the period
immediately before and after the taxation began, and the existence of the earnings test
provides us with a 'control' group. We can also draw on the rich set of empirical tools
from both the tax and earnings test literatures to take a multi-pronged approach to
investigating the policy's effects.

One difference, however, is that our conceptual

framework, which we present next, provides precise, predetermined conditions for
classifying individuals into differently affected groups.
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CHAPTER 2
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND POLICY DETAILS

In this section, we lay out the details of the 1983 benefit taxation policy and
describe how the labor supply incentives faced by individuals of different income levels
and different income compositions are affected by the policy. We begin with an intuitive
discussion and simple theoretical framework, followed by a separate subsection that
rigorously derives the conditions for classifying individuals into different groups, and
then end by using TAXSIM to verify these conditions and the predicted effects of the
1983 policy. The details and implications of the 1993 policy that added a second layer of
taxation of social security benefits are discussed in chapter 6, when we consider the likely
current effects of this policy.
Our theoretical framework is static and does not explicitly consider the 'forward
looking' effects discussed above; we leave such considerations to future work. We also
follow the common approach of considering the individual's labor supply decision as
separate from and exogenous to the spouse's. We then use our framework to identify
four groups of individuals on an (arguably) exogenous basis - by differences in their
respective amounts of non labor income. Based on these differences in non labor income,
we determine the incentives facing each group. One group is completely unaffected by
the policy - our 'control' group - which facilitates our differences-in-differences
empirical approach.
13

While the assumption of exogenous nonlabor income is common in much of the
static labor supply (e.g., Mroz 1987, Eissa 1995) and social security earnings test
literatures (e.g., Friedberg 2000), we recognize that it is a strong assumption and attempt
to explore its validity in the empirical analysis.

Likewise, one can question the

comparability of treatment and control groups classified on the basis of nonlabor income.
Eissa (1995), who also uses nonlabor income to classify her groups, discusses in detail
the conditions necessary for this approach to be valid and reviews existing evidence that
supports such conditions. As in Eissa (1995), we explore the robustness of our results to
using an alternative 'control' group.10

Another exercise limits our analysis to single

individuals to address the possible endogeneity of spousal earnings. Finally, similar to
past social security studies which use slightly younger (or older) workers as a 'control'
group (e.g., Friedberg 1999, Haider and Loughran 2007), we investigate the behavioral
differences across such age groups as well, resulting in a DDD(D) model similar to
Gruber and Poterba (1994) who also use income as one source of differences in their
DDD estimator.11 Our results are reasonably robust to all of these investigations.
Nonetheless, the exogeneity of nonlabor income and the comparability of households
classified on that basis remain important assumptions - and by extension, possible
caveats - for this research, and we therefore return to this issue as we present our
strategy, interpret our findings, and conduct sensitivity analyses.

Eissa (1995) defines her primary treatment group to be married women whose spousal earnings and other
nonlabor income place them in the 99th income percentile. Her main control group is married women at the
75th percentile, but she explores using those at the 90th percentile as an alternative.
11

The authors estimate the effects of TRA86 on health insurance purchases of the self-employed by
comparing the high and low income employed versus self-employed before and after TRA86.

14

2.1. Policy Description and Its Budget Effects

The Social Security Amendments of 1983 required higher income individuals to
include social security income as federal taxable income.

Filers with "combined

incomes" above a certain threshold are required to include up to one half of their benefits
as taxable income. "Combined income" is the sum of adjusted gross income, non-taxable
interest, and one half of social security benefits. Thus, elderly individuals pay taxes on
up to one half of their social security benefits if their combined income exceeds the
threshold, which is equal to $25,000 for single individuals or $32,000 for married
couples.
When an individual's combined income reaches the threshold level, benefits are
added to taxable income at a rate of $1 for every $2 of income above the threshold level.
Benefits cease to be added to taxable income when the amount of taxed benefits reaches
50 percent of the total benefit amount. Therefore, when combined income reaches the
income threshold plus the amount of the individual's social security benefit, half of the
benefits would be included as taxable income, and no additional benefits can be taxed. If
combined income is above the threshold but does not exceed the threshold by more than
the social security benefit amount, then benefits are taxable at an amount equal to one
half of the amount by which combined income exceeds the threshold.
Figure 1 depicts the effect of this policy on an individual's budget constraint over
consumption and leisure before and after the policy change. For ease of exposition, we

assume a proportional tax on income. We also ignore, for now, the effects of the
earnings test; this allows us to see the full range of possible impacts for a worker with
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relatively low nonlabor income and to ignore the implicit tax rate caused by the earnings
test. (As demonstrated shortly, workers with high nonlabor income will only face the
leftward portions of the budget constraint and those with low nonlabor incomes will not
face the policy at all due to the earnings test.) The first kinkpoint occurs when the
combined income threshold is exceeded, at which point the marginal tax rate increases by
50 percent as each $1 of earnings causes $.50 of social security benefits to be added to
taxable income. That is, the marginal wage is now (l-t-0.5t)Wover this range where W
is the gross wage and t is the assumed proportional income tax rate. This continues until
the individual has worked/earned enough such that the maximum one half of benefits is
added as taxable income. This is the second kinkpont; benefits are no longer added to
taxable income as income and hours increase and the after tax wage returns to its pre
benefit taxation level, (l-t)W. This policy therefore results in a three-segment, kinked
budget line. On the first segment, the policy has no effect because the combined income
threshold has not yet been exceeded. Over the second segment, the after tax wage is
reduced because benefits are being added to taxable income. Once the maximum amount
of benefits has been added, the slope of the budget line returns to its original value.
The segment(s) of this budget line actually faced by a given individual depends
on the value of non labor income, their social security benefits and the earnings test.
First, there are individuals whose non labor income plus one half of their benefits12
exceed the threshold by more than the full amount of their benefits. This treatment group

Benefits play two roles in this policy. First, one half of benefits is included in the "combined income"
calculation. Second, if the combined income exceeds the threshold, then benefits are added to taxable
income at 50 cents for every dollar that combined income exceeds the threshold. Thus, "combined
income" and "taxable income" have very distinct meanings.
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pays taxes on the maximum one half of their benefits regardless of their labor supply
decisions. For this group, the relevant portion of the budget line in Figure 1 is labeled
Treatment Group #1. The policy creates a pure income effect, with no effect on wages,
and results in a parallel downward shift of the budget line. For example, consider a single
individual with asset income of $30,000 and social security benefits of $8,000. In this
case, combined income at zero earnings exceeds the $25,000 threshold amount by $9000
($30,000 plus one half of $8,000), which means that $4,500 of benefits could be subject
to taxation. However, this amount exceeds the maximum one half of benefits subject to
the tax, or $4,000, and so only $4,000 is subject to tax regardless of how much he or she
works. For individuals in this group, there is a pure income effect resulting from the
reduction in social security benefits that should act to increase labor supply.
The next group of individuals affected by the policy falls in the range of the
budget line labeled Treatment Group #2. For this group, non labor income at zero
earnings exceeds the taxation threshold but by less than the amount necessary for the
maximum benefit amount to be taxed. Thus, at zero hours of work they must include
some of their benefits as taxable income and that amount grows as they work more hours.
This leads to a reduction in their after tax wage until the maximum one half of benefits
have been added as taxable income. For example, consider an individual with asset
income of $23,000 and benefits of $8,000. Combined income at zero earnings exceeds
the threshold by $2,000 (23,000 + 0.5*8,000 - 25,000), so this individual will pay taxes
on $1,000 of benefits even if earnings are zero. If she chooses to work, then there is an
extra marginal tax on earnings that expires once her combined income reaches $33,000
(this occurs with an additional $6,000 of earnings). Once combined income reaches
17

$33,000, it exceeds the threshold by $8,000 (the benefit amount) and the maximum one
half of benefits is taxable. As with treatment group 1, there are income effects present,
but there is also a wage effect resulting from the fact that additional earnings increase the
amount of benefits included in taxable income. Therefore, this group also experiences a
labor supply reducing substitution effect, leading to an ambiguous impact on labor
supply.
The final group affected by this policy falls in the range labeled Treatment Group
3. These are individuals whose combined income at zero hours of work is below the
threshold. Benefits are not taxed when hours of work are equal to zero. Rather, benefits
become taxable when earnings push combined income over the threshold. Consider an
individual with asset income of $18,000 and social security benefits of $8,000. Once his
earnings push combined income over the $25,000 threshold, benefits are added as taxable
income, which is equivalent to a tax on wages. The tax on benefits therefore reduces the
wage for these workers also, again resulting in the usual competing income and
substitution effects.
For this group, the number of hours after which benefits become taxable depends
on both the amount of non labor income and the individual's wage. Holding the amount
of non labor income constant, higher wage workers will hit the threshold at a lower
number of hours and should therefore be more likely to face the benefit taxes. Lower
wage workers will reach the income threshold at a much higher number of hours (or may
not be able to reach it at all). Holding wages constant, individuals with a higher non
labor income hit the threshold before individuals with lower amounts of non labor
income.

The effects that wages and nonlabor income have on the relative positions of
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individuals in treatment group #2 can be determined analogously. In fact, both treatment
groups #2 and 3 can be viewed as 'intermediate' groups between treatment group 1 and
the control group that is created by the earnings test.
The preceding analysis ignores the earnings test, which was still in effect during
the 1981 to 1986 time period considered in our empirical study. The earnings test does
three things.

First, it makes actual or observed social security benefits depend on

earnings. The above discussion classifying individuals into groups must therefore be
refined to refer to maximum possible social security benefits because each group is
classified based on its position at zero hours of work. Second, it provides an exogenously
defined control group for our analysis. This control group consists of individuals whose
benefits would be "earnings tested" away before they reach the combined income
threshold for social security benefit taxation. Consider a single individual with zero non
labor income and benefits of $5,000. According to earnings test rules, once earnings pass
the earnings test threshold13, benefits are reduced by $1 for every additional $2 earned.
Thus, if the earnings test threshold is $6,000, this individual would have had all benefits
removed by the earnings test by the time his combined income reached $25,000 ($22,500
in earnings plus one-half of $5000 in benefits). The earnings test therefore provides an
exogenously determined 'control' group that will allow us to use a natural experiment
methodology to determine the labor supply effects of the 1983 policy.14

13

Actual thresholds during these years ranged from $5,500 in 1981 to $7,800 in 1986. The average amount
of social security benefits received by individuals in our sample is $4030.
14

As noted above, a fair criticism is that these 'control' individuals are substantially different from the
other groups due to their low income, although the short period of time makes it seem likely that inherent
differences are captured by including the treatment dummy variables. To further address this issue, we
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Third, we need to consider how the earnings test will affect our remaining
'treated' individuals. The earnings test effectively reduces the marginal wage once the
earnings test threshold is exceeded and expires once benefits have been reduced to zero
(which occurs when earnings equal the threshold plus twice the maximum possible
benefits). It therefore behaves in a similar manner as a tax on benefits, and the two
policies combine in such a way as to mitigate each other's effects. To see this more
clearly, consider the case of an individual in treatment group #1 who now faces the
earnings test (with implicit tax rate, tE =0.5) and a proportional income tax t as before,
shown in Figure 2. Prior to the 1983 policy, his budget line has two kinkpoints. The first,
A, occurs when the earnings test threshold is first exceeded and his marginal wage is
reduced by the implicit tax due to the earnings test (i.e., his marginal wage changes from
(l-t)W to (1-t- (E)W).

The second, B, occurs when all benefits have been 'earnings-

tested' away and the marginal wage returns to its original level.
The taxation of benefits alters this budget line in two ways. At zero hours of
work, his net income is reduced by the amount of tax he is paying on the maximum one
half of benefits, while his marginal wage is unchanged. He will continue along this
lower, but parallel, budget line until his earnings exceed the test threshold, at which point
his marginal wage is again decreased. However, with every dollar in benefits lost to the
earnings test, his tax liability is reduced by one-half his marginal tax rate. Instead of his
wage being reduced to (1-t- tg)W as before, it is now only reduced to (1-t- tE(l-0.5t))W.
The new, after-tax policy budget line must rejoin the original one at point B because at

perform sensitivity analyses that incorporate different types of control groups. These exercises are
discussed in detail in chapters 3.2 and 5.
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this level of earnings there are no more benefits to tax or be earnings-tested away. This
further highlights how taxing social security benefits actually reduces the implicit tax rate
of the earnings test - the marginal wage must be higher in order for the budget lines to
rejoin at the level of hours and earnings where all benefits are gone.
This analysis shows that even within treatment group #1 there is the potential for
this policy to have wage effects, operating indirectly through its interaction with the
earnings test. Treatment groups #2 and 3 are affected analogously. For treatment group
#2, the after-tax/after-eamings test budget line is very similar to Figure 2 except at low
hours of work, where the after-tax budget line is not parallel because, as before, each
dollar of earnings adds another $.50 of benefits to taxable income. For an individual in
treatment group #3, it is possible that the earnings test threshold could be crossed before
the tax threshold is crossed. Crossing the earnings test threshold first implies a new
kinkpoint that occurs before the tax threshold and reduces the marginal wage to (1-ttgJW. Once the tax threshold has also been crossed, the marginal wage increases to (1-ttE(l-0.5t))W.
More generally, this analysis reveals that individuals, depending on their levels of
nonlabor income and social security benefits, will cross the earnings test threshold,
income tax threshold or both, as they work more hours. Individuals in the control group
cross the earnings test threshold first and at a low level of 'combined income', such that
by the time they reach the income tax threshold, no social security benefits remain to be
taxed. At the other end of the nonlabor income distribution, treatment #1 crosses the
income tax threshold even without working and pays tax on the maximum one half of
benefits. If they work enough to also cross the earnings test threshold, then the implicit
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tax it imposes is mitigated by the reduction in their tax liability. The effects of both
policies disappear once all benefits have been earnings-tested away. Again, treatment
groups #2 and 3 represent intermediate cases of these two extremes; crossing either
threshold reduces the marginal wage while crossing the second threshold mitigates that
decrease.
Adding the earnings test to our analysis therefore provides us with a control group
but further complicates the predicted labor supply effects of the treatment groups.
However, these complications exist only for those who have the potential to cross both
thresholds. For treatment group #1, the sum of the two effects of taxing benefits (pure
income effect at zero or low hours of work and an increased marginal wage once the
earnings test threshold is exceeded) seems likely to increase labor supply. For the other
two treatment groups, the effect on labor supply remains ambiguous. Fortunately, the
conditions for classifying individuals into the treatment groups rely only on nonlabor
income and benefits received at zero hours of work and therefore are unaffected by the
existence of the earnings test. The next subsection derives these conditions formally.

2.2. Deriving Expressions for Assignment into Treatment and Control Groups

As outlined in the previous section, the structure of this policy allows us to assign
individuals into the treatment and control groups based only on differences in their
respective amounts of non labor income and maximum social security benefits. While
many studies in the taxation and labor supply literature, such as Eissa (1995) and Eissa
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and Liebman (1996), assign individuals into treatment and control groups somewhat
arbitrarily, our definition of treatment and control groups falls directly out of the
conceptual framework. As in 2.1, we begin by first ignoring the earnings test and then
alter the conditions in light of it.
Combined income is given by:
Y = V + E + -B.
2 '

(1)

where Y is combined income, V is non labor income (spousal earnings and assets), E is
earnings and B is social security benefits. Thus, the individual's taxable income is

Y,taxable

0
V + E + -(V + E + -B)-Y*
2
2

(2)

l

-B
2

In equation (2), 0 is the minimum amount of benefits that can be taxed, 1/2B is the
maximum benefit amount that can be taxed, and the middle term is the intermediate case
where benefits are taxed 50 cents on the dollar for every dollar above Y*, the combined
income threshold, but where Y is not sufficient for the maximum of one half of the
benefits to be added.
Recall that treatment group 1 consists of individuals whose combined income at
zero hours of work (non labor income plus one half of social security benefits) exceeds
the combined income taxation threshold by more than the full amount of their benefits,
which means they pay taxes on the maximum one half of benefits. We identify this
group with the following condition:
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V + -B>Y*+B

(3) Treatment Group 1

Thus, the condition on V for this group becomes:
V>Y* + -B

(3 a) Treatment Group 1

Treatment group 2 has combined incomes at zero hours of work that exceed the
combined income threshold, but they do not exceed the threshold by an amount sufficient
to make the maximum one half of benefits taxable. This group is identified by the
following condition:
Y*<V + -B<Y*+B

(4) Treatment Group 2,

Or, as a condition on V,
Y* — B<V <Y* + -B

(4a) Treatment Group 2

The last group of elderly individuals affected by the 1983 policy is the most
complex, treatment group 3. These are individuals whose combined income at zero hours
of work is below the threshold, yet if they choose to work, their earnings could push their
combined income over the threshold. This group is identified by the following condition:
V + ~B<Y*<V

+ -B + E

(5) Treatment Group 3,

where E represents maximum possible earnings. This condition is difficult to apply
because we do not always observe the hourly wage (i.e., nonworkers) and because the
choice of maximum possible hours is arbitrary, especially for older workers. Fortunately,
the earnings test provides an additional condition; E may be so high that the individual
would no longer have any benefits left to tax at that level. However, it also requires the
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other three conditions to be altered so that they are written as a function of maximum
social security benefits (what is received at zero earnings).
To incorporate the earnings test into our analysis, we rewrite observed or actual
social security benefits as

B = B--(E-T)ifE>T

(6)

Equation (6) states that the observed benefit amount, B, is the exogenous (in the current
period) component of benefits, B, less the part removed by the earnings test. If E is less
than T, the earnings test threshold, then observed benefits consist only of the exogenous
component. Substituting (6) into (1), we see that an individual must pay taxes on benefits
if:
E + V + -(B--(E-T))>Y*

(7)

= E + V + -B--E
2
4

(8)

+ -T>Y*
4

= -E + V + -B+-T>Y*
4
2
4

(9)

We can now define our treatment and control groups more precisely.

In

particular, equations 3, 3 a, 4 and 4a can simply be rewritten such that B appears rather
than B, because these conditions are derived at zero hours of work (in order to be
exogenous). Treatment group #3 can now be subdivided into those who could potentially
reach the income threshold (without specifying a wage or maximum hours) and still have
benefits remaining, and those who could not (our control group). Re-arranging equation
(9), an individual is not subject to the tax if:
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V<Y*--E--B--T
4
2

4

(10)

Equation (10) implies that the individual's potential income is not sufficient to reach the
threshold. However, this expression relies on earnings, which are endogenous. So, in
order to define our control group exogenously, we use the following additional condition:
Y * -V > 2 B+ T

(11) Control Group (isolatedfrom Treatment #3)

The right hand side of Equation (11) is the amount of earnings where benefits have been
reduced to zero by the earnings test. The left hand side is the difference between the
threshold income and non labor income, or the amount of earnings plus half of actual
benefits required to reach Y*. The inequality specifies that this difference be large
enough that it would require earnings so large that social security benefits would be zero
(i.e., E exceeds 2B+ T) per earnings test rules.
In an effort to assign individuals into the treatment and control groups based on
exogenous variables15, we use equation (11) to define our control group. Treatment
groups 1 and 2 are identified by equations (3 a) and (4a), where B is actually maximum
benefits, B . Individuals fall into treatment group 3 if equation (11) does not hold and
V<Y*--B.
2

(12)

If equation (11) does not hold, we cannot exogenously rule out that the individual could
potentially be affected, while equation (12) requires that the individual does not have

Again, we follow the literature and treat non labor income, V, as exogenous. We also assume that
maximum possible social security benefits (those received at zero earnings) are exogenous.
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enough non labor income to fall into treatment group 2. Thus, the policy creates three
groups 'treated' differently and one group that should be totally unaffected.

2.3. Predicted Effects of the Federal Policy Using TAXSIM

To verify that the budget lines and labor supply effects are as we describe in the
previous sections, we use the NBER's TAXSIM calculator to plot out budget lines for
representative individuals in each treatment group. We use the values of social security
benefits and non labor income given in section 3.1, and we assume a wage of $10 per
hour. To simplify the analysis, we begin by calculating the effects of the federal income
tax (only) for a representative individual from each group for hours of work ranging from
0 to 2080 (40 hours of work for 52 weeks), where the only difference between groups is
the amount of non labor income assumed. Each after-tax budget line is plotted using the
federal tax calculator for 1983 (Before) and 1984 (After)16. This allows us to see whether
the budget line behaves as expected and also whether there were other obvious changes to
the federal tax system that could confound our results.
Figure 3 a shows the budget lines plotted for the hypothetical individual in
treatment group 1 and confirms our predictions. The pure income effect is shown by a
parallel shift of the budget line after 1983 compared to before. Results from this group
will have the most relevance for the social security literature because this group

16

We also construct budget lines for each year from 1981 to 1986. The only noticeable difference across
years is that the after-tax V intercept increases slightly each year, likely a consequence of the yearly
increases in the standard deduction.
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experiences a strict reduction in net benefits and little or no effect on wages. Results
from treatment groups 2 and 3 will be more relevant for the taxation and labor supply
literature because in addition to the policy creating a reduction in benefits, it also creates
a reduction in the after tax wage.
Figure 3b shows the budget line plotted for the hypothetical individual in
treatment group 2. While there is an income reduction even if hours of work are zero,
there is also a wage effect over some range. This wage effect expires once taxable
benefits reach the maximum of $4,000. The higher V is for individuals in this group, the
more they begin to look like individuals in treatment group 1. As V becomes lower, they
begin to look like individuals treatment group 3.
The budget lines for treatment group 3 are shown in Figure 3c. Notice that
benefits are not taxed when hours of work are equal to zero. Rather, benefits become
taxable when earnings push the individuals combined income over the threshold. In this
example, the individual has asset income of $18,000 and social security benefits of
$8,000. Once earnings push combined income over the $25,000 threshold, benefits are
added as taxable income, which is equivalent to a tax on wages. This exercise therefore
confirms both that the budget lines of the treatment groups are affected in the way
predicted by our conceptual framework and also demonstrates that very little else was
changing in the federal tax treatment for these individuals that might obscure these
predicted effects.
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2.4. State Taxation of Social Security Benefits

Prior to 1983, states did not tax social security benefits. Some states followed the
federal government when it began taxing social security benefits with the 1983
legislation.17 During the period of our study, ten states had no income tax or one that is
very limited (i.e., Tennessee and New Hampshire; Connecticut enacted its income tax in
1991). Three states (Rhode Island, Nebraska and Vermont) based their tax liability on
the federal tax liability and so automatically followed the federal government. The other
states that began taxing social security benefits are Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Utah. These differences in
state tax treatment of social security benefits provide an additional layer of variation in
benefits. In addition, state tax liabilities can be indirectly affected by the federal policy if
the state allows federal income taxes to be deductible. However, we do not classify such
states as 'treatment' states per se.
To give an idea of how this policy affected the tax burden of affected individuals,
we use TAXSBVI to calculate changes in tax burdens for individuals in treatment groups 1
and 2 calculated using average income values for each group. We take these average
income values for each group and drop them into each state to calculate the change in the

This discussion and our conclusions regarding which states followed the federal government are based on
Zahn and Gold (1985), Table III.l, pp.40-43 for 1985, the results of TAXSIM, and information generously
provided by Jon Bakija from his income tax calculator (Bakija 2006). In the few instances where we found
disagreement or ambiguity among the sources (specifically for Georgia, Minnesota, New Mexico, and
Wisconsin), we consulted with Jon Bakija, Jon Rork, as well as Dan Feenberg and Inna Shapiro at
TAXSIM/NBER and the relevant legal documents we could locate for the state. We thank all of them for
their help with this exercise. Our investigation using these sources reveals a few changes during the 'after'
period of our study, 1984-86. Specifically, it appears as though Minnesota and Oklahoma may have begun
taxing in 1985 (rather than 1984) and Wisconsin in 1986. In the empirical analyses, we therefore
investigate the sensitivity of our results to the exact list of states and find our results are robust. For a
discussion of current state policy, see Conway and Rork (2008).
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overall tax burden resulting from benefit taxation. We do not report values for treatment
group 3 because the "average" individual in this group falls below the benefit taxation
threshold. This exercise is summarized in Table 1. At the federal level, increased tax
liabilities in 1985 range from $659 for married people in treatment group 1 to $846 for
single individuals in treatment group 2. Note that these burdens depend on the average
incomes and benefit levels of each group. At the state level, increased average state tax
burdens range from $105 for married people in treatment group 1 to $165 for single
individuals in treatment group 2. Due to the linkages between federal and state tax codes,
the increased tax burden at the federal level can result in a decreased burden at the state
level among states that did not tax benefits.18 When we repeat this exercise for 2005, we
find that the addition of the second set of thresholds in 1993 and increases in benefit
levels result in increased nominal burdens due to benefit taxation, despite the reductions
in marginal tax rates due to TRA86.

This point is discussed in more detail in the next section.
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CHAPTER3
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Given that we have one well defined group of people unaffected by the policy,
studying the policy's labor supply effects lends itself to the difference-in-differences
approach used in Eissa (1995) and Eissa and Liebman (1996)19. Our main econometric
model contains the "difference-in-differences" estimates designed to capture the impact
of the policy at the federal level and "difference-in-difference-in-differences" (DDD)
estimates designed to capture any additional responses to the policy at the state level.
Our primary dependent variable is labor force participation, but we also estimate
equations for hours conditioned on participation and adjusted for selection bias. In
addition to our econometric analyses, we also provide two different descriptive analyses,
discussed and reported in Chapters 4.2 and 4.3.

3.1. Model Specification

Our main model specification has the form:
P{LFPi=\) = a + Xi,p+ylg

3

3

^{Treatmen^ * Federal) + y2g Z(Treatmentg *Statest) + si, (13)

Note that this reduced form approach does not allow for measures of the welfare effects of taxes on
social security benefits. Thus, welfare measures such as excess burden and deadweight loss are not
discussed in this paper. Our approach is also subject to the usual criticisms and caveats regarding 'natural
experiments' (e.g., Besley and Case 2000). One particularly relevant criticism could be the dissimilarity
between our control group and treatment #1. We address this criticism in Chapter 5 by investigating the
robustness of our conclusions to instead using treatment #3 - the treatment group expected to face the
smallest treatment who is likely more similar - as a control. We find even stronger results in that scenario.
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where g indexes treatment group, i indexes the individual, s indexes states, and t indexes
time. X is a vector of control variables, and Treatment is a dummy variable indicating
that the individual belongs to treatment group g. The vector X contains the full set of
year dummies, treatment group dummies, state fixed effects, age dummies, and controls
for gender, race, marital status, and education level.20 The year dummies should capture
the effects of year to year changes in macroeconomic conditions that may affect labor
supply. The before and after difference-in-differences estimates for each group are given
by the coefficients in the row vector yx . Federal equals 0 for the years 1981 to 1983
and equals 1 for the years 1984 to 1986. State is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the
years 1984 to 1986 in states that taxed benefits. Therefore, y2g gives the DDD estimate.
That is, it tests for an additional response at the state level for states that taxed benefits
over and above the response at the federal level. Standard errors in all models are
adjusted for clustering at the state level.
In addition to state and year fixed effects, we attempt to control for changes to tax
policy at the state level by including a summary state marginal tax rate measure,
calculated in TAXSIM using average income values for each group, excluding social
security and pension income. We also include a variable designed to capture explicitly
any changes in the tax treatment of pension income across states over time. To do this,
we calculate marginal tax rates in TAXSIM again using only average pension income for

2

Because the federal policy only varies over time, the 'federal' dummy by itself (or an additional year
dummy for the 'after' period) must be omitted to prevent perfect collinearity. Rather, the effects of the
policy on the 'control' group, usually captured in the policy dummy coefficient, is subsumed in the 'after'
year dummies, none of which are statistically significant. Replacing the year dummies with a time trend
plus the 'federal' dummy has no qualitative impact on the results.
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each group.

For those states that fully exempted pension income from taxation during

this period from taxation, this variable will equal zero. As discussed more by Conway
and Rork (2008) and Zahn and Gold (1985), there were some changes to state tax policy
regarding pensions, which this variable should capture. We calculate these measures for
each year using the same average income values for each group. Therefore, the variables
are picking up differences across years in state tax policy and differences in these
changes across groups.
retirement decisions

Finally, Coile and Levine (2007) find that older workers'

may be influenced

by labor

supply

shocks, especially

unemployment. We therefore also include state unemployment rates to account for state
level differences in labor market conditions.
We estimate equation (13) with a linear probability model21 to determine whether
the probability of participation in the labor force changed for treatment group / relative to
the control group. We estimate equations for men and women pooled together and then
stratified by gender.

The regressions are identified by the assumption that there are no

other (unobserved) factors correlated with income group and labor supply that coincided
with the timing of the benefit taxation.22
In addition to looking at labor force participation, we also estimate equations
using hours conditioned on participation as the dependent variable. To do this, we
estimate equations similar to (13) with Heckman two step selection correction models.

21

We use a LPM here because interpreting multiple interaction terms in non-linear models is difficult. See
Ai and Norton (2003).
22

This is why we focus our labor supply analysis on this time period. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
introduced all sorts of changes to the tax code, and the stock market crash of 1987 could have differentially
affected the higher income individuals in our sample. The 1981-1986 period allows for the estimation of
the policy's labor supply effects that will not be confounded by these issues.
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Unfortunately, there is nothing in our data that we suspect would affect participation but
not hours of work, and so we rely on the non linearity of the estimated inverse mills ratio
. to identify the participation decision. We also estimate these hours equations with OLS,
ignoring self-selection, and find similar results.
3.2. Alternative Models

We estimate several alternative models in order to check the robustness and
sensitivity of our results.

First, we estimate a model containing only the

"Treatment*Federal" interactions. This gives a sense of what the overall effect of the
policy was at a national level and allows us to verify that our results are robust when we
ask less of the data (e.g., the treatment group sample sizes become quite small when
limited to certain sets of states). We also stratify the sample by age. It could be the case
that the young elderly (ages 65 and 66) may respond differently than the older elderly in
our sample (ages 67 to 69). While differences in the levels of participation will be
absorbed by the age dummies, there may be differences in the responsiveness to the
policy by age group. To determine the consequences of treating spousal earnings as an
exogenous component of non labor income, we estimate separate models for single
individuals. We also estimate models omitting the years 1981 and 1986 to mitigate the
potential effects of TRA86 and the increase in the DRC from 1 to 3 percent in 1982. The
potential for changing macroeconomic conditions to affect labor supply behavior
provides an additional justification for narrowing the time period further.
In another specification, we make use of the fact that states, by virtue of different
marginal tax rates, differ in the intensity of their tax treatment of social security benefits.
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To obtain an exogenous and continuous measure of the differences in the intensity of
taxation at the state level, we use TAXSEVI to calculate the change in the marginal tax
rate around the threshold income levels for each state. After the policy change, the policy
variable reflects the change in marginal tax rates caused by the benefit taxation. Before
the policy change, this variable equals zero for all states. Table Al contains a breakdown
of the changes in marginal tax rates around the income thresholds by state. States riot
listed experienced no change in state marginal tax rates resulting from the taxation of
social security benefits. For some states the marginal tax rate decreases slightly. This is
a product of the linkage between federal and state tax policy. Therefore, the variation in
the state policy variable is driven by three factors: the decision to tax benefits, differences
in state marginal tax rates, and cross state differences in the linkage between federal and
state tax policy.
Finally, to further investigate the validity of our empirical approach in general and
our classification by nonlabor income in particular, we look to the social security
literature for an additional control group or 'straw man.' Many previous studies (e.g.,
Haider and Loughran 2007, Pingle 2006) classify individuals on the basis of age, using
age groups who are unaffected by the policy change as a control group. One 'straw man'
exercise we could perform, then, would be to re-estimate our main model using slightly
younger individuals, classified in the same way into 'treatment' and control groups on the
basis of nonlabor income.23 Since these individuals are too young to receive social

23

Recall that social security benefits are important in assigning individuals into the different groups. For
that reason, we assign each younger individual the average amount of benefits from the older sample,
$4030. This practice preserves the basic ranking of individuals according to nonlabor income and provides
us with a benefit value with which to artificially classify them into groups.
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security benefits and thus are not actually 'treated' in the static model we consider, any
treatment effect we find would be evidence of a bias caused by our empirical approach.
Moreover, if this bias is similar across age groups, we can isolate the true treatment effect
from the bias by estimating the difference between the two age groups. Essentially, we
can perform a DDD(D) analysis similar to that of Gruber and Poterba (1994) by adding
another level of variation - the difference between slightly younger individuals and the
older individuals currently treated by the policy. The effect of state policy is now a fourway difference, where the policy effect is given by the difference-in-difference-indifferences between treatment and control states (hence, the fourth 'D').
However, as we note in chapter 1, all other age groups are potentially affected by
the rule changes in 1983, which makes it impossible to find a true 'straw man.'

The

dramatic increase in the DRC that was enacted in 1983 but took effect beginning in 1990
may have influenced the labor force decisions of younger workers.

The youngest

workers, in particular, could be especially affected because the DRC they face more than
doubled. Still, one would not expect this policy change to cause strong differences across
the treatment and control groups because all individuals are potentially affected by the
DRC.
There is no question, however, that these younger individuals are not a true
'control' group. This is not only due to the DRC but also because if individuals are
'forward-looking' (a necessary condition for the DRC to matter), then they might be
affected by the expected taxation of their future social security benefits as well. And, this
effect could very well differ along the lines of our treatment and control group
classification. For this reason we present this model only as an illustrative robustness
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check. We also use the age group and time period with the least number of potentially
confounding effects possible for the exercise. We use the oldest of the slightly younger
individuals who are not yet nearing regular or early retirement - ages 57-59 - to
minimize the increase in the DRC they experience. We limit the time period to 1982-85
(for both age groups) to avoid the initial increase in the DRC for all workers (1981) and
the anticipated effects of TRA86, which one might expect to affect younger individuals
differentially according to their nonlabor income.24 Coefficients on all variables are
allowed to differ between the two age groups to permit maximum flexibility.

This

exercise is therefore equivalent to estimating a separate model on our 'straw man' sample
(slightly younger individuals) and then calculating and testing the difference in the
treatment effects across the two samples. Our premise is that the estimated 'treatment'
effects for the young captures any bias due to our classification approach or other issues,
such as macroeconomic shocks. Finding similar results after this 'differencing' thus
provides reassurance that our empirical strategy is valid.

24

We also estimate regressions for each possible combination of age definition (the more typically used age
55-59 versus 57-59) and time period (1981-86 versus 1982-85). As discussed in chapter 5, the results are
robust to these choices.
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CHAPTER 4
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE

We use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1981 to
1986. (For some descriptive analyses we also use 2005 data.) The CPS is a large,
nationally representative cross section of the non-institutionalized civilian population.
While the research question in this study could perhaps be best answered using panel
data, there is no suitable panel dataset that covers the time period surrounding the 1983
policy.

The use of a large dataset such as the CPS is also necessary in order to have an

adequate number of observations for each of our identified groups. Even with this large
dataset, the sample sizes of some groups, treatment groups 1 and 2 in particular, become
small as we further subdivide the data into gender and age groups or try to isolate state
policy effects.

4.1. Data Description
Our main sample contains individuals between the ages of 65 and 69. Age 65 is
the age at which individuals become eligible for full social security benefits. We place

25

Potential candidates are the Retirement and History Survey (RHS), the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS), The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP), and the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of older men. The RHS ended in 1971 and the HRS
did not begin until 1992. The NLS survey of older men does not cover this time period and also does not
include women. The PSID is a survey of 5,000 households of all ages, and therefore is likely too small.
The SIPP did not begin until 1984. Administrative data is not useful for our purposes because we need
information on income, not just earnings. In fact, we make almost no use of earnings data in this study.
Finally, using the matched March CPS data, which amounts to a two period panel for each respondent, is
not feasible for us because matches between the 1984 and 1985 surveys cannot be conducted (Coile and
Levine 2007).
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the cutoff at age 69 to avoid complications resulting from changes to earnings test rules
in 1983 that affected individuals over age 70. The resulting sample contains 36,786
observations. Individuals are coded as participating in the labor force if they have both
positive hours worked and have positive earnings26. The various treatment and control
groups used in this study are defined based on non labor income and benefits as derived
in chapter 2. The education variable is a categorical variable where individuals are coded
as less than high school graduate, high school graduate, or some college.
We compute B, the maximum social security benefit, as the observed benefit plus
one half actual earnings minus the threshold amount. This essentially "gives back" the
benefits that were earnings tested away.

Again, because actual benefits depend on

individual labor supply decisions in the current year, they are determined endogenously.
While this method may not be the ideal way to obtain a measure of maximum benefits,
the measure is only being used to classify the groups. Furthermore, if individuals are
mis-assigned into either of the treatment or control groups, due to measurement error for
instance, our difference-in-difference estimates will be biased towards zero (Lewbel
2006). Using our measures of non labor income, maximum social security benefits,
earnings test threshold levels, and policy income threshold levels, we define our four
study cohorts.

26

Conditioning on positive earnings eliminates possible contamination for individuals who report working

52 weeks the previous year yet have zero earnings. Upon further investigation, these individuals usually

report their major activity in the survey week as "keeping house." As a robustness check, we also included
individuals who report looking for work as participating. Results were virtually identical using either
definition of participation.
27

For the majority of our sample, B and B are equal. Individuals with earnings above the earnings test
threshold tend to be higher income individuals whose group assignment is not sensitive to the adjustment to
their benefit levels.
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Our measure of non labor income, V, contains all non wage income, such as
interest income, pension income, dividend income, and spousal earnings. As discussed
earlier, we follow the typical assumption that spousal labor supply and earnings are
exogenous. Such earnings help determine an individual's marginal tax rate and also
whether an individual is above or below the benefit taxation threshold, and therefore we
include them in our measure of non labor income28.

To address the possible

consequences of treating spousal income as an exogenous variable, we calculate the
correlation between our measure that includes spousal income and one that does not. For
men, this correlation is 0.64 and for women the correlation is 0.52. This finding suggests
that the same individuals would likely continue to be classified as the highest income
(and most likely to be in treatment #1) if we excluded spousal earnings.

In addition,

recall that two of the alternatives models we estimate are designed to test the validity of
this assumption.
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for each of the four cohorts by gender. As
expected, most individuals during this time period, roughly 66 percent of the sample, fall
into the control group. Treatment group 2 only contains 1,177 individuals, which could
pose a problem for finding anything significant in estimation. Treatment groups 1 and 3
contain 3,763 observations and 7,328 observations, respectively29.

In general, the

Coile (2004) finds that elderly women tend to behave independently of their spouses' labor supply
decisions. Since spousal earnings are most relevant for women in our sample, this result suggests that
treating spousal income as exogenous may be a valid assumption.
29

Treatment group 3 is defined residually. We first define the control group and treatment groups 1 and 2
based on exogenous factors. The individuals left over comprise treatment group 3. It is possible that many
of these individuals, although we cannot exclude them from taxation exogenously, might not have potential
earnings sufficient to reach the taxation thresholds. The composition and size of our younger sample (aged
57-59) used in the DDD(D) model is reported in Appendix A2.

40

differences in characteristics are as one would expect, with treatment #1 having a much
higher non labor income and being a bit younger and better educated than the other
groups. Interestingly, treatment group #1 has lower maximum social security benefits
than the other two treatment groups, perhaps suggesting a heavier reliance on non labor
income throughout their lives and/or shorter earnings histories.
4.2. Descriptive Labor Supply Evidence

Figure 4a contains plots of labor force participation rates by cohort. The control
group shows a slight but steady decline in labor force participation rates from 1981 to
1986, with a slight uptick in 1985. Treatment group 1 experienced declines from 1981 to
1983, but from then on labor force participation rates increased, perfectly coinciding with
the taxing of benefits. Treatment group 3 likewise saw its labor force participation rate
decline from 1981-83, continuing downward through 1984, at which point it leveled off.
The series for treatment group 2 is erratic, which is not too surprising given its small
sample size. Two striking patterns emerge overall. The labor force participation rates for
all groups are declining during the 'before' period, with treatment groups #1 and 3
appearing especially similar with strong downward trends. The decline for these two
groups is reversed after 1983, especially for the group (Tr #1) for which we predict the
most positive labor supply effects, whereas the trend for the control group remains
essentially the same. Thus, it appears as though the 1983 policy may have been
responsible for slowing or stopping the decline in labor force participation rates among
the highest income elderly, as our conceptual model predicts.
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Figure 4b contains plots of hours conditioned on participation in the labor force
by cohort. This figure tells much the same story. For treatment group #1, and to a lesser
degree #3, we again see a reverse in the decline after 1983. For the control group,
however, the slight uptick we saw in labor force participation in 1985 appears to continue
through 1986. Together these two figures suggest that the policy may have halted the
steady declines in both the labor force participation and hours worked of treatment #1,
and perhaps #3, while leaving the control group mostly unaffected.
4.3. Clustering Around Income Thresholds

In addition to the hypothesized effects on labor supply, the laws of optimizing
behavior suggest that we should observe individuals clustering on or just beneath the
benefit taxation thresholds. Allowing for some degree of optimization error, we expect to
see a higher percentage of elderly individuals with 'combined income' measures around
in

(rather than strictly beneath) the income thresholds after 1983 compared to before.
Friedberg (2000) and Haider and Loughran (2007) find clustering beneath the earnings
test thresholds, which suggests that elderly individuals are aware, at least to some degree,
of the consequences of non-linear budget constraints.
To look for such clustering, we adopt the 'bunching analysis' method used in
Haider and Loughran (2007).

The histogram in Figure 5 shows the percentage of

When considering kinked budget constraints caused by non-linear tax systems, researchers typically
allow for two sources of error: 1) the usual error based on heterogeneity and 2) optimization error, where an
individual might be attempting to 'land' on or just underneath a kink but may instead wind up just over it.
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individuals that fall into each combined income "bin".

Specifically, we divide each

histogram "bin" into ten percentage point deviations from the thresholds. For example,
the bin labeled "-100" contains married individuals with combined incomes between $0
and $3,200 and single individuals with incomes between $0 and $2,500. The bin labeled
"0" represents the actual threshold values of $32,000 for married individuals and $25,000
for single individuals. Therefore, individuals in bins -10, 0, or 10 are within $3200 of the
threshold if they are married and $2500 if they are single. Studies using 'bunching
analyses' must often contend with 'round number bias,' which occurs because
respondents tend to report round numbers such as $25000.

However, because the

combined income measure used to determine whether benefits are taxable is not directly
reported by individuals in the survey data (we construct it ourselves as the sum of several
types of nonlabor and labor income plus one half of social security benefits), it seems less
likely to be an issue here.
The histogram reveals a slight uptick32 in the percentage of individuals around the
threshold levels after 1983 compared to before. Figure 5 reports.the histogram for our
entire sample using nominal values. We construct several alternative histograms to
explore whether limiting the sample to married people, to younger elderly (aged 65 and

31

Histograms are usually represented as bar graphs, but we follow Haider and Loughran (2007) and present
them as line plots. The line plots make any sudden breaks or jumps more evident than in the bar graph
representations.
3

The clustering observed in this study is substantially less evident than the clustering found around

earnings test threshold levels. This occurs for a few reasons. First, individuals may not be as aware of a
measure such as 'combined income' compared to an obvious measure such as earnings. Second, earnings
test thresholds during this period were between $5,000 and $8,000, which made them more accessible than
the $25,000/$32,000 taxation thresholds. Third, the marginal impact of the earnings test is larger than the
marginal impact of the social security benefit taxes-the earnings test removes benefits 50 cents for every
dollar earned in excess of the threshold, while the benefit taxation merely adds 50 cents to taxable income
for every dollar in excess of the threshold.
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66) or both has an impact on the results. We also repeat all of the exercises adjusting for
inflation by inflating combined income values in the 'before' period (1981-1983) using
the average value of the GDP deflator from 1984-1986. All are available upon request.
Overall, these histograms are quite similar to the one in Figure 5, although a couple of
patterns are evident. Adjusting for inflation moves the before and after lines much closer
together, as expected, and makes the bulge below the threshold smaller but perhaps more
obvious. Limiting it to married people and/or the younger elderly leads to a larger uptick,
using either nominal or inflation-adjusted values. Presumably, the younger elderly are
more likely to still be working, so to the extent that earnings are the mechanism by which
individuals are able to control where they fall relative to the threshold, this result should
also be expected.

It may be easier for married households to reach the threshold since it

is not double that of singles ($32,000 versus $25,000), although it could also lead to more
optimizing error.
We formalize this analysis by estimating equations similar to Pingle (2006),
where we estimate the probability that an individual falls into bin -10, 0, or 10 as a
function of a time trend (designed to capture the effects of inflation) and a "Post 1983"
variable. For the entire sample, the "Post 1983" variable is significant at the 10 percent
level. For married individuals and married individuals ages 65 or 66, the "Post 1983"
variable is significant at the 5 percent level. Therefore, although the upticks just beneath
the thresholds are fairly subtle, they behave in a consistent manner, are larger for those
groups expected to react most and appear to be statistically distinct from an overall time
trend. Both types of descriptive analyses ~ the 'bunching analyses' and the time trends

44

in labor supply behavior across the groups - therefore suggest that the elderly reacted to
the taxation of their social security benefits.
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CHAPTER 5

5. ESTIMATION RESULTS
This section summarizes the results of our difference-in-differences estimation.
Our baseline model, given by equation (13), includes the set of Treatment*Federal
interactions and Treatment*State interactions. The Treatment*Federal coefficients give
the before and after difference-in-differences estimates for each group resulting from the
introduction of the policy at the federal level, while the Treatment* State interactions give
the DDD estimates for states that taxed benefits compared to states that did not tax
benefits.

We estimate both participation equations and self-selection-corrected hours

equations conditioned on participation.
Results from our baseline participation equation are reported in Table 3. As noted
in chapter 3.2, we also implement several sensitivity and robustness checks. These
exercises are summarized in Table 4 for the key policy coefficients.

Some of these

exercises have a large impact on sample size and therefore the power of the resulting
estimates, and so we report sample sizes for each, along with treatment group 1 cohort
sizes, in Appendix A2. All models are estimated with state fixed effects, year dummies,
age dummies and the other variables described above33. Control variables have their

The measure of disability available in the CPS does not line up well because it refers to the (current)
survey year, whereas the rest of the labor market information refers to the previous year. Nonetheless, we
re-estimate the models including a dummy variable equal to 1 for individuals who report being unable to
work in the survey year. The policy coefficients are unaffected by the inclusion of this variable.
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expected signs and are consistent across all exercises. The probability of labor force
participation increases with education and decreases with age. The effect of being
married on the probability of participation is positive and significant for males and
negative and significant for females. High income individuals, especially women, have
lower labor force participation rates overall, as indicated by the Treatment #1
coefficients, although the middle to high income groups (treatment groups 2 and 3), have
higher participation, if anything.
5.1. Benefit Taxation at the Federal Level

Turning to the first of our estimated policy effects, the coefficient on the
"Treatmentl*Federal" variable is positive and significant at the 5 percent level in the
pooled model and approaches significance at the 10 percent level (t = 1.6) for women.
Splitting the sample by gender increases the standard errors, which is expected given the
smaller numbers of observations, but the point estimates are similar to the pooled model
(0.39 for men and 0.37 for women).

In contrast, the federal treatment effect is never

close to significant for the other two treatment groups. Treatment #2's small sample size
make this expected, but the lack of significant results for treatment #3 is an important
finding that further bolsters our results for treatment #1. Our conceptual framework
makes clear that this is the potentially treated group for which we expect the smallest
effects. A fair criticism of our approach is that our control group - individuals without
much non labor income - may not be similar enough to our primary treatment group #1.
It is reassuring to note that if we instead compare treatment group #1 to treatment group
#3, a much more similar group as revealed by the descriptive analyses, we arrive at the
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same conclusion.

The labor force participation of treatment group #1 is positively

affected relative to of any of the other groups, just as predicted by our conceptual
framework.
These results are also quite consistent and behave as expected across our different
exercises, reported in the left panel of Table 4. The other two treatment groups continue
to show no evidence of a significant federal policy effect, except for a couple instances
that are actually negative, while the effect for treatment #1 remains consistently positive
and often statistically significant.

As we discuss more shortly, the state treatment

estimates are puzzling, and so we first check to see that our results are robust to their
omission.

The estimated federal policy effect is slightly smaller and no longer

significant, which is expected given that the federal coefficient now includes the
weighted average of treated and non-treated state estimated policy impacts. It is
nonetheless consistent with the rest of the estimates, however. Younger individuals (ages
65 or 66) appear more responsive than older individuals aged 67 to 69 (0.50 compared to
0.38). Despite the reduction in sample size, these effects remain significant in the pooled
model at the 10 percent level.

The effects of age appear to differ between men and

women, as older women appear more responsive than women ages 65 or 66, although the
coefficients are never significant likely due to the very small number of treatment #1
observations when subdivided by age and gender.
To determine whether our significant results for treatment group 1 are a product
of treating spousal earnings as exogenous, we estimate the models for single individuals
34

Specifically, we can reject the equality of the federal*treatment coefficients for treatment groups #1 and
3 at the 10% level or better in all three cases. The results for treatment #1 are therefore even stronger if we
compare them to treatment #3 instead of the less similar control group.
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only. This reduces the sample size by roughly two thirds and the size of treatment #1 by
even more, so we expect a large impact on precision. The point estimates are of a very
similar magnitude to our baseline model, so that the lack of significance at conventional
levels appears to be entirely driven by the (expected) inflated standard errors.

In

addition, we estimate models using a continuous measure of the change in marginal tax
rates around the benefit taxation thresholds, a specification which recognizes that the
magnitude of the state policy differs across state tax systems as well as marital status.
Changes in tax rates at the federal level were 13 percent for single individuals and 12.5
percent for married couples. Again, the "Treatment l*Federal" coefficient is positive and
significant in the pooled model and implies a similarly sized effect as the discrete model,
while treatment effects for groups 2 and 3 are not significant. Re-estimating the models
omitting the years 1981 and 1986, to remove the possible influences of TRA86 and the
1981 increase in the DRC, yields very similar results.

Finally, our federal results are

quite robust to our DDD(D) specification in which we attempt to 'difference away' any
remaining bias by subtracting the estimated 'treatment effect' for the young.35
Overall, results for treatment group 1 are consistently positive, with a typical
range of 0.02 to 0.05. This result is robust to splitting the sample by gender, age, and
marital status, although the effects predictably become weaker in significance as sample
size diminishes. Results for Treatment groups 2 and 3 are rarely significant and, if so,

35

It is interesting to note that the 'treatment' effects for the young tend to be positive, but uniform, across
all groups, which is consistent with the predicted effect of an increased DRC and the expected wealth effect
of benefit taxation. Re-estimating the models with a more expanded age group (ages 55-59) and/or time
period (1981-86) leads to even more positive estimated effects for the young. Nonetheless, the
relationships between the estimated policy effects for each treatment group are preserved. The estimated,
age-differenced (DDD(D)) treatment effect for individuals age 65-69 in #1 are consistently larger than
those for the other groups and is always statistically different from that estimated for treatment #3.
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negative. These estimates therefore suggest that the approximate 20 percent reduction in
benefits experienced by treatment group 1 led to an approximate 2-5 percentage point
increase in the probability of working after the policy's introduction, which is a fairly
large response relative to the overall rate of only 37% and 15% for men and women,
respectively, in this group. These results therefore provide supportive evidence that the
dominant income effects predicted by the conceptual model had a substantial impact on
the labor supply of high income elderly individuals.
5.2. Benefit Taxation at the State Level

A priori, since marginal tax rates and tax burdens at the state level are smaller
than at the federal level, we expect to see coefficient estimates on the "Treatment* State"
interactions that are of similar sign to the federal interactions but smaller in magnitude.
Although the state treatment effects for groups 2 and 3 are again consistently
unimportant, the "Treatment 1* State" coefficients are negative, highly significant, and
quite large in the pooled and gender stratified regressions. They are fairly robust to all of
the exercises we perform in Table 4, and the significance remains even when the sample
is stratified by age and marital status, which is remarkable given the very small number
of treatment #1 observations in 'treated' states. They are also robust to the inclusion of
state specific, group specific, and age specific time trends (not reported, but available
upon request as are all exercises discussed here). Only the DDD(D) exercise appreciably
diminishes this result and, even so, the large negative magnitude of the estimated policy
effect persists.
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The state results for treatment group 1 are obviously puzzling and lead us to
explore several alternative explanations. First, the results may be due to small numbers of
treatment #1 observations in treatment states. In fact, there are only 488 observations in
treatment group 1 in treatment states, with 218 in the "before" period and 270 in the
"after" period. However, this explanation is not satisfactory because having a small
number of observations usually translates into insignificant coefficients. We test whether
the results could be due to a small number of influential outliers that are driving the
results, identified as those observations with large Dfbetas for the "Treatment*Federal"
•ye

and/or "Treatment*State."

However, the influential observations are fairly evenly

distributed across treatment states, and no troubling pattern stands out; their wholesale
exclusion from the sample has no real impact. We re-estimate the models dropping one
treatment state at a time to test whether one influential state is driving the results. We also
modify our list of treatment states to reflect the apparent disagreement in the literature
over which states taxed benefits and which states did not. We stratify our sample into
'treated' and 'control' state observations and then estimate the (total) policy effects for
each group. (One would then expect a negative/zero effect for 'treated' states and a
positive effect for 'control' states; this exercise also allows the other coefficients to vary
by type of state.) In all cases, the basic results remain.

3

Dfbetas are calculated as the change in the estimated coefficient when the observation is excluded from
the sample divided by its estimated standard error. See Judge et al (1988), pp. 895-6 for more discussion.
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We adapt the 'aggregate' approach suggested by Bertrand et al (2004) to see
whether our results could be due to unadjusted serial correlation.
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This exercise

weakens the estimated state treatment effect somewhat - it is now only -0.067 and
significant at the 10% level - but does not eliminate it. The estimated federal policy
effect is generally stronger in this exercise. Finally, we estimate a less restrictive version
of equation (13) by stratifying the sample into the four groups and estimating a separate
equation for each. This allows all of the coefficients to differ between groups. The
statistically significant, negative difference between the state policy's effects on
treatment #1 versus the control group remains.
We next examine the actual data - the time trends for the different groups in
treatment versus control states.

As shown in Figure 6 for treatment #1, the series

behave quite differently between treatment and control states. The downward trend
among treatment group 1 in treatment states is much stronger than in control states, even
before the 1983 policy. Both series flatten out in 1983-4, but then diverge in 1985. Note
that observations in the 'control' states behave exactly as theory would predict and they
also look much more similar to the overall control group prior to the policy (nationally,
shown in Figure 4a). The other groups (discounting treatment #2 with its very small size)

Bertrand et al (2004) provide evidence that many strong difference-in-difference results reported in the
literature for treatment/control state policies may in fact be due to serial correlation, especially when the
time series is long and the policy changes are small. The authors suggest an aggregate 'before and after'
approach which we adapt for our DDD model by constructing state aggregates 'before' and 'after' the
policy for each of our groups and then re-estimating the model. The results of all of these analyses are
available upon request.
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have much more similar time trends across treatment versus control states, so the
difference appears unique to treatment #1. 3 8
We draw several conclusions from this analysis. First, our econometric results are
not due to some statistical artifact or influential outlier; the apparent differences in
behavior over time between treatment and control states appears real.

Second, these

differences existed even before the policy is enacted, which violates a basic requirement
for the difference-in-differences approach to work, that the treatment and control groups
are facing similar time trends.

It appears as though some other unobservable factor

specific to treatment #1 may have coincided with the timing of the state benefit taxation.
Recall that our models already control for group-specific state marginal tax rates
calculated with respect to pension income and to overall other income. (Omitting these
policy variables, as well as the state unemployment rate, has no impact on the results.)
One other possible candidate is the widespread elimination and reduction of state estate,
inheritance and gift (EIG) taxes during this period, as documented in Conway and Rork
(2004). These taxes have the potential to impact only the high income elderly; however,
we detect no strong patterns in either the level or changes in EIG policies across
treatment and control states.39 Elderly migration in response to tax policy also does not
seem a plausible explanation. One would expect retired workers to be most likely to
migrate and so this should reinforce the labor supply effects as retired workers move to

38

In all four cases, the labor force participation rates appear to be higher in 'treatment' states rather than
'control' states, but this overall difference should be captured by the state fixed effects.

39

Five of the 13 treatment states eliminated EIG taxes during 1979-86, while 9 of the 37 control states did.
Overall, 7 of 13 treatment states had no EIG taxes at the end of the period compared to 14 out of 37 control
states. Treatment states therefore seem somewhat more likely to have abandoned their EIG taxes, but the
pattern is not strong.
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low tax states. In addition, the overall rate of state-to-state elderly migration is so small
(approximately 5% migrate over a 5 year period; see Conway and Houtenville 2001) that
migrants seem unlikely to exert a large effect in the sample.
The source of this unexplained difference remains unanswered in our view. We
are reassured, however, that its significance does not stand up to the DDD(D) model,
whereas the federal effect does and is strengthened if anything. Given that this policy
affected only the higher income elderly during the time period of our analysis, we do not
have a great deal to work with in the data when trying to isolate any effects at the state
level. However, as more and more individuals are affected by this policy each year,
future research may be able to adequately address the effects of benefit taxation at the
state level. Despite the inability of our models to address the effects of this policy at the
state level, our models estimating the effects of the policy at the federal level generate
robust results for treatment group 1.
5.3. Estimates from Hours Equations

To estimate the effect of the 1983 policy on hours of work conditioned on
participation, we estimate Heckman two step models.

Results from our main

specification are reported in Table 5. While none of the coefficients is significant at
conventional levels, the "Treatment l*Federal" coefficient approaches significance at the
10 percent level (t = 1.54) in the pooled regression.

Moreover, if we instead use

treatment #3 as our comparison group, the effect on treatment #1 is statistically
significant at the 10% level (i.e., we reject the coefficients' equality at 10% level.) More
importantly, the odd results at the state level are not present in the hours equations. Once
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again, neither treatment #2 or 3 is significantly affected by the policy. The control
variables - education, age, marital status, group assignment - behave in much the same
way here as they did in the labor force participation regressions. In general, the hours
equation results are quite similar to the labor force participation equations, except that
they tend to be weaker, probably due to the smaller sample size, and that the anomalous
state policy effects are not present.
We estimate models similar to those in Table 4 for hours equations, but because
only about one third of our sample works, results from these models are generally
inconsistent and not significant. As noted by Eissa and Liebman (1996), hours estimates
are sensitive to model specification issues, so we alternatively estimate OLS hours
regressions and find similar, mostly insignificant results. There are, however, other
possible reasons for the lack of significant responses. We will not observe any change
along the intensive margin if individuals are not able to freely adjust their work hours.
That is, there may be discontinuities in individuals' choice sets (Haider and Loughran
2007). Alternatively, the lack of responsiveness could be a product of the conflicting
labor supply effects predicted by economic theory and our conceptual framework.
Overall, our results suggest that individuals in the highest income groups (women
in particular) may have increased their labor force participation and may be working
more hours relative to individuals in the group not affected by the 1983 policy. However,
given the limits of our data, it is unclear whether these individuals are delaying retirement
from their main jobs or whether they are "unretiring" and going back to work as
described in Maestas (2004) and Reimers and Honig (1993). Because we find stronger
responses among the women in our sample, existing studies that ignore women in their
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analyses may be missing an important part of the link between social security benefits
and elderly labor supply.

In addition, Coile (2004) finds that women make their

retirement decisions more independently from their spouses than men do; this lends
additional credibility to our results and also provides one possible reason why the men's
results are weaker (we ignore spousal incentives). The effects of this policy on the joint
retirement decisions of couples could therefore be even more important.
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CHAPTER 6
6. PRESENT DAY SCOPE OF THE POLICY

As discussed earlier, the policy and its potential effects on labor supply have
changed in three important ways since its 1983 inception:

1) the erosion of income

thresholds due to inflation, 2) the removal of the earnings test, and 3) the 1993 policy. In
this section, we explain within our conceptual framework the expected effects of the
evolved policy and then repeat our bunching analyses using 2005 data to search for signs
of a current behavioral response. We also investigate the composition of the 2005 data
to see how many individuals would fall into each group.
The erosion of the income thresholds will clearly push more individuals further up
the income distribution into Treatment #1. The removal of the earnings test in 2000
eliminates our control group and means that everyone could potentially be affected by
this tax if they work enough hours. It also means we can ignore the earnings test and its
interactions and return to the analysis in Figure 1.
The 1993 policy added a second set of income thresholds in 1993. Specifically,
beginning in 1993 single and married households with combined incomes above $34,000
and $44,000, respectively, must begin adding in a maximum of 85% of the social security
benefits as taxable income.40 In Figure 1, this change causes two more kinks in the left

The actual rules deviate from what one might expect. As outlined in IRS Publication 915, 2003,
available online at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p915.pdf, accessed 7/10/07, once combined income
exceeds the second threshold, households must include .85 of the amount by which combined income
exceeds the threshold plus the lesser of .5 x benefits or .5 x difference in income thresholds (i.e., .5 x
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side budget segment and causes treatment group #1 to be further subdivided.

Figure 7

shows the effect of the second set of thresholds (and ignores the earnings test, since it is
no longer relevant). Individuals whose combined income is large enough to have to pay
the maximum one half in benefits at zero hours of work again see a parallel downward
shift in their budget line - until they earn enough to cross the second threshold. At that
point, they face an increase in their marginal tax rate as they begin paying taxes on more
of their social security benefits as they work more until they have finally earned enough
to pay taxes on the maximum 85% of benefits. The budget line and resulting labor
supply effects are therefore even more complex and the only group that truly faces only
an income effect (like our original treatment group #1) is the portion of group #1 whose
combined income at zero hours of work is large enough such that they pay taxes on the
maximum 85% of benefits. The higher rate (85% versus 50%) suggests even stronger
potential income and wage effects than before, especially with no earnings test to help
mitigate its effects.
Estimating the labor supply effects of the current policy would require an entirely
different empirical methodology and is well beyond the scope of this study. Rather, we
investigate the extent to which individuals are potentially affected by using 2005 data
from the CPS and using similar conditions as those derived in Chapter 2 to assign
individuals to the various groups. We further subdivide control group #1 into those who

($34,000-25,000) = $4500 for single; $6000 for married). The amount of taxable benefits cannot exceed
85% of total benefits, however. This leads to a complicated expression for the level of combined income
(and by extension, V) at and beyond which the household is paying taxes on the maximum 85% of benefits.
As a result, households face an additional tax rate of .85t over this range until their combined income is
high enough such that the maximum 85% of benefits is subject to tax. Further documentation, some
illustrative examples and the derivation of this second level of income are available upon request. We have
also verified these findings with additional simulations in TAXSIM.
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face pure income effects (the highest income individuals) and those facing a more
complex budget line. These breakdowns are reported in Table 6 for both 1981-86 and
2005. In 2005 there is no longer a control group, due to the elimination of the earnings
test, whereas two thirds of our sample was unaffected in 1981-86. Treatment #1 has
tripled in size, entirely due to the erosion of the thresholds by inflation.

Furthermore,

28% of the sample faces pure income effects (i.e., they are in the far left range of the
budget line) and therefore should experience an increase in labor supply according to our
results. Another 12% of the sample faces a combination of income and wage effects,
such that 40% of the 2005 sample is affected by this income tax policy at zero hours of
work. The remaining 60% also have the potential to be affected, but likely only those
with relatively high wages or nonlabor incomes are influenced.

In any event, this

exercise confirms our suspicion that many more people are currently affected by this
policy.
To search for evidence of a corresponding behavioral response, we repeat the
bunching analyses from chapter 4.2 using the 2005 data (Figure 8).

There is some

observable clustering around the (first) social security benefit taxation threshold. Again,
the clustering is more evident among the younger married elderly.

The bin at +30

roughly corresponds to the $34,000/ $44,000 benefit taxation thresholds that were added
in 1993. We examine this more closely by repeating the analysis using $44,000 as the
value in "bin 0" for married people and $34,000 for single people (Figure 9). There is
also a slight jump in the distribution around this threshold. These exercises confirm two
things. First, there are substantially more elderly around the thresholds in the 2005 data
compared to the 1981-1986 data. Second, we observe some clustering in 2005 around
59

both taxation thresholds, which suggests that this policy remains an important factor in
the labor supply decisions of the elderly.
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CHAPTER 7
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Almost 25 years ago the federal government and several states began taxing social
security benefits, and yet this policy has been almost completely overlooked by
economists. Our purpose here is to close that gap. We set out a conceptual framework
that helps us to understand the policy's possible labor supply effects and the implications
that it has for other social security policies, such as the earnings test, Delayed Retirement
Credit and individual-level measures constructed in 'forward-looking' studies of
retirement.

To investigate the policy's effects empirically, we take a multi-faceted

approach including 'bunching analyses' of incomes and both descriptive analyses and
difference-in-difference (and DDD) estimates of labor force participation and hours
worked using data from the CPS. We focus on the time period immediately before and
after the policy was enacted (1981-86) in order to avoid the confounding effects of other
policies (e.g., TRA 86) and to provide the cleanest possible 'natural experiment.' Our
findings mostly confirm the labor supply effects predicted by our model - that the highest
income elderly individuals would increase their labor supply (participation and hours
worked) relative to all other groups as a result of the federal policy.

The estimated

response is also of a meaningful magnitude, where the approximate 20 percent reduction
in benefits due to taxation causes a 2-5 percentage point increase in the probability of
labor force participation.
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The earnings test that was in existence at that time turns out to be quite important.
It provides us with a control group of individuals who could not have been affected by
the policy, and it mitigates the wage effects of the policy for those who could be.
Furthermore, the elimination of the earnings test in 2000 means that everybody over age
65 is now potentially affected and that the possible effects on labor supply are magnified
(even for those previously affected). Two other changes also cause the policy to have
grown in importance - the fact that the thresholds are not indexed for inflation and the
addition of a second set of higher income tax thresholds in 1993. Using 2005 data from
the CPS we show that approximately 28% of individuals over age 65 now fit the
definition of the 'highest income' individuals who should react with increased labor
supply, compared to only 10% during 1981-86. Another 12% are (ambiguously) affected
by the policy even at zero hours of work (compared to only 3% earlier). The policy
therefore continues to grow in importance over time.
Despite our thorough and careful investigation into this policy's labor supply
effects, unanswered questions remain. The strong, negative estimated effect of the state
policy is an unresolved puzzle. We suspect that it is due to the small number of 'treated'
observations in states that enacted the policy and evidence that these individuals were
different from their counterparts in states that didn't enact in the policy - even before it
was enacted. The time period we study, while providing the 'before' and 'after' scenario
least likely to be confounded by other factors, is limited in that the income thresholds
were so high in real terms that only a small number of high income elderly were
predictably 'treated,' especially at the state level. In addition, our empirical methodology
does not allow for the estimation of the forward looking effects found in more recent
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studies of the Social Security program.

Future research could extend the analysis

forward and include the effects of the 1993 policy change and the 2000 elimination of the
earnings test, as well as any changes in state policy. Additional evidence could be
provided by building the effects of this policy into studies that examine the effects of
other social security policies and seeing if it has an impact on their conclusions. Given
our relatively strong results for women and the 'marriage tax' implicit in the income
thresholds for married and single households, the effects on the joint retirement decisions
by couples may be especially affected. This policy could also have an effect on other
behaviors such as savings or state-to-state elderly migration. The policy is affecting a
growing number of individuals and the research presented here strongly suggests that
elderly labor supply is reacting to this policy, so further exploring its possible behavioral
effects appears warranted.
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Table 1: Simulated Changes in Tax Burdens Due to Benefit Taxation

Treatment 1
1985
Treatment States
Contro States
Married Single Married Single
Federal
$659
$659
$783
$783

Treatment 2
Treatment States
Contro States
Married Single Married Single
$743
$846
$743
$846

State
Avg.

$105

$115

-$4

-$5

$148

$165

-$7

-$7

State
Min

$19
(MT)

$16
(MT)

-$49
(AZ)

-$58
(AZ)

$41
(MT)

$45
(ND)

-$74
(OR)

-$83
(OR)

$0
$0
$187
(VT)
Treatrnent 1
Contro States
2005
Treatme nt States
Married Single Married Single
$1812
Federal $1812
$1466
$1466

$253
(MN)

$273
$0
$0
(MN)
Treatment 2
Treatment States
Contro 1 States
Married Single Married Single
$1351
$863
$1351
$863

State
Max

$169
(VT)

State
Avg.

$412

$334

-$6

-$5

$452

$308

-$7

-$5

State
Min

$137
(CT)

$43
(CT)

-$109
(LA)

-$88
(LA)

$0
(CT)

$0
(CT)

-$122
(OR)

-$78
(OR)

State
Max

$522
(VT)

$430
(MN)

$0

$0

$899
(UT)

$574
(UT)

$0

$0

Notes: Calculations were performed in TAXSIM for hypothetical individuals constructed
using average income values by group and marital status.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Group and Gender

Variable
Proportion in Labor
Force
Annual Hours (if
LFP=1)
Married
Black
High School Diploma
Less than high school
College
Age 65
Age 66
Age 67
Age 68
Age 69
Non Labor Income ($)
Social Security Benefits
at zero hours of work ($)
Number of observations

Control
0.326

Men
Treatment #1 Treatment #2 Treatment #3
0.369
0.423
0.368

1330

1382

1452

1455

0.815
0.098
0.304
0.534
0.162
0.219
0.202
0.202
0.191
0.186
5744
4960

0.830
0.037
0.269
0.206
0.525
0.259
0.200
0.195
0.181
0.165
52378
5710

0.859
0.042
0.300
0.253
0.448
0.221
0.242
0.181
0.171
0.185
30499
7480

0.840
0.044
0.385
0.293
0.321
0.226
0.201
0.204
0.192
0.177
17155
7347

10087

1473

645

4167

Women
0.152

Proportion in Labor
0.189
0.227
Force
1142
Annual Hours (if
1103
1407
LFP=1)
0.568
Married
0.549
0.666
Black
0.102
0.034
0.041
0.417
High School Diploma 0.367
0.386
Less than high school 0.492
0.238
0.254
0.141
0.377
0.330
College
Age 65
0.219
0.255
0.248
0.211
Age 66
0.207
0.201
0.193
0.186
0.188
Age 67
0.193
0.179
0.207
Age 68
0.188
0.177
0.147
Age 69
51972
28789
Non Labor Income ($) 6109
Social Security
3335
3252
5340
Benefits at zero hours
ofwork($)
Number of
14431
2290
532
observations
Numbers given are proportions unless otherwise noted

0.222
1235
0.501
0.053
0.437
0.257
0.306
0.211
0.214
0.198
0.185
0.192
18080
5050

3161
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Table 3: Labor Force Participation Estimates from Main Specification
Variable
State Tax dummy
Treatment 1
Treatment 2
Treatment 3
Treatment 1 *Federal
Treatment2*Federal
Treatment3 *Federal
Treatmentl*State
Treatment2*State
Treatment3 * State
Married
Black
Female
< High School
College
State Unemployment
Rate
Pension MTR
MTR excl. SS and
Pension Income
Constant
Age Dummies
State Effects
Year Dummies

Pooled
-0.007
(0.45)
-0.064***
(4.01)
0.042
(1.62)
0.018
(1.47)
0.043**
(2.17)
-0.009
(0.30)
-0.014
(1.06)
-0.101***
(3.30)
-0.049
(0.99)
-0.013
(0.50)
-0.047***
(8.34)
-0.014
(1.46)
-0.159***
(23.34)
-0.060***
(8.68)
0.090***
(8.69)
-0.001
(0.16)
-0.003
(1.33)
0.002
(0.64)
0.440***
(15.16)
Yes
Yes
Yes

Men
-0.017
(0.80)
-0.045
(1.57)
0.053
(1.57)
0.011
(0.60)
0.039
(1.30)
-0.025
(0.64)
-0.011
(0.48)
-0.121**
(2.48)
-0.035
(0.47)
<0.001
(0.01)
0.048***
(4.20)
-0.39**
(2.34)

Women
0.003
(0.11)
-0.064***
(4.09)
0.010
(0.28)
0.025*
(1.68)
0.037
(1.60)
0.020
(0.40)
-0.019
(-0.96)
-0.087***
(2.75)
-0.066
(0.95)
-0.030
(0.84)
-0.090***
(12.31)
0.012
(1.12)

~

~

-0.063***
(6.10)
0.130***
(9.13)
0.002
(0.47)
-0.004*
(1.74)
0.004
(1.07)
0.341***
(8.24)
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.056
(8.31)
0.050***
(4.35)
-0.002
(0.48)
-0.002
(-0.52)
O.001
(0.03)
0.317***
(9.18)
Yes
Yes
Yes
69

Cont. Table 3
Model F
N

136.38***
36,786

43.74***
16,372

48.12***
20,414

Notes: Estimates are from linear probability models. Absolute values of t-statistics are in
parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent
level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by state.
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Table 4: Estimated Policy Effects from Alternative Labor Force Participation
Specifications
Treatment Group 1
Main Specification
(Table 3)
Federal Only
Ages 65 & 66
Ages 67-69
Single
1982-1985
Continuous Measure
DDD(D) with
younger cohort
Treatment Group 2
Main Specification
(Table 3)
Federal Only
Ages 65 & 66
Ages 67-69
Single
1982-1985
Continuous Measure
DDD(D) with
younger cohort
Treatment Group 3
Main Specification
(Table 3)

Treatment* Federal
Pooled
Men
Women
0.043**
0.039
0.037
(2.17)
(1.30)
(1.60)
0.030
0.023
0.025
(1.53)
(0.77)
(1.14)
0.050*
0.054
0.031
(1.71)
(0.87)
(1.19)
0.038*
0.023
0.042
(1.92)
(1.54)
(0.60)
0.038
0.036
0.042
(0.47)
(1.07)
(1.19)
0.042*
0.033
0.041*
(1.96)
(0.99)
(1.69)
0.003*
0.002
0.003
(1.41)
(1.83)
(0.95)
0.052*
0.038
0.079*
(1.79)
(1.78)
(1.02)

Treatment*State
Pooled
Men
Women
-0.101*** -0.121** -0.087***
(3.30)
(2.48)
(2.75)
-

-

-

-0.133***
(3.36)
-0.077**
(2.07)
-0.068
(1.16)
-0.062
(1.63)
-0.025**
(2.31)
-0.089
(1.15)

-0.200**
(2.62)
-0.061
(1.17)
0.062
(0.42)
0.031
(0.37)
-0.020
(1.10)
-0.058
(0.55)

-0.088*
(1.78)
-0.080**
(2.01)
-0.131**
(2.22)
-0.040
(1.20)
-0.026**
(2.86)
-0.075
(1.01)

Pooled
-0.009
(0.30)
-0.018
(0.61)
0.060
(1.39)
-0.067
(1.64)
-0.002
(0.03)
-0.036
(1.07)
-0.001
(0.41)
-0.023
(0.47)

Men
-0.025
(0.47)
-0.031
(0.87)
0.060
(0.92)
-0.091*
(1.82)
-0.006
(0.06)
-0.044
(0.89)
-0.002
(0.59)
0.010
(0.15

Women
0.020
(0.40)
0.009
(0.18)
0.054
(0.88)
-0.020
(0.29)
0.008
(0.11)
-0.018
(0.31)
0.001
(0.25)
-0.019
(0.27)

Pooled
-0.049
(0.99)

Men
-0.035
(-0.47)

Women
-0.066
(0.95)

-

-

-

-0.016
(0.25)
-0.069
(1.21)
-0.061
(0.64)
0.040
(0.67)
-0.020
(1.25)
-0.045
(0.47)

0.062
(0.61)
-0.114
(1.34)
0.159
(0.59)
-0.017
(0.45)
-0.023
(0.99)
-0.179*
(1.93)

-0.108
(1.17)
-0.025
(0.34)
-0.015
(1.24)
0.043
(0.56)
-0.020
(0.69)
0.035
(0.25)

Pooled
-0.014
(1.06)

Men
-0.011
(.048)

Women
-0.019
(0.96)

Pooled
-0.013
(0.50)

Men
O.001
(0.01)

Women
-0.030
(-0.84)
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Cont. Table 4
Federal Only
Ages 65 & 66
Ages 67-69
Single
1982-1985
Continuous Measure
DDD(D) with
younger cohort

-0.016
(1.27)
-0.020
(0.97)
-0.009
(0.55)
-0.010
(0.46)
-0.007
(0.45)
-0.001
(1.15)
-0.026
(1.20)

-0.010
(0.49)
-0.006
(0.17)
-0.015
(0.59)
0.068
(1.50)
0.007
(0.30)
-0.001
(0.35)
-0.053
(0.85)

-0.024
(1.28)
-0.045*
(1.71)
0.002
(0.06)
-0.036
(1.50)
0.006
(0.30)
-0.002
(1.20)
-0.077**
(2.23)

-

-

-0.031
(0.93)
0.002
(0.05)
-0.056
(1.42)
-0.014
(0.52)
-0.005
(0.63)
-0.009
(0.21)

-0.011
(0.21)
0.013
(0.30)
-0.166**
(2.34)
-0.017
(0.45)
-0.006
(0.66)
-0.053
(0.85)

-

-0.042
(1.01)
-0.022
(0.58)
-0.015
(0.34)
-0.017
(0.56)
-0.004
(0.34)
0.020
(0.49)

Notes: Estimates are from linear probability models estimated with same specification as
Table 3. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. Standard
errors are clustered by state.
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Table 5: Hours Estimates from Main Specification
Variable
State Tax dummy
Treatment 1
Treatment 2
Treatment 3
Treatmentl *Federal
Treatment2 *Federal
Treatment3 * Federal
Treatmentl* State
Treatment2* State
Treatment3 * State
Married
Black
•

Female
< High School
College
State Unemployment
Rate
Pension MTR
MTR excl. SS and
Pension Income
Constant

Pooled
41.09
(0.54)
-282.21**
(2.09)
121.12**
(2.29)
163.10***
(2.97)
186.57
(1.54)
-45.84
(0.32)
-69.03
(1.02)
-160.35
(-0.63)
-140.79
(-0.59)
-44.73
(-0.38)
-307.34***
(3.21)
-104.34*
(1.86)
-889.56***
(3.13)
-391.88***
(3.31)
389.44***
(2.71)
2.08
(0.13)
-22.96
(1.57)
4.76
(0.64)
204.12
(0.31)

Men
151.97*
(1.75)
-156.25
(1.28)
143.10
(1.00)
68.74
(1.31)
106.49
(0.82)
-66.99
(0.47)
32.88
(0.48)
141.18
(0.43)
-67.72
(0.29)
-50.80
(0.45)
63.27
(0.53)
-126.79
(1.13)

Women
-82.50
(0.53)
488.06
(0.80)
378.63
(1.44)
315.75*
(1.77)
211.87
(0.63)
81.74
(0.23)
-257.33
(1.46)
-415.55
(0.56)
-262.74
(-0.38)
-94.94
(-0.28)
-782.79
(1.24)
54.19
(0.38)

-

"

-268.68*
(1.74)
284.24
(1.10)
-11.89
(0.65)
-24.68
(1.43)
4.34
(0.39)
835.63
(0.68)

-507.36
(1.21)
330.00
(1.05)
14.19
(0.39)
0.68
(0.02)
3.80
(0.27)
-1610.46
(0.59)
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Cont. Table 5
X
Age Dummies
State Effects
Year Dummies
Wald Statistic
Uncensored Obs.

1654**
(2.24)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2581***
9,532

778.57
(0.70)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1086***
5,637

2296.50
(0.97)
Yes
Yes
Yes
887.26***
3,895

Notes: Estimates are from Heckman two step models. Absolute values of t-statistics are
in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1
percent level, respectively. Standard errors in Heckman models are not clustered by
state.
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Table 6: Cohort Breakdowns for 1981-1986 and 2005

Treatment 1

1981-1986
10.23

Treatment 2
Treatment 3
Control

3.20
19.92
66.65%

2005
27.67 (Cross both thresholds)
2.82
9.16
60.35
0%

Notes: Authors' calculations from CPS data. In 2005, treatment 1 is subdivided into
those who cross the thresholds added in 1993 and those who do not. The removal of the
earnings test in 2000 eliminates the control group completely.
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Figure 1: Effect of Social Security Benefit Taxation on Consumption-Leisure Budget
Line

Maximum Benefits
Taxed:
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Combined Income
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Figure 2: Individual in Treatment #1 with Earnings Test —Before and After
Taxation of Social Security Benefits

Hours of work where
earnings test threshold is
reached
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Notes: The solid line represents the period before the policy change while the
dotted line represents the period after the policy change
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Figure 3a: Treatment Group #1 Before and After 1983 Plotted in TAXSIM41
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Numerical Example
V: $30,000
B: $8,000
W: $10/hour
Y*: $25,000
Condition For Assignment into Treatment #1: V>Y* + (1/2)B
V = $30,000
Y* + (1/2)B - $25,000 + $4000 = $29,000
$30,000 > $29,000

41

Budget lines were plotted with calculations in TAXSIM for the years 1983 (Before) and 1984 (After) by
calculating after tax income at each hour of work from 0 to 2000
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Figure 3b: Treatment Group #2 Before and After 1983 Plotted in TAXSIM
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V: $23,000
B: $8,000
W: $10/hour
Y*: $25,000
Condition For Assignment into Treatment #2: Y*<V+(1/2)B<Y*+B
Y* = $25,000
V+(1/2)B = $23,000 + $4,000 = $27,000
Y* + B = $25,000 + $8,000 = $33,000
$25,000 < $27,000 < $33,000
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Figure 3c: Treatment Group #3 Before and After 1983 Plotted in TAXSIM
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Numerical Example
V: $18,000
B: $8,000
W: $10/hour
Y*: $25,000
When hours of work equal zero, V + (1/2)B < Y*
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Figure 4a: Labor Force Participation Rates by Cohort
40%

10%
1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

Year
• Treatment#1 —

Treatment#2 — -Treatment#3 •"

Control

81

Figure 4b: Hours Conditioned on Participation by Cohort
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Figure 5: Bunching Analysis for Entire Sample: Distribution of C o m b i n e d Incomes
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Notes: Each bin represents a 10 percent deviation from the threshold values. Bin 0
contains married individuals with combined incomes between $32,000 and $35,200 and
single individuals with combined incomes between $25,000 and $27,500
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Figure 6: Labor Force Participation Rates for Treatment #1 by Treatment vs.
Control States
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Figure 7: Effect of 1993 Thresholds on Consumption-Leisure Budget Line
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Figure 8: 2005 Bunching Around 1st Threshold for Entire Sample
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Notes: Each bin represents a 10 percent deviation from the threshold values. Bin 0
contains married individuals with combined incomes between $32,000 and $35,200 and
single individuals with combined incomes between $25,000 and $27,500. The second set
of social security taxation thresholds ($32,000 single, $44,000 married) occurs
approximately at bin +30.
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Figure 9: 2005 Bunching Around 2nd Threshold
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APPENDIX
TABLE Al. CHANGES IN MARGINAL TAX RATES AROUND BENEFIT
TAXATION THRESHOLDS

Federal
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Georgia
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana42
Nebraska
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode Island
Utah
Vermont
Wisconsin

Single
13
-0.65
-1.04
3
2.96
3
2.96
2.78
-0.78
-0.52
6.4
2.22
-1.04
2.6
0.58
-0.48
-1.3
3.01
2.86
3.44
4.55

Married
12.5
-0.63
-1
2.25
3
3
2.62
3.57
-0.75
-0.5
4.65
2.25
-2.62
2.5
0.66
-0.5
-1.25
2.89
2.91
3.32
4.1

Although Montana was one of the states that taxed benefits, Montana uses a measure different than the
'combined income' measure used at the federal level.
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TABLE A2. COHORT SIZES FOR ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
REPORTED IN TABLE 4

Sample Sizes
Main Sample
Ages 65 & 66
Ages 67-97
Single
1982-1985
DDD(D) with
younger cohort

Pooled
36,786
15,780
21,006
11,952
24,558
18,203

Total Sample
Men
16,372
6,997
9,375
2,878
10,949
8,719

Women
20,414
8,783
11,631
9,074
13,609
9,484

Treatment Group 1
Men
Women
Pooled
3,673
1,473
2,290
1,722
676
1,046
1,244
2,041
797
764
1,014
250
1,530
2,486
956
2,033
2,813
780
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PART 2: LABOR SUPPLY RESPONSES TO GOVERNMENT PROVIDED
HEALTH INSURANCE: EVIDENCE FROM KIDNEY TRANSPLANT
PATIENTS

90

INTRODUCTION

Between 1993 and 1995 Medicare increased the coverage of immunosuppression
medication for kidney transplant recipients from one year following transplantation to
three years following transplantation. These medications, which are necessary for the
long term survival of a transplanted kidney, cost an average of $10,000 per year43.
Therefore, this policy change provides a sharp, exogenous increase in public insurance
benefits depending on the year in which an individual receives a kidney transplant.
Those transplanted before July 1, 1993 received only a one-year benefit, while those
transplanted after July 1, 1995 received a three-year benefit.

These medications are

covered by Medicare Part B, which reduces the out-of-pocket cost to the individual by 80
percent, or approximately $8,000 per year44. I use this exogenous source of variation in
public insurance benefits to study the labor supply effects associated with the provision
of public insurance.
This particular component of the Medicare program has certain characteristics
that allow for a more comprehensive analysis of labor supply effects than other insurance
programs administered by the government.

Other government sponsored insurance

programs, such as Medicaid, federal Disability Insurance, and Medicare for the
43

Danovitch (2005) reports the average cost of medications in 2003 was $10,000 per year. The least
expensive regimen costs $6,000 while the most expensive costs$17,500. In this paper, I estimate average
treatment effects (ATEs) using his average estimate of $10,000 per year. Future work could examine local
average treatment effects (LATEs) to determine whether labor supply responses were larger for those with
more expensive regimens. During the period studied, the typical cost range was $7,000-$ 12,000.
Patients are also required to pay the $89 monthly Part B premium.
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elderly, are either means tested or targeted at very specific groups, including low income
women, children, the elderly, or the disabled. Medicare's coverage of individuals with
end stage renal disease (ESRD, or kidney failure) is universal. This universal eligibility
provides a unique opportunity to explore labor supply responses to the provision of
public insurance among a more demographically heterogeneous group of individuals.
Although individuals with private insurance may opt not to enroll in the ESRD
component of the Medicare program, the fact that eligibility is not means tested allows
for analysis of individuals at all income levels. Also absent is the incentive to stop
working in order to qualify for the benefit.

The program's universal eligibility also

affords the rare opportunity to study labor supply responses to government insurance
among a large number of prime working age men and women.
Admittedly, kidney transplant recipients may not be entirely representative of the
general population.

However, despite being recipients of kidney transplants, these

individuals are relatively healthy. While the end stage renal disease population as a
whole is less healthy than the general population, I focus only on transplanted
individuals. Patients fortunate enough to receive transplants are those individuals whose
quality of life would improve the most by receiving a transplant and thus are highly
selected on health status. In the year 2000 there were approximately 220,000 patients
undergoing dialysis treatment for ESRD, of which only 9,000 (about 4 percent) received
a transplant from a deceased donor (United States Renal Data System 2000 Annual Data
Report). The current kidney shortage results in only the healthiest patients receiving
transplants.

Further, I limit the study sample to individuals whose kidneys are

functioning at the time of data collection. Among the entire sample used in this study, 91
92

percent of the patients with functioning transplanted kidneys report "no activity
limitations". Ogutmen et al. (2006) find that transplant recipients report significantly
better quality of life after transplantation than individuals on dialysis, while Ichikawa et
al. (2000) find that patients with functioning transplants report quality of life measures
"nearly similar" to the general population. Despite the improved quality of life resulting
from transplantation, co-morbidities, such as diabetes, may reduce the probability that a
transplanted patient is able to work. Therefore, employment rates among this population
are lower than employment rates in the general population.
Medicare's increased medication coverage for kidney transplant recipients
resembles other public health insurance expansions, such as the Medicaid expansions of
the late 1980s and early 1990s, but does not create certain empirical difficulties typically
encountered in studies of Medicaid expansions.

Immunosuppresion medications are

necessary for the long term success of kidney transplant patient outcomes, so examining
kidney transplant patients circumvents the problems of low take up rates among those
without other forms of insurance and the endogenous nature of selection into other
publicly provided health insurance programs. However, this policy change does create a
few conflicting labor supply incentives. The income effect associated with the large
transfer payment theoretically discourages labor supply, while the potential health
benefits of the increased duration of medication coverage may promote labor supply. It
is also possible that individuals will opt out of employer provided insurance, resulting in
higher wages. This should not affect part time workers, who may not be eligible for
employer provided insurance.
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To study the labor supply effects of this policy, I divide the sample into high and
low income groups defined by median income of the residential zip code. Individuals
residing in lower income zip codes are less likely to be privately insured, and the value of
the increased benefit comprises a larger share of household income. For these reasons,
one could expect the labor supply responses, if any, to be greater for lower income
individuals. Using the median income of the zip code to identify treatment effects avoids
the endogeneity associated with using individual incomes or insurance status, which are
both closely tied to labor supply decisions. Kidney transplant recipients are not likely to
be directly comparable to the general population, so comparing labor supply responses
within the kidney transplant population is the most appropriate method of identifying the
labor supply effects of the coverage increase.
Duration analysis, analysis of labor force transitions, and difference-in-differences
estimation of employment rates reveal that overall labor force participation rates were
lower after the policy change and that individuals delayed re-entry into the labor force
following transplantation. These effects are larger for individuals in the low income
group, as predicted. Most of the decrease in labor force participation resulted from a
large reduction in the number of individuals working part time after transplantation. The
participation decrease suggests the presence of dominant income effects associated with
the coverage increase. Although this evidence comes from a segment of the population
that is not entirely representative of the general population, these estimates may be
representative of individuals with chronic conditions, such as diabetes, or individuals
with high expected medical expenses, such as the elderly.
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CHAPTER 1
1.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Because this study relates to a group of individuals with which most readers are
probably unfamiliar, in addition to reviewing the literature on the labor supply effects of
publicly provided insurance, I also include background information about kidney
transplant

patients

in

general

and

a

history

of

Medicare's

coverage

of

immunosuppression medications.
1.1. Background on ESRD and Kidney Transplantation and Medicare Policy

End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) is the clinical term for chronic kidney disease,
or kidney failure45. The kidneys are organs that filter minerals from the bloodstream.
Chronic kidney disease is caused by a number of factors, such as diabetes and
hypertension. Diabetes is the leading cause of kidney failure and is present in 40 percent
of the ESRD population.

According to Danovitch's (2005) Handbook of Kidney

Transplantation, in 2000 there were 275,000 individuals receiving dialysis for ESRD46.
Due to the increase in obesity and diabetes this number is expected to reach 520,000 by
2010. Approximately half of the patients on dialysis are over age 65, and the average age
of patients receiving kidney transplants has increased over time. Fifty three percent of

45

All of the clinical information presented in this section is taken from Danovitch (2005).

46

This estimate is different from the 220,000 figure reported by the United States Renal Data System.
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patients with ESRD are male and 37 percent are black. In 2004, there were 60,000
patients on the kidney transplant waiting list.
Upon failure of the kidneys, individuals must undergo dialysis treatment, where
the patient's blood is filtered through a machine and then pumped back into the patient.
Patients receive dialysis treatment an average of 3 times per week, and each treatment
lasts roughly 2.5 to 5 hours. This frequent treatment presents a significant obstacle to
being able to work. Despite the critical shortage of donor kidneys, some patients with
ESRD are fortunate enough to receive kidney transplants. The number of deceased donor
kidneys has remained constant around 9,000 per year47.

In this study I focus on

recipients of deceased donor kidneys due to the positive selection on health caused by the
current kidney shortage. While recipients of kidneys from living donors have better long
term graft survival rates, these patients are not as closely selected on health status.
Transplantation rates are lower for older individuals due to the risks associated
with transplanting older patients, and transplantation rates are lower among blacks due to
the lower availability of donor organs. Patients that are not considered to be good
transplant candidates and therefore are not among those on the transplant waiting list
include elderly patients, morbidly obese patients, smokers and drug users who refuse to
quit, and patients with multiple chronic co-morbidities such as diabetes, cardiovascular
disease, and the HIV virus. In general, patients that are not considered for transplantation
are patients with "limited or irreversible rehabilitative potential" (Danovitch 2005)48.

In this study I focus on recipients of deceased donor kidneys due to the positive selection on health
caused by the current kidney shortage. While recipients of kidneys from living donors have better long
term graft survival rates, these patients are not as closely selected on health status.
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Transplanted patients who do not experience any surgical complications leave the
hospital within one week. Almost all living donor recipients experience "excellent graft
function" in the first week compared to 30 to 50 percent for deceased donor recipients.
Among

all recipients, first year post transplant mortality is about 5 percent, with most

mortality occurring in the first three months.49 Stable patients are discharged from the
hospital 4 to 10 days following transplantation and many return to work after 4 to 6
weeks. However, it is not uncommon for individuals to remain out of work for up to
three months. After receiving a transplant, ESRD patients no longer require dialysis
treatment. Rather, patients return for annual follow up visits. Thus, after the initial
period spent recovering from the surgery, transplantation removes a large obstacle to
being able to work.
The first year following a kidney transplant is the most costly. Costs during the
first post transplant year are $100,00050, but after the first year the cost falls to $10,000
per year (this is the cost of the immunosuppression medication). In the year 2000, 65
percent of transplanted individuals ages 25 to 55 with functioning kidneys at 3 years
following transplantation were employed. According to data from the Current Population
Survey (CPS), the corresponding employment percentage for the overall population in the
year 2000 was 78 percent. Thus, while overall less healthy than the general population,

The criteria for the allocation of kidneys from deceased donors are determined by the Organ Procurement
and Transplantation Network (OPTN). The OPTN was established by the U.S. Congress in 1984 as a
private, not-for-profit organization under contract with the federal government.
49

This implies that the most sick newly transplanted patients who may be unable to work will not confound
the results of mis study.
50

This includes the cost of the operation and post transplant hospital stay.
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the majority of patients with functioning transplanted kidneys appear to be healthy
enough to work.
Employment among transplant recipients is lower than that of the general
population in part due to co-morbidities associated with transplantation that may affect
their ability to work. For example, the incidence of post transplant new onset diabetes
among transplant recipients is 9 percent at 3 months following transplantation, 16 percent
at one year, and 24 percent at three years following transplantation. This particular
condition is related to a patient's age, family history of diabetes, hepatitis C infection,
and it is more prevalent in Black recipients. Although such co-morbidities may affect a
transplant recipient's ability to work, the natural experiment approach I adopt in this
study should account for this difference in participation levels compared to the general
population because labor supply responses are identified by changes over time within the
transplant population.
Following the transplant, immunosuppression medications are necessary for the
survival of the transplanted kidney. Schweizer et al. (1990) discuss the factors that lead
to transplant failure and conclude that the leading cause of organ failure is noncompliance regarding post transplant medication. Results indicate that 91 percent of the
non-compliant transplant recipients experience graft failure. During the 1970's, graft
survival rates at one year post transplant were only 50 percent. By the 1990's, graft
survival rates at one year increased to 90 percent. Danovitch (2005) attributes this
increase to the development of better immunosupression medications.
Between 1993 and 1995, Medicare increased the duration of immunosuppression
medication coverage from 1 year post transplant to 3 years post transplant for all
98

transplant recipients. Woodward et al. (2001) find evidence that the increase in the
duration of Medicare's coverage of immunosuppression medication had a positive impact
on the graft survival of low income kidney transplant patients who receive kidneys from
deceased donors.

The authors use the same 1993 to 1995 extension of Medicare's

immunosuppression coverage that this paper uses as a natural experiment to identify the
effects of extending the coverage of immunosuppression medication on graft survival
rates.

The authors assign low income individuals to the treatment group (these

individuals are the most likely to have been affected by the policy change) and high
income individuals to the control group (high income individuals are more likely to have
had sufficient income to pay for the immunosuppression medications or other insurance
coverage).
Woodward et al. use United States Renal Data System (USRDS) data for the
years 1992 to 1993 and 1995 to 1997 for their before-and-after approach. Results for the
1992 to 1993 cohort indicate that although there were no significant differences in graft
survival rates of high income and low income patients at the end of year 1, the low
income group had a 4 percentage point higher graft failure rate in the second and third
years post transplant after Medicare's immunosuppression coverage ended. However,
Medicare covered 3 years of medications for individuals transplanted between 1995 and
1997. In this cohort, no significant differences in graft survival rates occurred in the
second and third years post transplant.

The methodology used in this labor supply

analysis closely resembles that used in the Woodward et al. (2001) paper.
The difference-in-differences models estimated in my study are identified by the
assumption that non-insurance factors that could affect employment status are similar
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across treatment and control groups. It is possible that changes in transplant outcomes,
medical technology, or immunosuppression medications could affect high and low
income patients differently. Based on the findings in Woodward et al. (2001), these do
not appear to be a problem. Graft survival rates at one year following transplantation
improved 3.6 percentage points for high income patients and 3.9 percentage points for
low income patients between the "before" and "after" periods. Changes in the types of
immunosuppression medications used also appear similar among high and low income
patients.

The use of cyclosporine declined 12.6 percentage points for high income

patients and 13.1 percentage points for low income patients. The use of tacrolimus
increased by 6.9 percentage points for high income patients and 7.4 percentage points for
low income patients. The use of azathioprine declined by 42.2 percentage points and
41.8 percentage points for high and low income patients, respectively.

Mycofenolate

mofetil, not available in the "before period", was used by 42 percent of high income
patients and 38.2 percent of low income patients in the "after" period. These findings
suggest

that

changes

in

transplant

outcomes,

medical

technology,

and

immunosuppression regimens were similar among high and low income groups and
therefore should not confound the estimation.

1.2. Labor Supply Effects of Publicly Provided Insurance

Existing studies of the effects of public health insurance coverage on labor supply
use variation in existing public insurance programs, primarily Medicaid, as the source of
variation in benefits.

Unfortunately, using variation in state Medicaid programs to

estimate the effect of public health insurance provision on labor supply presents a few
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challenges. First, it is difficult to put a precise dollar value on Medicaid benefits. It is
unclear whether the dollar value of Medicaid benefits to families is the cost of the
covered treatments or the cost of an equivalent insurance plan purchased in the private
insurance market. In addition, because Medicaid is a means tested program, individuals
have an incentive to reduce their labor supply in order to qualify for benefits. Lastly, the
Medicaid program is targeted at low income single women with children, the disabled,
and the poor elderly. These studies do not allow for analysis of prime working age men,
or women with different family structures, so the generalizability of the results to the
general population is questionable. Similarly, because the Medicare program is targeted
primarily at elderly individuals, it also is not ideal for drawing inferences about the
potential responses among the general population. In addition the Medicare program has
not changed a great deal over time and does not vary by state. These factors make
studying the labor supply effects of public insurance programs difficult.
Winkler (1991) uses data from 1986 to examine the effect of state level
differences in the value of Medicaid coverage on both labor force participation and hours
of work. The author experiments with three methods for valuing Medicaid benefits at the
state level.

One measure defines the value of the benefit for each state as annual

Medicaid expenditures divided by the number of annual recipients. Similarly, the second
measure calculates the value of benefits as annual Medicaid expenditures divided by the
annual number of welfare recipients.51 The third measure computes the value of the
benefit as annual Medicaid expenditures per dollar of state personal income. The author

51

Recall that during this time period the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program was
linked to the Medicaid program.
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acknowledges that these measures are only proxies for the actual value of benefits to
individuals, which are likely to vary across households within each state.
The author uses individual level data from the Current Population Survey. The
final sample includes female heads of household between the ages of 18 and 64 with
children under the age of 18. The author does not condition sample selection on income
eligibility. Results of participation and hours equations suggest that a 10 percent increase
in the value of Medicaid benefits reduces a household head's probability of working by
0.9 to 1.3 percentage points. The author finds no effect of Medicaid benefits on hours of
work. This study faces the methodological challenges discussed above, in particular the
use of a state level Medicaid variable to proxy for individual valuation of Medicaid
benefits and the lack of generalizability to other public insurance programs due to the
focus on female heads of household.
In a similar study, Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) examine the effect of Medicaid
benefits on employment decisions and welfare participation. Rather than using a state
level proxy for the value of Medicaid benefits, the authors construct a family specific
valuation variable. The authors identify three potential methods for valuing Medicaid
benefits. First is the "government cost", define as government expenditures per enrollee.
Second is the cash equivalent approach, which the authors claim is the preferred method.
The last method is the "funds released" approach, where the value of benefits is
calculated as the amount of money households have available to spend on other goods in
the presence of the government benefit. The authors modify the government cost method
using individual and family characteristics in order to obtain a better measure than the
state level proxy used in Winkler (1991).
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Specifically, the authors use data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) to obtain information on health status and expected medical
expenditures.

The study accounts for regional differences in the cost of care in

calculating their Medicaid variable. The study sample is restricted to include female
heads of household between the ages of 18 and 64 with children under the age of 18.
Results show a significant negative effect of Medicaid benefits on labor supply. The
magnitudes suggest that a 10 percent increase in the value of Medicaid leads to a 1.7
percentage point decline in labor force participation. This magnitude is larger than the
estimate found in Winkler (1991), and when the authors test Winkler's measure in their
data the results are insignificant.

The authors conclude that individual level

heterogeneity in benefit valuation is important for estimating the effect of Medicaid
benefits on labor supply.
While the value of public insurance benefits is difficult to measure when studying
the Medicaid

program,

the valuation

of Medicare's

increased

coverage

of

immunosuppression medication is more straightforward. Individuals who use Medicare's
coverage of immunosuppression medication include individuals who lack a private
insurance plan that will cover the cost of the drugs and may also include individuals who
opt out of private insurance plans. Among patients without another form of insurance,
the government cost, the cash value of the medications, and the additional funds made
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available by the public provision of the benefit are identically equal to the annual cost of
the drugs52.
In addition to the issue of valuing the benefit, another complication of the
Medicaid program involves the incentive to reduce labor supply in order to maintain
eligibility for the program. Once earnings exceed the state defined eligibility thresholds,
individuals lose their Medicaid coverage. This abrupt loss of coverage creates a "notch"
in the individual's consumption-leisure budget line.

For this reason, the Medicaid

program is not ideal for exploring the possible labor supply effects of a non means tested,
broad based public insurance expansion.

Yelowitz (1995) finds that increasing the

Medicaid income eligibility thresholds, therefore moving this notch, resulted in
significant increases in labor force participation among lower income women.

The

ESRD component of the Medicare program is not means tested and therefore allows for a
more straightforward analysis of the potential labor supply discouraging income effects
associated with government transfer payments.
Another possible avenue for studying the effect of publicly provided insurance on
labor supply is to look at the introduction of National Health Insurance (NHI) programs
in other countries. Gruber and Hanratty (1995) consider the introduction of NHI in
Canada from the years 1965 to 1971. The authors find that there were no disemployment
effects resulting from the introduction of the plan. However, it is not clear that the
experiences of other countries would be comparable to the experiences of the United
States. Although this result is contrary to the prior belief that government provided
52

The value of the medication for patients who drop their private coverage depends on the out of pocket
costs they would have paid had they kept their private coverage. Unfortunately the USRDS data do not
contain this information.
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health insurance (or any in-kind transfer) causes decreases in labor supply, the structure
of the plan created labor supply promoting substitution effects that offset the income
effects resulting from the government transfer and the effects of the tax increases
necessary to finance the program. That is, the wage increases that resulted from the
removal of employer sponsored health insurance were large enough to offset the income
effect of government provided health insurance and the effects of the tax increase.
Although shifting the financing from the employer to the government does not
necessarily provide the individual with an increase in the total amount of compensation
(wages and benefits), the authors argue that if individuals value an additional dollar in
wages more than a dollar of health insurance, then a dollar for dollar replacement of
wages for insurance could generate a labor supply promoting substitution effects. This is
also potentially true for Medicare's coverage of immunosuppression medications. If
individuals are able to opt out of employer provided plans and opt into Medicare's
coverage, wages might increase53.

In addition to the income effects caused by

Medicare's increased coverage of medications for kidney transplant recipients that should
reduce labor supply, there also may be positive health benefits and wage increases that
might increase labor supply. These conflicting effects leave the theoretical prediction
ambiguous.

This wage increase would be most likely to occur among individuals who obtain new jobs following
transplantation. They may seek out employers who offer higher wages instead of insurance benefits. It is
also possible that individuals who drop coverage at their existing jobs may see their weekly take home pay
increase if their previous contributions to their employer plans were greater than the $89 monthly Medicare
premium.
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CHAPTER 2
2.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

Given that immunosuppression medications are necessary for the survival of a
transplanted kidney and that transplant recipients have close contact with their
physicians, it is highly likely that individuals without private insurance will take
advantage of the benefit54.

Therefore it is possible to view the increase in Medicare

coverage as an increase in an individual's non-labor income55. To the extent that these
medications may be valued less than their cash value, any labor supply responses will be
understated. Immunosuppression medications cost an average of $10,000 per year, so the
extra two years of coverage provide each individual with a substantial amount of
additional income during the second and third post-transplant years. Therefore, the policy
change generates an income effect that should act to discourage labor supply (Figure 1).
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows an individual who reduces her hours of work, while panel (b)
shows an individual who drops out of the labor force56.

54

One of the difficulties associated with studying the Medicaid program is that not all individuals are aware
of their eligibility for the program, and therefore many who are eligible do not enroll. Because transplant
recipients are being treated by physicians who understand the importance of the immunosuppression
medications, the chance of a transplant patient being unaware of the Medicare benefit is highly unlikely.
55

1 model the value of the benefit as an increase in non labor income equal to the cost of the medications
because with for individuals without alternative forms of health insurance, the "government cost", "cash
equivalent", and "funds released" approaches described in Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) yield identical
valuations equal to the amount of the subsidy.
56

Analyzing these effects in a static labor supply model implicitly assumes that other factors, such as life
expectancy or work life expectancy are being held constant.
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The coverage increase may also affect the average health of the kidney transplant
population.

If healthier individuals have lower reservation wages, then patients

experiencing this health benefit may be more likely to work even in the absence of a
wage increase due to a change in the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure. Further, if individuals are healthier during this period as a result of avoiding
the health complications and medical treatment leading up to graft failure, then it could
be easier for individuals after the policy change to work. That is, health improvements
may increase the marginal productivity of a worker, resulting in a higher market wage.
Figure 2 illustrates these two possible scenarios. Panel (a) depicts how improved
health may affect an individual's reservation wage. As health improves, preferences for
consumption (and therefore work) increase and labor supply increases. These health
effects may only be experienced by those individuals who avoid a graft failure that would
have occurred in the absence of coverage57.

Panel (b) shows an individual's

consumption-leisure budget line in the presence of a wage increase resulting from
improved health status.

The wage increase should result in higher labor force

participation, while the effect on hours worked is unclear due to the conflicting income
and substitution effects of the wage increase. Thus, the income effect is present among

The analysis in Figure 2 assumes that the value of the benefit extension is equal to the cash value of the
subsidy provided by Medicare. Among patients who would have complied with the medication regimens
even in the absence of the two year coverage extension, it is suitable to value the benefit at the cash value
of the subsidy. However, individuals who would not have been compliant may not value the benefit at the
full amount of the subsidy, and therefore the response to the income effect should be weaker for these non
compliant patients than for those who would have complied. The subset of patients who experience a
health effect (and experience a wage increase as a result of the improved health status) and do not value the
medications at their cash equivalent may therefore be even less likely to decrease their labor supply than
patients who experience a health improvement but do value the benefit at its cash equivalent. To the extent
that the medication coverage is valued at less than the cash value of the medications, the magnitudes of the
estimated labor supply effects will be understated.
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the entire sample, while the health effect is present only in the individuals who
experienced a survival benefit according to the estimates found in Woodward et al.
(2001).
If individuals who are eligible for insurance through their employers decline to
enroll because the medications are covered by Medicare, net wages could increase. This
will occur at the individual level if individuals seek out jobs that offer higher wages
instead of health insurance benefits. For individuals who remain in the same job, this
could occur if the Medicare Part B premium is less than previous contributions to
insurance purchased through the employer.
In this situation, participation should unambiguously increase, while the effect on
hours is unclear. If labor supply curves are upward sloping (i.e., if substitution effects
dominate), then this wage increase should increase labor supply, as shown in Panel (a) of
Figure 2. This situation resembles the wage increases resulting from the replacement of
employer benefits with government benefits discussed by Gruber and Hanratty (1995). If
individuals no longer have money deducted from their paychecks in order to pay for
health insurance through their employers, wages increase, resulting in higher
participation. The effect of the wage increase on hours of work is ambiguous. It is also
possible that individuals return to work specifically to obtain insurance through their
employer. Insurance purchased through an employer is cheaper than private insurance
purchased individually due to the larger risk pools and the tax exempt status of insurance
purchased through an employer. Before the Medicare coverage extension, individuals
with only one year of coverage may have returned to work earlier following
transplantation than individuals who received the three year benefit. This may also lead
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to a reduction in labor force participation among individuals eligible for the three year
benefit if these individuals delay their re-entry into the labor force due to the additional
two years of Medicare coverage. Therefore, the overall impact of these insurance effects
on labor supply is ambiguous. These conflicting income, health, and insurance effects do
not allow for a clear theoretical prediction of the policy change's effect on labor supply.
If we observe an increase in labor supply after the coverage increase, we can conclude
that the health effect and the wage increases due to the insurance effect dominate.
However, a decrease in labor supply would suggest that the income effect and the
incentive to delay re-entry due to the insurance effect dominate.
The next issue is to determine which individuals are "treated" by the policy and
which individuals are not. A logical approach would be to consider those who use
Medicare's coverage the treatment group, while those who have private insurance and do
"not use Medicare's coverage the control group.

Unfortunately, the USRDS began

collecting information on insurance payers in 1994, so information during the "before"
period of this study is unavailable. Therefore, I am forced to use an alternative definition
of the treatment and control groups. Given that about half of those eligible for the
Medicare's coverage have other insurance, it seems reasonable to assume that individuals
with other coverage are more likely to be higher income individuals. In fact, roughly 65
percent of individuals residing in low income zip codes transplanted between 1995 and
2001 report Medicare as the primary payer for their care compared to only 30 percent of
those living in high income zip codes58. Also, because the medications comprise a

58

This insurance information was collected at the time of transplantation and therefore does not vary with
post-transplant labor supply decisions.
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smaller percentage of an individual's budget as income increases, the value of the
medication as a percentage of total income will be greater for low income patients, and
therefore the response, if any, should be greater, for this group59. Further, the effect of
health improvements is likely to be greater for this group since graft survival rates
improved by 5.16 percentage points for low income patients and by 1.7 percentage points
for high income patients (Woodward et al. 2001).
Due to this imperfect definition on treatment and control groups, this approach is
better termed a quasi-difference-in-differences method. As Lewbel (2007) describes,
given that I have information on insurance status for a different time period, it is possible
to use this information from the 1995 to 2001 data to weight the estimated policy effects
found when using the imperfect treatment-control definitions. This method, also used in
Kutinova (2008) will be described in greater detail in the results section.
The two year increase in the duration of coverage lends itself to the "before and
after" approach used in this study. Figure 3 illustrates the nature of the policy change.
Until July 1, 1993, the duration of Medicare's coverage was one year post transplant.
After July 1, 1995, the duration of coverage was three years. Therefore, the policy
change allows for the use of the natural experiment

"difference-in-differences"

methodology used in Eissa (1995). Ideally, I would like to have a treatment group that
was affected by the policy change and an equivalent control group that was not, but due
to the lack of information on insurance payer in the "before" period of the study, I am

59

Eissa (1996), Eissa and Liebman (1996), and Gruber and Poterba (1994) also define treatment and
control groups on the basis of income. These studies examine responses to changes in income tax rates and
use the fact that higher income individuals experience a greater treatment effect than lower income
individuals to justify their treatment-control group definitions. Although USRDS data do not contain
individuals' incomes, I use income of the zip code as a proxy.
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forced to use a less than perfect treatment/control definition. Any mis-assignment of
individuals into either the treatment or control group will bias the differences-indifferences coefficient towards zero, so if there is bias, my results will underestimate the
true policy effect (Lewbel 2007). In this setting, the difference-in-differences model is
identified by the assumption that non-health insurance factors causing labor supply
changes by income group are not correlated with the timing of the Medicare coverage
extension.
If increased Medicare coverage affected the labor force participation of kidney
transplant recipients, then we should observe a delayed re-entry into the labor force in the
1995 to 1997 period relative to the 1991 to 1993 period. If high income individuals are a
valid control group, then we should observe a bigger effect among low income patients.
To look for labor supply effects, I conduct a descriptive analysis of employment patterns
following transplantation which includes time plots of participation rates as well as an
analysis of labor force transitions made possible by the panel nature of the data. If the
data contained an exact date of re-entry into the labor force, I would be able to conduct a
more rigorous duration analysis60. I estimate a Cox Proportional Hazards model using
the USRDS follow up codes of 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, and 5 years
post transplant to measure the time of failure, in this case defined as entering the labor
force.
To test for a differential impact of Medicare's extended coverage on the low
income treatment group, I estimate difference-in-differences equations at follow up

60

There is no variable in the dataset that indicates the exact date of re-entry. Rather, re-entry is identified
by the transition from not working to working between follow up visits.
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periods 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years after transplantation. There is a reason to
expect a response at 6 months following transplantation, even though medications were
still covered at this time during the before period. Individuals who know their coverage
will expire after one year may seek employment before that one year coverage period is
over '. This urgency is not present after the coverage increase.

The equation for the

difference-in-differences estimator has the form:
P(LFP = 1) = F(J3X + y.LowY + y2Post + y3 (LowY * Post)) (1)
In equation (1), LowY indicates that the individual is in the low income treatment group.
Post denotes the post 1995 period and X is a vector of demographic controls, including
age, race, gender, and county unemployment rates.

The y3 coefficient gives the

difference-in-differences estimate designed to isolate the policy effect, assuming that the
treatment and control groups are valid and that time varying factors specific to the low
income group that affect labor supply are controlled for.
Conceptually, the change in the treatment group's labor force participation rate
between the pre and post period contains the effect of the policy change (73), the effect of
anything else that might have changed between the pre and post periods that could affect
labor force participation (jz), and any time invariant characteristics specific to low
income individuals (yi). Therefore, in order to ascertain the effect of the policy, we
subtract the change in labor force participation experienced by a control group that was
not subjected to the policy change but was subjected to the same "anything else" that may

Studies in the literature on Unemployment Insurance (UI) and labor supply typically find that individuals
begin their job search prior to benefits expiring. See, for example, Meyer (1990), Katz and Meyer (1990),
and Rogers (1998).
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have affected the treatment group's labor force participation rate. Subtracting the control
group's difference from the treatment group's difference isolates the reduced form effect
of the policy change, 7362.
There are several identification issues that should be discussed. Medicare is not
the only public insurance program for which transplant recipients are eligible in order to
pay for their immunosuppression medications.
federal or state disability benefits.

Patients may also qualify for either

Slakey and Rosner (2007) point out the lack of

uniformity with regard to state Medicaid disability rules but find that disability status is
not correlated with either education or ethnicity. In order to control for possible changes
to federal disability rules over time as well as for state differences in Medicaid generosity
regarding disability, I include the full set of "state*year" interactions to capture
differences in both federal and state level policies across the years of the study. Because
the treatment and control groups are defined at the zip code level within each state, these
interactions do not subsume the policy effect.
The existence of employer sponsored insurance (ESI) is another potential
confounding issue. I do not have information on patients' marital statuses and therefore
do not have information about possible ESI received through a spouse. Section 701 of
the Health Insurance Portability Act (HIP A) of 1996 limited the exclusion of pre-existing
conditions to no more than one year after an individual enrolls in an employer provided
health insurance plan63. This limitation could make work more attractive in the "after"

In the final model the "post" variable is subsumed by the set of year dummies. Results are not sensitive
to either specification.
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period of the study. However, this also might make it more likely that individuals with
employer plans drop out of the labor force with the knowledge that coverage with a new
employer will resume no more than one year after returning to work. The net effect of
this policy on the labor supply of kidney transplant patients is unclear, although this
policy change may not be relevant for part time workers who are usually not eligible for
ESI.
A possible concern in defining groups based on median income of the zip code is
that labor market opportunities might be different for high and low income zip codes
before and after the policy change. CPS data for the years 1991 to 2000 for individuals
between the ages of 25 and 55 reveal that participation rates among non college educated
individuals (defined as a high school diploma or less) increased by more than
participation rates for college educated individuals. Participation rates for non college
educated workers range from 65.11 percent in 1991 to 72.76 percent in 2000, while
participation rates for college educated individuals range from 78.56 percent in 1991 to
80.82 percent in 2000. To account for potential differences in labor market opportunities
between high and low income zip codes over time, I include county unemployment rates
in the models using data from the Area Resource File (ARF). This should control for
differences in job opportunities over time between the high and low income zip codes.

63

The provision of HIPAA (1996) regarding the exclusion of pre-existing conditions took effect in 1997.
Estimating models at 6 months and 1 year post transplant including only data from the years 1991 through
1996 produces qualitatively similar results. Sample sizes in the "after" period are smaller, and statistical

significance is predictably weaker, but the estimated policy effects are only slightly smaller and still
significant in pooled models (which include men and women) at the 1 percent level at 6 months and at the 5
percent level at 1 year following transplantation. Therefore, it does not appear as though HIPAA (1996) is
driving the results in any substantial way. This is expected since most of the declines in labor force
participation occur among part time workers, who are not likely to be eligible for insurance through their
employer.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA

I use data from the United States Renal Data System (USRDS) for the years 1991
to 1997. The "before" period covers transplants occurring from January 1, 1991 to July
1, 1993. The "after" period covers transplants occurring between July 1, 1995 and
December 31, 1997. The transplants performed between July 1, 1993 and July 1, 1995
were omitted because this was the time period in which the policy was phased in. The
unit of observation in this study is the patient follow-up visit64. To focus on individuals
of prime working age, patients less than 25 years old or greater than 55 years old are
excluded from the sample. The USRDS data do not contain certain variables that are
usually of interest in these types of studies, such as the individual's education level and
information on spouses, so the study will not account for changes in these variables that
are not captured by the use of a control group that may affect labor supply behavior. The
data also do not contain a variable for hours worked. Instead, the data contain a variable
that classifies individuals as working either part time or full time.

64

These observations are not independent. I estimate models separately for each follow up period (6
months, 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years), so individuals do not appear in the same model more than once.
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3.1. Data Description

Table 1 contains variable descriptions. Individuals are coded as participating in
the labor force if they are listed as working full time, working part time, or seeking
employment. Individuals listed as "retired" or "student" are dropped from the sample.
Individuals are assigned to either the low income treatment group or the high income
control group based on the median income of their residential zip code taken from the
2000 US Census.
The USRDS dataset does not contain a variable for the individuals' incomes.
However, using the zip code level income information as a proxy for insurance status is
actually preferable in this case. If I had used individual level income information to
assign individuals into the treatment or control group, the individuals' employment
statuses could determine into which group they were assigned65. Therefore, the zip code
level median incomes provide a more desirable, exogenous measure of individual
incomes.
The low income group consists of individuals in the first, second, and third
income deciles. The high income group consists of individuals in the ninth and tenth
income deciles. Income defined at the zip code level is likely to be a better proxy for
insurance status in the tails of the zip code income distribution. That is, individuals
residing in the lowest income zip codes should be more likely to rely on publicly

65

A basic requirement of the difference-in-differences strategy is that the treatment and control groups are
stable and exogenously determined. Using zip code level incomes insures that individuals are not "group
jumping" through changes in employment status, thus providing stable groups that are not endogenously
determined by the individuals' employment statuses.
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provided insurance than individuals in higher income zip codes, who are probably more
likely to be privately insured. This is supported by the data from 1995 to 2001 that show
65 percent of patients in these low income zip codes report Medicare as the primary
payer for their care compared to only 30 percent of patients in the high income zip codes.
The included deciles were chosen to provide somewhat equal numbers of observations in
the low and high income groups while remaining in the tails of the zip code median
income distribution66.
Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups for patient
follow-up visits recorded at six months, one year, two years, three years, and four years
post transplant. Although the relevant post transplant period for Medicare's coverage of
immunosuppression medications is years one to three following transplantation, I include
six month and four year visits because of possible labor market rigidities that could force
individuals to begin seeking employment before the end of the first post transplant year
or to have difficulty finding employment immediately after the three year period ended.
It is reasonable to assume that individuals, knowing that their coverage is going to expire,
may seek employment before Medicare's coverage officially ends.

3.2. Descriptive Labor Supply Evidence

Figures 4 and 5 depict graphically the labor force participation rates of the low
income treatment group and high income control group, respectively. Although both

66

Cohort sizes at 6 month follow up visits are 2,647 for deciles one and two, 3,443 for deciles one, two,
and three, 4,318 for deciles nine and ten, and 6,496 for deciles eight, nine, and ten. Results are not
sensitive to different cohort definitions. Comparing deciles one and two to nine and ten, comparing deciles
one and two to ten, or comparing deciles one, two, and three to deciles eight, nine, and ten return similar
results.
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groups experienced a decline in labor force participation rates between 1993 and 1995,
the drop was more drastic for the low income treatment group. The biggest differences
occur at 6 months and 1 year after transplantation. Interestingly, participation rates for
the treatment group in the "before" period decline sharply between years 1 and 3. This
precipitous drop is not experienced by the high income control group, so if these low
income patients are deliberately not working in order to collect disability benefits, or if
the decline is related to declining health status associated with coverage expiration, then
the estimate of the effect of the increased medication coverage on labor force
participation will be biased downward in the periods following 1 year after
transplantation.
If this drop off is related in some way to the cancellation of coverage, then we
should see a similar decline in employment after the expiration of coverage in the third
year among patients in the "after" period. This is not the case. While participation rates
declined 14 percentage points in the two years following coverage expiration in the
"before" period, participation rates declined only two percentage points in the two years
following coverage cancellation in the "after" period. Burkhauser and Daly (2002) report
that enrollment in federal Disability Insurance increased throughout the 1990s, so if
disability enrollment among the transplant population mirrored this trend then we might
expect to see a larger decrease in employment after the cancellation of coverage if this is
the explanation for the decline.

Again, the lack of a drop off following coverage

cancellation in the "after" period does not support this conclusion. Beginning in 1994 the
USRDS employment variable became more detailed and included a "not working due to
disease" category, which could act as a rough proxy for disability status. This variable is
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not available for patients in the "before" period, so I am unable to determine disability
enrollment among these patients.67
Another possible explanation for the substantial decline is that individuals may be
exiting the labor force in order to qualify for Medicaid benefits under the "medically
needy" category or to qualify for federal Disability Insurance. Unfortunately I am unable
to explore this in the data. The USRDS did not begin collecting information on insurance
status until 1994, so, as with disability status, the information is not available for most of
the patients in the "before" period of the study. Once again, the lack of decline in
participation following coverage cancellation in the "after" period also does not support
this conclusion, assuming that enrollment and eligibility among the transplant population
did not decline between 1991 and 1997.
The possibility exists that the decline may be due to health complications. The
decline in participation is coming entirely from part time workers, who may be closer to a
health status associated with not being able to work. The percentages of part time
workers before and after the policy change converge to roughly the same level as that of
patients in the period after the coverage extension (Figures 6 and 7). This level may
represent the percentage of patients that actually are healthy enough to work a limited
number of hours. The interesting question, and one that cannot be answered definitively,
is whether patients in the "after" period would have been compelled to seek part time

As a robustness check I estimate models omitting patients who claim to be "not working due to disease."
The results are qualitatively similar, although magnitudes are smaller and statistical significance for men
diminishes beyond the 10% level. Because I cannot omit these patients from the "before" period of the
analysis, omitting them only from the "after" period will make any decline in participation appear smaller.
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employment in a similar fashion had they been eligible for only one year of coverage. I
investigate this possibility more thoroughly in the results section.
In addition to the fact that participation rates for the low income group at 6
months and 1 year declined more than the participation rates for the high income group,
another piece of evidence that suggests individuals are responding to the labor supply
incentives created by the policy is that participation rates for the low income treatment
group increase between years 1 and 2 after transplantation. This increase does not occur
in the "before" period among low income patients and is not obvious among the high
income patients. These patients, knowing that their coverage will expire in year 3, may
be re-entering the labor force in anticipation of coverage ending.68 In addition, because
pre-existing conditions were only excludable from employer coverage for a period of one
year, re-entering the labor force in the second post transplant year would ensure employer
coverage by the time Medicare's coverage expired at the end of the third post transplant
year. The USRDS data contain more detailed information on insurance payer after 1995;
however the source of private coverage is not specified so I am unable to test for the
presence of ESI explicitly.
To look for evidence of a delayed re-entry into the labor force post transplant in
the 'after' period of the study, I estimate a basic Cox Proportional Hazard model, with
'time' measured at the specified follow up periods (6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4
years, and 5 years). Results of this estimation are in Table 3. The coefficient on "Low
Income*Post" suggests that the probability of re-entering the labor force at any given
68

Also note that follow up visits at "Year 2" do not necessarily take place exactly 2 years after
transplantation. Therefore, these patients may be re-entering the labor force closer to the coverage
expiration date than the graphs would indicate.
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time period is 15 percent lower for low income individuals after the coverage extension.
While this exercise provides suggestive evidence that re-entry into the labor force was
delayed among this group relative to the high income control group, the follow up
periods provide only a rough estimate of the actual time of re-entry.
The USRDS data set does not contain information on hours worked, but it does
classify workers as working part time or working full time. Figures 6 and 7 show the
percentage of patients working full time and part time, respectively, for the low income
treatment group69. While the percentage of low income patients working full time after
the policy change appears relatively constant before and after the policy change, there is a
substantial decrease in the percentage of low income workers working part time. Figures
8 and 9 contain the same information for the high income treatment group. Among high
income patients, there is a decrease in the number of patients working full time, and a
substantial decrease (although much smaller than that for the low income group) in the
percentage of patients working part time. The overall drop in participation suggests that
these part time workers exited the labor force altogether, rather than transitioning to full
time work.
Examining transitions between the no work, part time, and full time states
supports the information conveyed by the descriptive analyses.

First, a greater

percentage of low income individuals dropped out of the labor force entirely between
years 1 and 3 before the policy change than after. Transitions from working to not
working between the first and second year are 4 percentage points greater before the

69

1 do not condition on participation in the labor force. Conditioning on participation in the labor force
shifts the lines in Figures 4 and 5 up but does not change the patterns or relationships shown in the figures.
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policy change compared to after, and transitions from working to not working between
the second and third year are 6 percentage points greater before the policy change
compared to after.
The transition patterns also support the descriptive evidence of a reduction in the
number of part time workers after the policy change for both income groups. Before the
policy change, approximately 20 percent of those individuals not working at 6 months
were employed part time in year 1. After the policy change, roughly 5 percent of
individuals not working at 6 months were employed part time in year l 70 . This is true for
both the low and high income cohorts. During the second post transplant year, transitions
from not working to working part time fell from 12 percent to 7 percent for the high
income cohort and from 15 percent to 8 percent in the low income cohort. Due to the
unbalanced nature of the panel (due to individuals leaving the sample due to graft failure,
not attending a follow up visit, or not providing information on key variables), some of
the changes in participation rates between follow up periods are purely cross sectional
and therefore not reflected in an analysis of individual transitions.
Overall, the descriptive evidence reveals a few noticeable patterns. First, the
increase in participation between years 1 and 2 for the low income group after the policy
change suggests that individuals may have delayed their re-entry into the labor force.
This pattern is supported by results of the hazard model. Both the descriptive time plots
of the percentage of individuals working part time and an analysis of labor force
transitions suggest a steep decline in the percentage of individuals working part time after
70

Transitions from not working at 6 months to working full time at 1 year were relatively similar before
and after the policy change (19.08 before and 16.28 after) for the low income group. This suggests that the
decline in overall participation rates is driven by this reduction in part time workers.
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the policy change. Patterns among full time workers are relatively similar before and
after the policy change for the low income group, so these part time workers appear to
have exited the labor force entirely. Lastly, participation declined between years 1 and 3
among low income patients before the policy change. To the extent that this is related to
a lower health status associated with coverage expiration as shown in Woodward et al.
(2001) or an attempt to qualify for disability or Medicaid benefits upon coverage
expiration, my estimates of labor supply effects in the difference-in-differences models
beyond year 2 will be biased towards zero if this effect is not picked up by the high
income control group who may not have experienced a similar health decline or might
71

have been less likely to take advantage of public programs .

71

1 examine more explicitly the role of the health status of patients in Chapter 4 but the evidence is
inconclusive.
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CHAPTER 4
4.

ESTIMATION RESULTS

In order to confirm the magnitude and test the statistical significance of the
descriptive estimates, I first do simple difference-in-differences calculations for follow up
visits at 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years post transplant. Then, I estimate the
difference-in-differences regressions with linear probability models72. Finally, I apply
the methodology outlined in Lewbel (2007) to attempt to correct the estimates for the
misclassification of individuals into the treatment (Medicare patients) and control
(privately insured) groups.
4.1. Simple Difference-in-Differences Estimates

To quantify the magnitude of the relative decrease in labor force participation for
the low income treatment group, I calculate simple difference-in-differences estimates at
6 months, 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years post transplant. These calculations are found in
Table 4. At 6 months post transplant, there is a 9.44 relative percentage point decrease in
participation rates for the low income treatment group. At 1 year post transplant, there is

72

1 estimate linear probability models for ease of computation. The full set of "state*year" interactions
makes estimating non linear models more difficult. However, I estimate both linear probability and logit
models, with treatment effects calculated using the method outlined in Ai and Norton (2003), in models
excluding the "state*year" interactions and find similar results. Therefore, I conclude that my results are
robust to more appropriate non-linear models. Given the difficulty in interpreting interaction terms in
standard logit and probit models, I do not attempt to estimate an ordered probit or multinomial logit model
for the no work-part time-full time decision.
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a 5.53 percentage point relative decrease in labor force participation.

At 2 years and

beyond, the difference turns positive. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions
that income effects should not be present beyond the third year, but here the difference
turns positive during the second year.
4.2. Difference-in-Difference Regressions

Tables 5 through 8 contain estimation results of participation equations
estimated for follow up visits at 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years, respectively.
Equations are estimated with linear probability models73. For each follow up period, I
estimate pooled regressions and then separate models for men and women. Regression
results largely support the information conveyed by the simple difference-in-differences
calculations, although the estimated policy effects are slightly larger in magnitude with
the inclusion of the control variables and "state*year" effects.

There is an 11.6

percentage point relative decline in labor force participation rates for the low income
treatment group 6 months after transplantation. The effect is slightly larger for women (13.3 percentage points) than for men (-12.0 percentage points). At 1 year post transplant,
the effect becomes smaller, but still statistically significant. These effects are significant
at the 1 percent level. At 1 year, there is roughly an 8 percentage point relative decrease
for the low income treatment group. At 1 year post transplant, the estimated policy effect
for men (-8.0 percentage points) is slightly larger than the estimated policy effect for
women (-7.7 percentage points). All three policy coefficients are significant at the one

73

1 also check the robustness of the results to the use of logit models. I compute the interaction effect (or
policy effect) of the y3 coefficient from the logit models using the method outlined in Ai and Norton
(2003), although for ease of computation I omit the set of "state*year" interactions and find similar results.
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percent level. At two and three years post transplant the policy coefficients become
slightly positive, which would suggest that low income individuals are actually working
more relative to the high income individuals after the policy change, however the
differences are not significant (P= 0.933 and P=.173 in pooled models at 2 and 3 years
post transplant, respectively).
To test for differential effects by age, I estimate separate models for individuals
ages 25 to 40 and 40 to 55. At 6 months after the transplant, the policy coefficient for the
older age group is nearly twice as large as the policy coefficient for the younger group (0.139 compared to -0.089), but this difference diminishes at 1 year following the
transplant (-0.074 compared to -0.088).

Statistical significance disappears for both

groups at two and three years following the transplant, as in the previous models.
While we might initially expect any effect to disappear at year three rather than
year two, if individuals are returning to work during the second year in anticipation of
losing their coverage in the third year, then the negative effect should disappear in year
two. This is purely speculative, and I do not have any way of confirming this in the data.
It is also possible that the health or insurance effects discussed in the conceptual
framework are responsible for the increase in the second year, but it is unclear why these
effects would only begin to dominate income effects in the second post transplant year.
As mentioned previously, there is some mis-assignment of individuals into the
treatment and control groups because zip code income is not a perfect proxy for insurance
status. Lewbel (2007) shows that in this type of situation, an unbiased estimate can be
obtained by dividing the biased estimate of the policy effect by the sum of the proportion
of truly treated individuals in the treatment and the proportion of unaffected individuals
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in the control group, less 1. According to USRDS data from 1995 to 2001, when
information on insurance payer is available, 65 percent of individuals in the low income
group were Medicare patients, while only 30 percent of high income individuals were
coded as Medicare patients, meaning that 70 percent were privately insured. According
to Lewbel's (2007) method, using, for example, a biased estimate of a 10 percentage
point relative decrease, I would divide 10 by ((.65+.7)-l) to obtain an unbiased estimated
policy effect of 28.5774.
Table 11 reports the policy effects obtained from the linear probability models
and the estimates corrected using Lewbel's method at 6 months and 1 year after
transplant.

Using Lewbel's (2007) weighting method, the estimated policy effects

balloon to declines of roughly 35 percentage points at 6 months and 23 percentage points
at 1 year following transplantation. This dramatic increase, though somewhat unsettling,
is a product of the fact that zip code incomes are only a weak proxy for insurance status.
Because we can be certain that at least a portion of the control group is affected by the
policy and a portion of the treatment group is not, the estimated policy effects generated
from the high and low income comparisons are likely biased towards zero. Therefore, the
actual policy effect

probably lies somewhere in between the baseline and

misclassification corrected estimates.
If we consider the percentage change in the amount of insurance coverage to be
100 percent (if the change in coverage was an additional 2 years and we measure this
change over the midpoint of 1 and 3 years), these results suggest magnitudes similar to
74

Intuitively, if there were zero misclassification, the weight would be 1 and the estimates would be
unchanged. In the case of complete misclassification, where treatment is 50 percent in each group, the
weight approaches infinity and the treatment effect is undefined.

127

but slightly greater than those found by Winkler (1991) and Moffrtt and Wolfe (1992).
These estimates suggest that overall, for men and women combined, a 10 percent
increase in the amount of medication coverage leads to a 1.2 to 3.3 percentage point
decline in labor force participation at 6 months and between a 0.8 and 2.3 percentage
point decline at 1 year.
If the medications are valued as their cash equivalents, it is also possible to
express these magnitudes as income effects. The average zip code household income of
low income transplant recipients is approximately $25,000 per year.

The $8,00075

average increase in income resulting from the coverage increase translates into a percent
change in income of roughly one third. Using the approximate range of a 10 to 30
percentage point reduction in participation implies that a one percent change in income
results in a -0.3 to -0.9 percentage point reduction in participation76.
To attempt to take into account possible changes over time in health status, I
include in the regressions a variable from the USRDS data that measures a patient's
serum creatinine level. As Danovitch (2005) explains, serum creatinine levels are the
strongest predictor of a successful long term outcome, with higher measured levels
indicating a higher probability of graft failure. Although this variable is negative and
significant as expected, it does not change the magnitude or significance of the "Low
Income*Post" coefficient in any of the models. Similarly, including dummy variables for
the year after transplantation in which an individual's graft failed, if the individual

75

Recall that the average cost of the medications is $10,000 per year, for which Medicare enrollees receive
an 80 percent subsidy ($8,000).
76

Given the wide range of income elasticities reported in the labor supply literature (some of which are
positive), it is difficult to make a direct comparison with other studies.
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experienced a failure within five years, does not change the policy coefficients, although
this set of dummy variables removes the significance of the creatinine measure.
Separating the sample by employment status, three year graft survival rates are
lower for those either working part time or not working at all when compared to those
working full time. This result holds in both periods. This suggests that health status is an
important determinant of employment status. As mentioned before, because the
percentage of part time workers in both periods converge to the same level, the
percentage of patients working part time in the "after" period may represent the actual
percentage of patients healthy enough to work in a limited part time capacity. Before the
coverage extension, these patients may have felt pressure to return to work at 6 months or
1 year following transplantation in order to cover their medications beyond 1 year and
then left the labor force due to health reasons. There is no urgency to re-enter the labor
force during this period after the coverage extension. I attempt to find evidence of this
hypothesis by looking for differences in creatinine levels and three year failure rates
before and after among those working part time. Observing statistically worse health
measures among part time workers in the "before" period would lend support for the
77

hypothesis that they drop out of the labor force due to health reasons . Unfortunately,
both tests are inconclusive, so the reason for the decline in low income participation
7R

between years one and three in the "before" period remains an unanswered question .

Without Medicare claims data, I cannot test for the presence of any health complication other than graft
loss and its associated effects that could lead to an exit from the labor force.
78

Restricting the sample to those who did not experience a graft failure within five years does not change
the results in any substantial way. Participation declines for the low income group by 11 percentage points
at 6 months relative to the high income group and by 8 percentage points at one year. The policy
coefficient turns positive and insignificant at year 2 as in the models estimated on the full sample.
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CHAPTER 5
5.

CONCLUSION

Using data from the USRDS, I find evidence to suggest that Medicare's increased
medication coverage led to significant decreases in labor force participation. Descriptive
evidence suggests that this drop occurred primarily among part time workers. These
results suggest that the observed labor supply responses among low income women found
in studies of Medicaid expansions are also present among other demographic groups,
even without means testing or endogenous participation. The substantial decreases in
labor force participation after Medicare's drug coverage extension at 6 months and 1 year
after transplantation suggest dominant income effects, even in the presence of other
factors that would be expected to increase labor supply, such as health improvements and
possible wage increases due to a lower reliance on employer provided health insurance.
This study has a few limitations. First, recipients of kidney transplants are likely
to be less healthy than the general population. The treatment-control approach used in
this study accounts for the fact that these patients may have lower labor force
participation rates overall, but it does not account for the fact that they may be more
responsive than the general population to the income effects created by public insurance
provision. However, if we believe that these patients are more responsive than the
general population, then the estimates found in this study could represent possible upper
bounds on the responsiveness of the general population.

The reason for the sharp
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decrease in participation between the first and third post transplant years for low income
patients transplanted before the coverage extension, in particular among part time
workers, remains an unanswered question. I have attempted to explore the possibility
that the decline is caused by changes in health status or the incentive to stop working and
enroll in the disability or Medicaid program but have not reached a definitive conclusion.
Another limitation is the use of zip code median incomes to assign individuals
into the treatment and control groups. While zip code incomes are an imperfect proxy for
insurance status, I attempt to correct the estimates to take into account the
misclassification as described in Lewbel (2007). This correction produces estimates that
are three times as large due to the weakness of zip code incomes as a proxy for insurance
status. Another potential problem with using zip code incomes is that the observed
difference between high and low income patients' labor force participation rates before
and after the policy change might reflect changes in labor market opportunities over time
between high and low income zip codes. However, to control for this I include county
level unemployment rates in the analysis. The decrease in participation is not mirrored
by trends from the overall population. According to CPS data, participation increased
steadily over the 1990 to 2000 period from 73 to 78 percent among individuals age 25 to
55, the age range used in this study. To control for policy changes at the state level over
time, I include state*year dummies.
Possible extensions to this research include investigating the extent to which the
decline in labor force participation among low income kidney transplant recipients may
have contributed to the improved graft survival rates found in Woodward et.al. (2001).
This health production angle follows Ruhm's (2000) work investigating the impact of
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unemployment increases on health outcome measures. In addition, state Medicaid rules
regarding ESRD may provide useful variation to study other behavioral effects related to
public health insurance provision.
Medicare's coverage of immunosuppression medications for kidney transplant
recipients provides a unique opportunity to explore labor supply responses to the
provision of public insurance among a large number of relatively healthy men and
women of prime working age and of all income levels. This particular policy is also free
from other problems that plague existing studies of behavioral effects related to public
insurance programs, such as low take up rates and endogenous selection into the
Medicaid program.

The observed responses to income effects associated with the

increased transfer payment suggest that labor supply discouraging income effects are
important among a more heterogeneous group than the populations usually studied in
other public health insurance programs.
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Table 1: Variable Definitions

Variable
LFP

Definition
LFP = 1 if the individual is coded as working full time, working
part time, or seeking employment

Female

Female = 1 if the individual is female

Black

Black = 1 if the individual is black

Low Income
(LowY)

Treatment group (median income deciles 1,2, and 3)

High Income

Control Group (median income deciles 9 and 10)

Before

Transplants occurring between 1/1/1991 and 7/1/1993

After (Post)

Transplants occurring between 7/1/1995 and 12/31/1997

Age

Patient's age in years at recorded follow up date

Median Income

Median individual income in the zip code of the individual's
residence taken from the 2000 US Census

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Cohort
Variable
LFP
Female
Black
Age
Median
Income
N

Low Income
Before
.728
.388
.390
40.90
24,847

Low Income
After
.595
.396
.425
42.23
24,902

High Income
Before
.840
.419
.101
41.99
62,702

High Income
After
.724
.403
.131
42.78
62,428

7,114

7,813

9,204

10,404

Notes: Sample includes follow up visits recorded at 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years,
and 4 years after transplantation for individuals between the ages of 25 and 55. "Before"
refers to individuals transplanted between 1/1/1991 and 7/1/1993 and "After" refers to
individuals transplanted between 7/1/1995 and 12/31/1997.
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Table 3: Cox Proportional Hazard Model

Variable
Low Income
Post
Low Income*Post
Female
Black
County Unemployment
Age Polynomial
Observations
Model Chi-Square

Hazard Ratio
0.919**
0.802***
0.851***
0.917***
1.02
1.01
Yes

Z statistic
2.33
6.70
3.35
3.54
0.75
1.55
-

29,873
254.03***

Notes: Cox proportional hazard model for observations between 6 months and 4 years
after transplantation. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level, respectively.

Table 4: Simple Difference-m-Difference Calculations

Low Income Before
77.50
High Income Before
82.54

Low Income Before
78.99
High Income Before
85.72

Low Income Before
73.28
High Income Before
84.25
Low Income Before
65.84
High Income Before
81.95

6 Months after Transplant
Low Income After
Percentage Point
Difference
53.51
-23.99
High Income After
67.99
-14.55
1 Year After Transplant
Percentage Point
Low Income After
Difference
59.65
-19.34
High Income After
71.91
-13.81
2 Years After Transplant
Low Income After
Percentage Point
Difference
63.52
-9.76
High Income After
73.26
-10.99
3 Years After Transplant
Percentage Point
Low Income After
Difference
62.21
-3.63
High Income After
71.26
-10.69

Difference-inDifferences
-9.44

Difference-inDifferences
-5.53

Difference-inDifferences
1.23

Difference-inDifferences
7.06

Notes: Results are from simple "difference-in-differences" calculations at each specified
follow up period (6 months after transplant, 1 year after transplant, 2 years after
transplant and 3 years after transplant). All numbers are percentage points.

Table 5: Participation Equation 6 Month Results

Variable
Low Income

Men
-0.058**
(2.56)
-0.120***
(4.13)

Women
-0.051*
(1.78)
-0.133***
(3.61)

~

~

County
Unemployment

Pooled
-0.060***
(3.44)
-0.116***
(5.17)
-0.047***
(4.70)
0.001
(0.06)
-0.003
(1.41)

-0.001
(0.06)
-0.002
(0.75)

0.001
(0.03)
-0.006
(1.43)

Age Polynomial

Yes

Yes

Yes

State*Year Effects
N

Yes
7,764

Yes
4,708

Yes
3,056

Low Income*Post
Female
Black

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *,**,*** denote statistical significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Absolute values of t-statistics are in
parentheses. Predicted probabilities fall between zero and 1 for 100% of observations.

Table 6: Participation Equation 1 Year Results

Variable
Low Income

Men
-0.069***
(3.14)
-0.080***
(2.83)

Women
-0.071**
(2.54)
-0.077**
(2.12)

-

-

County
Unemployment

Pooled
-0.068***
(4.01)
-0.079***
(3.56)
-0.051***
(5.09)
-0.016
(1.28)
-0.006***
(2.60)

-0.015
(0.96)
-0.006*
(1.92)

-0.009
(0.44)
-0.007*
(1.69)

Age Polynomial

Yes

Yes

Yes

State*Year Effects
N

Yes
7,409

Yes
4,463

Yes
2,946

Low Income*Post
Female
Black

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *,**,***. denote statistical significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Absolute values of t-statistics are in
parentheses. Predicted probabilities fall between zero and 1 for 100% of observations.

Table 7: Participation Equation 2 Year Results

Variable
Low Income

Men
-0.093***
(3.71)
-0.011
(0.33)

Women
-0.137***
(4.48)
0.014
(0.36)

"

-

County
Unemployment

Pooled
-0.116***
(6.06)
0.002
(0.08)
-0.045***
(4.05)
-0.026*
(1.83)
-0.007**
(2.51)

-0.034*
(1.88)
-0.008*
(2.42)

-0.010
(0.43)
-0.005
(1.04)

Age Polynomial

Yes

Yes

Yes

State*Year Effects
N

Yes
6,311

Yes
3,792

Yes
2,519

Low Income*Post
Female
Black

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *j**)*** denote statistical significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Absolute values of t-statistics are in
parentheses. Predicted probabilities fall between zero and 1 for 100% of observations.
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Table 8: Participation Equation 3 Year Results

Variable
Low Income

Men
-0.151***
(5.26)
0.042
(1.14)

Women
-0.186***
(5.27)
0.043
(0.93)

-

-

County
Unemployment

Pooled
-0.162***
(7.42)
0.039
(1.36)
-0.041***
(3.22)
-0.048***
(2.92)
-0.008***
(2.73)

-0.059***
(2.73)
-0.014***
(3.49)

-0.030
(1.12)
-0.001
(0.28)

Age Polynomial

Yes

Yes

Yes

State*Year Effects
N

Yes
5,135

Yes
3,036

Yes
2,099

Low Income*Post
Female
Black

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *5**5*** denote statistical significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Absolute values of t-statistics are in
parentheses. Predicted probabilities fall between zero and 1 for 100% of observations.

Table 9: Policy Effects with Misclassification Correction
LPM

Lewbel

Pooled 6m

-0.116

-0.331

Female 6m

-0.133

-0.380

Male 6m

-0.120

-0.346

Pooled lYr

-0.079

-0.226

Females lYr

-0.080

-0.229

Males lYr

-0.077

-0.220

Notes: Lewbel estimates for the LPM models were obtained using the weighting method
explained in the text.
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Figure 1: Income Effects of Medicare's Immunosuppression Drug Coverage
Extension
Consumption

Coverage

Leisure
Hours of work decrease

Panel (a): Hours of work decrease due to income effect
Consumption

Individual drops out
of labor force

Panel (b): Individual drops out of labor force

Notes: Both panels show the effect of the extra medication coverage on an individual's
consumption-leisure budget line. Non labor income increases by the amount of coverage
and produces an income effect that should decrease labor supply along both the hours and
participation employment margins. $8,000 equals the average yearly medication cost
($10,000) with Medicare part B's 80 percent subsidy.
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Figure 2: Health Effects of Medicare's Immunosuppression Drug Coverage
Extension
Consumption

Preferences over
consumption and
leisure in good health
Preferences over
consumption and
leisure in poor health

Leisure

Participation
increases

Panel (a): Improved health lowers reservation wage and increases labor supply
Consumption

$8,000

Hours of work
increase

Leisure

Panel (b): Wages increase due to improved health increases hours worked
Notes: Panel (a) shows the effect of a lower reservation wage. As preferences for consumption (and
therefore work) increase, the individual's indifference curve becomes flatter. Assuming dominant
substitution effects (upward sloping labor supply curves) both effects increase labor supply along both the
hours and participation employment margins. Panel (b) shows the effect of a wage increase resulting from
improved health. The slope of the solid line gives the individual's market wage rate in an unhealthy state,
while the slope of the dotted line gives the individual's market wage rate in a healthier state.

Figure 3: Months of Medicare Immunosuppression Coverage by Transplant Year

48

36
Months

24
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1991
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1997
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Year
• Months

Notes: Between July 1,1993 and July 1,1995, Medicare phased in the increased
coverage for immunosuppresion medications. Before July 1, 1993, coverage lasted for
12 months. After July 1, 1995, coverage lasted for 36 months.

Figure 4: Treatment Group Participation Rates by Time of Follow Up

Years After Transplant
-Low Income Before — • Low Income After

Notes: Labor force participation rates for the low income treatment group measured at
specified time intervals (6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years) following
transplantation. Sample includes only individuals with functioning kidneys at each time
interval. "Before" refers to individuals transplanted 1/1/1991 to 7/1/1993. "After" refers
to patients transplanted 7/1/1995 to 12/21/1997.

Figure 5: Control Group Participation Rates by Time of Follow Up
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Years After Transplant
-High Income Before — - High Income After

Notes: Labor force participation rates for the high income control group measured at
specified time intervals (6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years) following
transplantation. Sample includes only individuals with functioning kidneys at each time
interval. "Before" refers to individuals transplanted 1/1/1991 to 7/1/1993. "After" refers
to patients transplanted 7/1/1995 to 12/21/1997.

Figure 6: Percentage of Low Income Patients Working Full Time

Years After Transplant
• Low Incoms Before — Low Income After
Notes: Percentage of patients working full time for the low income treatment group
measured at specified time intervals (6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years)
following transplantation. Sample includes only individuals with functioning kidneys at
each time interval. "Before" refers to individuals transplanted 1/1/1991 to 7/1/1993.
"After" refers to patients transplanted 7/1/1995 to 12/21/1997. Percentages are not
conditioned on participation in the labor force.

Figure 7: Percentage of Low Income Patients Working Part Time

Y ears Aflar Transplant

• Low Income Before — -Low Income After

Notes: Percentage of patients working part time for the low income treatment group
measured at specified time intervals (6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years)
following transplantation. Sample includes only individuals with functioning kidneys at
each time interval. "Before" refers to individuals transplanted 1/1/1991 to 7/1/1993.
"After" refers to patients transplanted 7/1/1995 to 12/21/1997. Percentages are not
conditioned on participation in the labor force.

Figure 8: Percentage of High Income Patients Working Full Time

Y e ars After Tr ansplant

•High incDme Before — -High Income After

Notes: Percentage of patients working full time for the high income treatment group
measured at specified time intervals (6 months, 1 year, 2 years. 3 years, and 4 years)
following transplantation. Sample includes only individuals with functioning kidneys at
each time interval. "Before" refers to individuals transplanted 1/1/1991 to 7/1/1993.
"After" refers to patients transplanted 7/1/1995 to 12/21/1997. Percentages are not
conditioned on participation in the labor force.

Figure 9: Percentage of High Income Patients Working Part Time

2
Years Ate Transplant
High Income Before — • High. Income After

Notes: Percentage of patients working part time for the high income treatment group
measured at specified time intervals (6 months, 1 year, 2 years. 3 years, and 4 years)
following transplantation. Sample includes only individuals with functioning kidneys at
each time interval. "Before" refers to individuals transplanted 1/1/1991 to 7/1/1993.
"After" refers to patients transplanted 7/1/1995 to 12/21/1997. Percentages are not
conditioned on participation in the labor force.

PART 3: DO SOCIAL NETWORKS HELP TO EXPLAIN GEOGRAPHICAL
VARIATION IN MEDICAID ENROLLMENT?
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INTRODUCTION

Although Medicaid eligibility levels increased throughout the 1990s, these
eligibility increases have not fully achieved their goal of providing health insurance to the
low income uninsured due to less than 100 percent take up rates. While researchers have
studied many determinants of insurance coverage and Medicaid enrollment, a large
portion of the cross community variation in uninsurance rates remains unexplained
(Cunningham and Ginsburg (2001)). This paper investigates whether social networks,
measured by racial and ethnic concentration in housing patterns, can explain any of the
variation in Medicaid enrollment.
As many studies have documented, Medicaid expansions have not been effective
in covering all uninsured children. Despite increases in the income at which households
lose Medicaid eligibility, many eligible children remain without health insurance.
Thorpe and Florence (1998) report that 15.5 percent of children were uninsured in 1989,
and despite substantial Medicaid eligibility increases, 9.1 percent of children were still
uninsured in 1994. Similarly, Selden, Banthin, and Cohen (1998) estimate that between
2.7 and 2.9 million children were eligible for Medicaid but not enrolled in 1994. Aizer
(2007) demonstrates that participation in Medicaid among eligible individuals may lower
overall health care costs due to the benefits of preventative care. These cost savings

come from avoiding costly hospitalizations by treating problems before they require
treatment in emergency rooms. If enrollment in Medicaid can lower overall health care
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costs, then a clearer understanding of why individuals enroll or do not enroll is an issue
worthy of further study.
In recent years economists have become interested in the role that social networks
play in disseminating information about the availability of public programs. Language
and other barriers may prevent individuals from racial and ethnic subgroups from
enrolling in programs for which they are eligible. Individuals who are in more frequent
contact with other individuals from their own ethnic group should be more likely to enroll
in public programs due to the presence of "network effects". This could be due to direct
verbal information sharing among members of the same ethnic group or due to learning
through observing the behavior of others. Aizer (2007) finds that outreach campaigns
that specifically target Spanish speaking populations in California were effective in
increasing Medicaid enrollment, which suggests that informational barriers are significant
determinants of Medicaid enrollment. A better understanding of the role that social
networks play could have important implications for how information about public
assistance programs is communicated to racial and ethnic subgroups.
Studies in the social sciences that examine how individuals' behaviors are
determined by those around them can be classified into two groups. The first group
contains studies of "peer effects", in which an individual's behavior is influenced by
people the individual knows and has regular contact with, such as individuals living on
the same street, working in the same office, or attending the same school (Case and Katz
1991, Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992, Aaronson 1992, Borjas 1995, Ginther, Havemann,
and Wolfe 2000). The second group consists of studies of "network effects", where an
individual's network is defined at a broader geographic level, such as the city or MSA of
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residence, and does not just contain people with whom an individual has regular, frequent
contact, but rather contains all individuals of the same race, ethnicity, or language group.
The argument behind network effects is that information sharing is greater in larger
networks and that individuals can obtain information over a larger area than simply their
street, school, or office.

For example, in addition to learning from or observing the

behavior of close friends and family, casual acquaintances and random encounters may
also be avenues through which people can obtain information about public programs.
This may work through improved information about program details, decreased stigma,
or mimicking behavior. Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000), Aizer and Currie
(2004) and Deri (2005) define social networks over broad geographic areas such as the
zip code or Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Each study tests the hypothesis that
information can be diffused and shared over larger areas in a way that does not require
close one on one contact among peers.
Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) find that individuals from nonEnglish-speaking language groups with stronger social networks, as measured by the
number of individuals in the same metropolitan area who speak their language, are more
likely to participate in welfare programs79. Similarly, Deri (2005) studies patterns in
health care utilization in Canada and finds that individuals who live in metropolitan areas
where a larger fraction of the population speaks their native language are more likely to
utilize medical services. Aizer and Currie (2004) find strong suggestive evidence of

79

The authors define "welfare use" as receiving any income from public assistance programs other than
Social Security. This income may come from Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) or other
programs such as Heating Assistance. The authors are unclear whether in-kind transfers, such as food
stamps, are reported as income from public assistance
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network effects among Black and Hispanic mothers with respect to publicly provided
pre-natal care in California, but the authors conclude that their network estimate is
picking up the effect of omitted regional characteristics. These studies draw from a
sociology literature that describes how information diffuses throughout a population.
Strang and Meyer (1993) contend that information is more likely to be passed between
individuals who are culturally similar, and therefore the diffusion of information is likely
to be greater when individuals have more contact with others from their own reference
groups. Network effects studies use this concept to model the observed effects of group
behavior on individual behavior in large geographic areas where individuals have a
greater probability of contact with others of the same racial or ethnic group.
The fundamental question is whether the observed positive effects of networks on
program participation are a result of information sharing resulting from the networks
themselves or some omitted regional or group characteristic that simultaneously increases
program enrollment among an individual and others in her network.

Given the

contrasting results of these studies (Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan 2000, Deri 2005,
and Aizer and Currie 2004), the role of social networks in spreading information about
public programs is not clear. This study borrows from the methods of existing studies of
network effects to estimate the impact of social networks on child enrollment in the
Medicaid program. While existing studies define the size of an individual's network as
simply the fraction of an area's population that belongs to their racial, ethnic, or language
group, this study uses measures that incorporate spatial distribution patterns to calculate
the potential size and strength of an individual's social network. This paper also uses a
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larger level of geographical aggregation and is therefore less prone to bias from omitted
or unobservable regional characteristics.
I use the network measures originally suggested by Bertrand, Luttmer, and
Mullainathan (2000) and later adopted in Aizer and Currie (2004) and Deri (2005). The
identification strategy employed in this paper differs slightly from these previous studies
in that I also allow for cross group effects of networks from reference groups other than
the individual's own-group.

These cross group effects may reflect the presence of

omitted regional characteristics that increase enrollment among all groups in an area and
may include possible spillover effects of contact between individuals of different
groups80. If information sharing and learning are greater among individuals from the
same reference group, network effects can be identified by looking for differential owngroup effects of the network variables.
Overall, the results of this study are mixed at best and do not support the
importance of network effects in determining child enrollment in Medicaid. I do not find
evidence of network effects when networks are defined along racial and ethnic lines, and
I find only weak evidence that networks are important among individuals who speak only
Spanish. Even when using arguably more precise measures of the availability of network
contacts, such as the residential housing measures computed by the U.S Census Bureau, I
do not find evidence that networks defined at the MSA level are an important determinant
of Medicaid enrollment. It is possible that the only network effects strong enough to be
identified in an econometric analysis are those defined by language, such as in Bertrand,

80

Because it is unclear whether these cross group effects capture the effects of omitted regional
characteristics or interaction between members of different groups (or some of both), it is not possible to
attach a definitive meaning to their estimated coefficients.
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Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) and Deri (2005). While analyzing smaller geographic
areas may help to uncover network effects among English speaking racial and ethnic
subgroups, the analysis would face the same challenges of adequately controlling for
neighborhood characteristics encountered by Aizer and Currie (2004).
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CHAPTER 1
1.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

This study draws upon two existing literatures: the literature on the take up
responses to recent Medicaid and SCHIP expansions and the literature on the role of
social networks in spreading information about the availability of public programs. The
goal of this paper is to link these two literatures by offering network effects as an
explanation for some portion of the geographical variation in Medicaid and SCHIP
coverage.
1.1. The Effect of Medicaid Expansions and Medicaid Enrollment

Yelowitz (1995) provides a detailed summary of legislation related to Medicaid
expansions. The Sixth Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 (SOBRA 86) allowed states
to cover children under the age of two with incomes below 100 percent of the federal
poverty line beginning in 1987 and allowed states to gradually increase this age cutoff by
one year beginning in 1988 until all children under 5 years of age were included. The
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA 1987) allowed states to expand
coverage to children under the age of eight and increased the income cutoff to 185
percent of the federal poverty line for infants. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989
(OBRA 89) required states to cover all children under the age of six with family incomes
below 133 percent of the federal poverty line, and the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1990 (OBRA 90) required states to cover all children under age nineteen with incomes
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below 100 percent of the federal poverty line . In addition to these changes, the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA 97) created the State Child Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP), which extended coverage to older children of poor families.
Despite increases in Medicaid eligibility levels throughout the 1990's, many
children remained without insurance. Seldin, Banfhin, and Cohen (1998) estimate that in
1994 there were between 2.7 and 2.9 million children eligible for Medicaid but
uninsured.

The authors use data from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey

(MEPS) to estimate the effectiveness of federally mandated expansions, state eligibility
expansions, and the joint eligibility with the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program in enrolling children in Medicaid. They find that, overall, about half of
children eligible for Medicaid enrolled in the program, that take up rates among newly
eligible children were approximately 70 percent in 1996, and that

children eligible

through the AFDC program were more likely to be enrolled in Medicaid. Similarly,
Thorpe and Florence (1998) study expanded Medicaid eligibility and child health
insurance coverage. The authors report that Medicaid coverage of children grew from
8.3 percent in 1989 to 10.3 percent in 1994. Despite the increases in Medicaid eligibility
levels, 9.1 percent of children remained uninsured in 1994.

The large numbers of

uninsured children, even after the Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s through the mid
1990s, were a large motivating factor in the creation of the SCHIP program.
The SCHIP program was designed to cover children from families with incomes
above the threshold for Medicaid eligibility yet too low to afford private insurance

81

This provision was phased in one year at a time between the years 1991 and 2002 to cover children
between the ages of 6 and 18.
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coverage. LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) report that the introduction of SCHIP was
about as effective in enrolling children as previous Medicaid expansions. The authors
estimate that between 4 and 10 percent of children who became eligible for public
insurance through SCHIP gained insurance coverage. Kroenbush and Elbel (2004) find
that enrollment procedures influenced enrollment rates, particularly that waiting periods
and premiums negatively impact enrollment. Similarly, Wolfe and Scrivner (2005) find
that less complicated enrollment procedures were associated with greater program
enrollment. The authors estimate that 21 percent of children with incomes below 300
percent of the poverty line were uninsured in the year 2000. One potential pathway for
social networks to influence enrollment is by reducing the administrative burden of
enrollment through greater information sharing.
According to several studies, race and ethnicity are strongly correlated with
insurance coverage. Racine et al. (2001) use data from the National Health Interview
Survey (NHIS) to examine the effectiveness of the 1988 to 1995 Medicaid expansions in
enrolling children. Specifically, the authors examine changes in coverage, utilization,
and health status among poor white, black, and Hispanic children. Medicaid enrollment
rates increased by 16 percentage points, 22 percentage points, and 23 percentage points
for these groups, respectively. While the authors consider the differential effectiveness of
the expansions in enrolling children across racial groups, the study does not consider
what effect information and networks might play in explaining some of these differences.
The reasons for these ethnic and racial disparities are unclear. They could reflect the
preferences of certain groups for public programs. For example, some cultures might
encourage reliance upon family rather than the government for health care needs.
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Alternatively, these differences could be driven by unobservables that are not captured
with a standard set of controls. If differences in access to information on the availability
of public programs are driving the differences, then social networks may explain some of
the differences in Medicaid enrollment across ethnic and racial groups.
There remain many unanswered questions regarding the large numbers of eligible
but uninsured children. In a pre-SCHIP study, Cunningham and Ginsburg (2001) use
data from the 1996 and 1997 Community Tracking Study to decompose the determinants
of insurance status.

The authors find that 71 percent of the differences in cross

community uninsurance rates are explained by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status,
while 29 percent of the variation remains unexplained.

The authors explain that

differences in uninsurance rates across communities are caused by differences in need or
demand for medical services, income differences, cultural differences82, insurance costs,
state Medicaid policy, and regional employer characteristics with respect to the
availability of employer sponsored insurance.

The data also reveal that higher

percentages of Hispanics and Spanish speakers in a community increase uninsurance
rates, along with lower education, lower incomes, lower levels of health, lower
employment, and more stringent Medicaid eligibility standards.
Overall, Cunningham and Ginsburg (2001) find that 33 percent of the cross
community variation in uninsurance rates is caused by differences in population
characteristics, such as race ethnicity, and socio economic status. The authors find that
25 percent of the cross community variation in uninsurance rates is due to employment

82

The authors control for cultural differences with variables that measure the racial and ethnic composition
of a city, such as percent white, percent Hispanic, and percent Black.
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related factors and 12.7 percent due to Medicaid eligibility differences, with a large
portion of the cross community variation in uninsurance rates remaining unexplained.
My study examines whether social networks can explain any of the variation in insurance
status by looking at the effect of social networks on Medicaid enrollment.
1.2. Studies of Peer and Network Effects

In general, studies of peer and network effects require an outcome to be studied
and a criterion for classifying individuals into peer groups or networks. Typically in the
"peer effects" literature, researchers hypothesize that an individual's behavior is
determined by the behaviors of people with whom the individual has regular, direct
contact, regardless of race, ethnicity, or other exogenous characteristic. More recent
work on "network effects" (Bertrand Luttmer, and Mullainnathan 2000, Aizer and Currie
2004, Deri 2005, Centola and Macy 2007) has expanded the geographic dimension of an
individual's network to contain all individuals in a geographic area, defined at broader
geographic areas, such as a zip code or Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), who belong
to the same racial, ethnic, or language group. The assumption underlying this definition
of networks is that, holding other relevant factors constant, individuals are more likely to
share information with or learn from the behavior of other individuals of the same race or
ethnicity. For example, individuals of the same race or ethnicity may attend the same
churches, send their children to the same schools, or engage in similar social or cultural
events.

The key difference between the two is that in the "peer effects" literature,

specific location, such as the street, city block, office, or school classroom defines the
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network, whereas in the "network effects" studies, networks are defined by broader
geographic areas such as the zip code or MSA and race/ethnicity.
The conceptual framework underlying this broader definition of an individual's
network is based on the ideas presented by Granovetter (1973), who describes networks
as containing "strong ties" and "weak ties." The author defines strong ties as one's close
friends, while weak ties consist of acquaintances and random encounters. Studies of
network effects that focus on broad geographic areas primarily measure the importance of
weak ties, whereas studies of peer effects are more likely to be capturing the effect of
strong ties. Granovetter describes the importance of these weak ties in forming an
individual's network:
"The overall social structural picture suggested by this argument can be seen by
considering the situation of some arbitrarily selected individual-call him Ego.
Ego will have a collection of close friends, most of whom are in touch with one
another-a densely knit clump of social structure. Moreover, Ego will have a
collection of acquaintances, few of whom know one another. Each of these
acquaintances, however, is likely to have close friends in his own right and
therefore to be enmeshed in a closely knit clump of social structure, but one
different from Ego's. The weak tie between Ego and his acquaintance, therefore,
becomes not merely a trivial acquaintance tie but rather a crucial bridge
between the two densely knit clumps of close friends. To the extent that the
assertion of the previous paragraph is correct, these clumps would not, in fact,
be connected to one another at all were it not for the existence of weak ties (p.
1363)."
Thus, two assumptions underlie the measurement of network effects. First, individuals
are more likely to interact with and therefore pass information to individuals from their
own racial or ethnic group. This is due to a greater likelihood of interaction between
individuals of the same group and may also result from greater levels of trust among

1
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members of the same ethnic group . Information can be passed through direct, verbal
contact or by observing and mimicking the behavior of others. Second, information can
be passed over broader geographic areas than simply those with whom an individual has
direct, frequent, regular contact either through acquaintances or random encounters with
individuals of the same ethnic group. Both of these assumptions are supported by the
sociology literature.
Studies of peer and network effects suffer from similar identification problems.
As described in Manski (2000), causal estimates of the behavior of one's group on the
individual's behavior may reflect one of three effects: an endogenous effect, where the
group's behavior influences the individual's behavior, an exogenous effect, where
common exogenous characteristics of a group's members affect individual behavior, or a
Correlated effect, where the behavior of a group may be correlated with the behavior of
an individual due to common characteristics or constraints. While the endogenous effect
most closely describes the idea of a peer effect, researchers worry about the "reflection
problem" which occurs when the behavior of the individual causally affects the behavior
of his or her group. There are two levels to the "reflection problem", one conceptual and
one mechanical. The conceptual problem is that behavioral influences can flow both
from an individual to the group and from the group to the individual. The mechanical
problem is that oftentimes the individual's outcome is included as being part of the group
outcome. The mechanical reflection problem is solved by dropping the individual from
the calculation of group behavior, while the conceptual problem becomes less of an issue

This idea is developed more fully in chapter 1.2.2.
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as group sizes become large and the geographic definition of a network or peer group
increases.
Correlations between individual and group behavior will reflect an exogenous
effect if some characteristic of the group, such as average income or education, affects
the outcome of interest for the individual and her group, thus producing a correlation not
caused by the group's behavior influencing that of the individual. Correlations between
individual and group behavior will reflect a correlated effect if some neighborhood
characteristic, such as the presence of welfare offices or effective outreach campaigns
designed to increase enrollment in a public program, increase the probability that both the
individual and members of her network will behave similarly. In this situation, the
correlation between individual and group behavior is driven by some omitted
characteristic common to the individual and the members of the peer or network group
and does not result from a causal influence of the group's behavior on the behavior of the
individual. Researchers have dealt with these identification issues by using instrumental
variables or studying situations where individuals are randomly assigned to peer groups.
In this study I adopt the quality-quantity interaction approach developed in BLM (2000)
to deal with these identification issues.

1.2.1. Peer Effects Literature

The peer effects literature in economics is extensive. Researchers have studied
the effects of peer influences on many different outcomes, including youth education and
criminal activity, labor market outcomes such as wages and unemployment, stock market
participation, and enrollment in public programs. Aaronson (1992) finds that high school
167

graduation and college enrollment rates are highly correlated within zip codes, while
Borjas (1995) similarly finds correlations within Census tracts in education and labor
market outcomes. The author attributes the persistent differences in these outcomes to
neighborhood effects.

More recently, Ginther, Haveman, and Wolfe (2000) find that

such neighborhood (defined in their study as the Census tract) correlations disappear
when controls for family background are included.
There is a literature that considers the effects of peer influences on job search84.
Recent papers include Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2005) and Wabha and Zenhou (2005).
Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2005) find that individuals are more likely to work with others
from the same city block, while Wabha and Zenou (2005) find that individuals in Egypt
are more likely to find jobs through friends than through other channels. Other behaviors
that have been studied include stock market participation (Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2004)
and Medicare participation (Beiseitov, Kubik, and Moran 2004). Hong, Kubik, and Stein
(2004) find that individuals who classify themselves as "social"

are significantly more

likely to invest in the stock market, and Beiseitov, Kubik, and Moran (2004) find that
social individuals are less likely to enroll in Medicare managed care but are more likely
to purchase a Medigap policy.
Two widely cited studies, Case and Katz (1991) and Evans, Oates, and Schwab
(1992), are early examples of peer effects studies and highlight the empirical difficulties

Ioannides and Loury (2004) provides a survey of the literature on the impact of peer influences on job
search.
85

In both studies, the authors measure the degree of sociability from two questions in the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS). The firsts asks whether the individual has good friends in the neighborhood, and
the second asks how many times they get together with friends.
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associated with drawing inferences between individual and group behavior. While the
former finds strong evidence of peer influences, the latter finds that peer effects disappear
after correcting for endogeneity.

Case and Katz (1991) study the effects of peer

influences on criminal activity and drug use for individuals ages 17 to 24. The authors
define an individual's network as being one to two blocks in size and estimate peer
effects including the observed behavior of neighbors as regressors in their models. The
results indicate that peer behaviors significantly affect youth involvement in crime, drug
use, alcohol use, and attending church. The authors point out several potential sources of
bias that might be driving their large and significant estimates of peer effects.

In

particular the authors caution that the relationships between individual behavior and peer
behavior may be a result of omitted neighborhood characteristics, such as the degree of
police presence, which may result in more crime being committed by both the individual
and his group members independent of any causal influence of the group on the
individual.
Due to the difficulty in inferring causality from observed correlations among the
behavior of group members, Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992) address the possibility that
choice of location, and therefore choice of peers, is endogenous. The authors study the
effect of living in a disadvantaged neighborhood on the probability that a teenager
becomes pregnant. Single equation estimation reveals that attending a school in which a
greater proportion of students are economically disadvantaged increases the probability
of teenage pregnancy.

To instrument for an individual's school characteristics, the

authors use characteristics of the metropolitan area, such as the unemployment rate, the
poverty rate, and percentage of college educated adults. In the second stage regression
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the coefficient on the key variable, the percentage of economically disadvantaged
students, changes sign and becomes insignificant. This result suggests that all of the
observed correlation between individual behavior and group characteristics can be
attributed to a family's choice of location. The authors conduct a similar analysis of high
school dropouts, and again find that single equation methods show a positive and
statistically significant peer effect, while the result disappears in two stage estimation
designed to account for the endogeneity of location choice.
More recently, researchers have attempted to overcome these endogeneity issues
by focusing on situations in which individuals are randomly assigned to their peer groups.
For example Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield (2001) use data from the Department of
Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Moving to Opportunity (MTO) randomized
housing experiment to estimate the effect of one's neighbors on juvenile crime. Due to
the random assignment of families into one of three groups,

endogenous location

selection is not likely to be a problem in this study, although the authors point out that
participation in the program is non random. The authors find that teens who left poor
neighborhoods were 30 to 50 percent less likely to commit violent crimes than those in
the control group who remained in the poor neighborhoods, but they allow for the
possibility that lower income areas may have more police monitoring than higher income
areas. This would reflect a "correlated effect" rather than any causal link between
neighborhood and individual behavior. Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001) conduct a
similar experimental peer effects study. The authors study households who received

86

The experimental group received housing subsidies and search assistance to move to low poverty areas,
the Section 8 only comparison group received subsidies but no constrains on where to locate, and the
control group received no assistance from MTO.
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public housing vouchers through a random lottery. The authors find no evidence of short
term impacts on the employment and earnings of parents but find that children had lower
rates of asthma attacks, injuries, and crime victimization.
In other experimental studies researchers have examined the case of randomly
assigned college roommates. Sacerdote (2001) studies peer effects among randomly
assigned roommates at Dartmouth College. Results suggest that peer influences are
important with respect to grade point average as well as social decisions, such as whether
to join a fraternity. Similarly, Rao, Mobius, and Rosenblat (2007) test for peer effects
among college roommates with respect to flu vaccination. The authors find that a 10
percent increase in the number of peers who receive flu shots increases the probability
that an individual receives a flu shot by 8.3 percentage points. Both studies argue that the
randomness of roommate assignment circumvents the usual selection issues that are of
concern in non experimental settings.

1.2.2. Network Effects Literature

Each of the previously described studies considers the effects of direct contact with
group members on the behavior of an individual. Other researchers have defined an
individual's social network as containing individuals from a similar racial or ethnic group
over a much broader geographic area. Strang and Meyer (1993) consider the question of
how information diffuses throughout a population. In order for diffusion to take place, an
individual who has not adopted a certain behavior must come into contact with an
individual that has adopted the behavior.

The authors argue that diffusion among
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individuals falling into the same reference group should be more rapid than when the
individuals fall into different reference groups:
"Such effects may operate via perceptions built into the actors involved. The
individual or organization's cognitive map identifies reference groups that
bound social comparison processes. Rational mimicking requires prior and
potential adopters be understood as fundamentally similar, at least with
respect to the practice at issue. Perceptions of similarity may enhance rates of
diffusion for additional reasons, as actors find themselves enmeshed in
competitive emulation (P. 491)."
This idea underlies the assumption that individuals who are in closer contact with others
in their own racial or ethnic group should be more likely to pass information regarding
eligibility and availability of public programs87.
Centola and Macy (2007) argue that the diffusion of certain behaviors, such as the
spread of job information and the adoption of new technologies, spread more rapidly
among larger networks of weak ties. This suggests that broader geographic definitions of
networks might be more appropriate for measuring an individual's network than simply
the people with whom the individual has frequent, direct contact. The authors describe
the adoption of technologies and behaviors as "complex contagions", where multiple
exposures to prior adopters are necessary for an individual to adopt the behavior. As
individuals observe more people adopting a certain behavior, the individual begins to
view the behavior as being more credible and legitimate (for example, through decreased
stigma) and therefore will be more likely to adopt the behavior.
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Other recent network studies include Christakis and Fowler (2007), which considers the diffusion of
obesity through a population, and Conley and Udry (2005), which studies the adoption of a new technology
among farmers. Both find evidence of network effects. These works differ from the papers discussed in
the text in that they do not emphasize the impact of racial or ethnic similarity in the diffusion of
information. They also focus on direct one on one contact between individuals by collecting individual
specific information on whom they associate with and obtain information from.
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The main work from which I draw is Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000)
(henceforth referred to as BLM). I adopt the network measure put forth in their study,
but. I use a slightly different identification strategy*^. BLM (2000) examine the role of
social networks on welfare participation. The authors use data from the Public Use
Micro Samples (PUMS) for the year 1990 to test the hypothesis that individuals with
bigger social networks are more likely to enroll in welfare programs due to the greater
availability of information obtained from others in their network. To define the size of an
individual's social network, they use the fraction of individuals in an MSA who speak the
same language. To the extent that researchers are concerned with the possibility that
individuals may choose to locate in places where more potential contacts are available,
the authors claim that MSA level data is superior to zip code level data because it is more
difficult to move between MSAs than between zip codes within an MSA. This reasoning
suggests that network effects measured over broader geographic areas are less likely to
suffer from the endogeneity biases associated with studying smaller peer groups.
BLM introduce a "contact availability" variable, which measures the density of
each language group in an MSA. To obtain their measure of networks, the authors
interact the contact availability measure with the mean welfare use of each language
group in the entire United States. Using the mean welfare use of each language group
within an MSA introduces the possibility that omitted MSA level characteristics could
bias the estimated effect of networks on the probability of welfare participation. This
bias will be present if these omitted characteristics both increase the mean welfare use
88

Whereas the BLM (2000) paper restricts the estimated network effect to be identical for all groups, I
enter each group's network variables separately into the regression and test for differential own-group
effects with an own-group dummy interaction. The reasons for this setup are discussed in chapter 3.

173

measure within the MSA and increase the probability that an individual belonging to that
group also uses welfare. For example, advertising that targets a specific language group
in an MSA could increase the probability that everybody in the MSA from that language
group enrolls in welfare, producing a correlation between individual and group behavior
not caused by information sharing within the group.
This network measure consists of two components- one that measures the quality
of the network (mean use of the group) and one that measures the size of the network (the
fraction of people who speak the same language). These quality and quantity measures
are designed to capture the probability that an individual has contact with someone who
is enrolled in the program of interest, and therefore has information about the program's
details, such as eligibility levels and enrollment procedures . As mentioned previously
these could be contacts with close friends (strong ties) or contacts with random
individuals from the same ethnic group (weak ties).
Even if individuals who are more likely to enroll in a program choose to locate in
places with a higher proportion of members from their own ethnic group, the effect of the
quantity measure on the probability of welfare use should be larger for groups with
higher enrollment rates if information sharing is occurring. The interaction term picks
this up. If there is no information sharing or learning occurring, then the effect of
network quantity on enrollment should not be any greater in areas where more
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This quality-quantity interaction strategy used by BLM (2000) is consistent with Doreian's (1981)
proposed method for appropriately measuring the effect of networks in a multiple regression setting. The
author argues that in order to measure how information diffuses throughout a population, researchers must
have information regarding both the number of adopters (represented in BLM (2000) by the network
quality mean participation measure) and some spatial measure that captures the probability that an
individual actually makes contact with one of these adopters (represented here by the quantity ethnic
composition measure).
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information is available. The authors explain that the uninteracted measures of quality
and quantity should capture many of the omitted variable biases usually encountered in
studies of peer and network effects, while the differential effect measured by the
interaction term would be suggestive of network effects. For example, if outreach efforts
target areas with larger populations of ethnic subgroups, individuals in these areas should
be more likely to enroll in the program. Such a correlated effect would be absorbed by
the uninteracted network quantity measure. This approach is valid as long as these
potential sources of bias are not correlated with both the quality and quantity variables,
which explains the use of a quality measure calculated at the national level. By focusing
on differences across groups within MSA's, the authors are able to add both group and
local area fixed effects.
The results support the hypothesis that network effects increase the probability of
welfare participation.

The authors test for networks at two geographical levels, the

Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).
Magnitudes of the results suggest that networks increase the responsiveness to welfare
policy shocks by 27 percent in the PUMA regressions and 15 percent in the MSA
regressions. The authors compare these results to "naive" models, which contain only the
mean use of each group and mean use within each PUMA.

These measures are

consistent with measures from the early (non-experimental) peer effects literature that
include only a measure of group behavior as an independent variable designed to identify
the effects of group behavior on individual behavior.

In these regressions, the

magnitudes are 115 and 193 percent greater, respectively, than models that use the
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quality-quantity interaction. The authors suspect that these large differences are due to
omitted variable biases.
In a similar study, Deri (2005) similarly adopts this quality-quantity identification
strategy to study health care utilization patterns in Canada.

Network measures are

constructed as in the previous papers- network quantity is measured by the fraction of
individuals in an area who speak a language and network quality is measured by the
mean health service utilization of the language group nationally. This directly follows
the BLM (2000) definition of network quality.

The author uses two levels of

aggregation. The first is the Census Sub Division (CSD), of which there are 5,984 in
Canada and the Consolidated Census Sub Division (CCS), of which there are 2,607 in
Canada90. Results suggest that networks are positively associated with health services
utilization. Networks are found to be significant determinants of utilization at both levels
of aggregation and therefore the author concludes that results are not driven by location
selection.
In a study that examines network effects among racial and ethnic groups (rather
than language groups as in BLM 2000 and Deri 2005), Aizer and Currie (2004) explore
the effect of social networks on the utilization of publicly provided prenatal care with zip
code level data in California for the years 1989 to 2000. Aizer and Currie adopt the
methodology of BLM (2000) to test for the existence of network effects among white,
Black, and Hispanic mothers. To create their measure of networks, the authors interact

Deri (2005) explains that there is wide variability in the size of these CSDs, both in terms of land area
and population. The CSD with the largest population is Toronto (population 2,385,421 in 1996), while the
smallest CSDs contain less than 100 individuals. In terms of land area, the largest CSD is Kenora, Ontario
(401,003 square kilometers) and the smallest have land areas less than 1 square kilometer.
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the fraction of women in an individual's zip code and ethnic group that used publicly
funded prenatal care with the proportion of new mothers in a zip code who belong to the
individual's ethnic group. If the effect of the fraction of women in an individual's ethnic
group that used the publicly provided prenatal care is caused by omitted variables or
endogeneity issues, then finding larger effects among women with larger networks
(measured by the proportion of new mothers belonging to the same ethnic group) could
be taken as evidence of information sharing. That is, the interaction term acts to separate
the network effect from the effects of omitted variables or the endogeneity of location
choice. This quality-quantity interaction scheme is similar to that used in BLM (2000).
The authors' baseline results indicate that network effects are an important
determinant of the probability of using publicly funded prenatal care, although the effect
diminishes in size and significance for blacks and whites when additional controls and
fixed effects are added.

However, the estimated effect of networks remains among

women having their second and third publicly funded delivery, which the authors take to
indicate that the correlation between individual and group use is driven primarily by local
hospital behavior. This result is an example of a correlated effect and could be a product
of the authors' choosing a level of aggregation (the zip code) that is too small to
adequately deal with local omitted characteristics.

The authors conclude that the

observed correlations between individual and group behavior are the result of something
other than information sharing within networks. In this study I adopt the quality-quantity
network measures used by BLM (2000), Aizer and Currie (2004), and Deri (2005) to
study network effects at a more broadly defined geographic area, the MSA, that should
not be subject to bias from local area omitted or unobservable characteristics.
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CHAPTER 2
2.

IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY

The previously described studies of network effects differ along three key
dimensions: the geographic area over which networks are defined, the network quantity
measure, and the network quality measure. The geographic definition of networks that I
use is the MSA, of which there are 240 in my Current Population Survey (CPS) data.91.
BLM (2000) argue that MSA data are superior to the zip code level data, the geographic
area used in Aizer and Currie (2004), because it is easier to move across zip codes within
MSAs than to move across MSAs.

Thus, location choices are less likely to be

endogenous if one uses MS As92.
One potential drawback of using MSAs in this context is that they may be too
large to reflect what information any given individual in the data is exposed to. While in
MSA data any significant effects would be less likely to be driven by endogeneity or
omitted area characteristics, it is also less likely that all true effects will be found
econometrically. However, this broader geographic definition is consistent with Centola
and Macy's (2007) assertion that weak ties, or contacts with acquaintances or informal
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1 cannot use the Census PUMS data as BLM (2000) did because the data do not contain detailed
insurance information. Census data would be preferable because they are representative at smaller
geographic levels and contain more classifications of ethnic and language groups.
92

Brueckner (2000) provides a survey of the welfare migration literature, which finds little or no effect of
welfare benefit generosity on migration patterns. Thus, it is less likely that individuals are moving based
on Medicaid generosity. Additionally, Kaestner, Kaushal, and Van Ryzin (2003) find that overall
migration rates between 1992 and 2000 among low income unwed mothers was roughly 30 percent over
this 8 year period and that the majority of this migration was within state. Only 3 percent moved out of
state.
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random encounters, are effective in spreading information. They say this is true because
multiple exposures to individuals engaged in behaviors may be required for that behavior
to spread through a population. With regard to public programs, this may work through
increased information sharing, learning by observation, or decreased stigma. As people
view more individuals engaging in a behavior, they may start to view that behavior as the
social norm. If this is the case, then analyzing the effect of networks on Medicaid
enrollment at a broader geographic level, such as the MSA, is appropriate.

2.1. Measures of Network Quantity

To measure network quantity, I use housing measures published by the U.S.
Census Bureau for each decennial Census. These measures take into account not only the
fraction of people in an MSA from a racial or ethnic group, but also how they are
spatially distributed throughout the MSA. Therefore, these measures may better capture
the probability of interaction between group members compared to BLM's (2000) and
Deri's (2005) simple percentages of individuals belonging to a group. The network
*

quantity variable is theoretically designed to capture the number of available contacts, so
spatial distribution is an important part of the likelihood of an individual making contact
with someone in her ethnic group. This is consistent with the argument advanced by
Doreian (1981), which argues that studying network effects in a multivariate setting
requires that measures of networks take into account both the likelihood that a potential
contact is a prior adopter of a behavior (the network quality) and the spatial distribution
of these potential contacts in relation to the individual (the network quantity).
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To see why this is true, consider two equally sized MS As with 10 percent
Hispanic populations. If in the first MSA Hispanics are uniformly distributed throughout
the entire land area, while in the second MSA Hispanics are tightly clustered around each
other, the probability of one Hispanic making contact with another would be greater in
the second MSA. Simply using the fraction of the population that belongs to a group, in
this case 10 percent, treats these two areas equally in measuring network quantity. While
this measure is not as specific as using racial composition at a smaller level, such as the
zip code, the greater specificity of the measure mitigates some of the measurement error
associated with aggregating up to a broader geographic level.
explaining this idea.

Maps are useful in

Consider two Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), Boulder,

Colorado and Reading, Pennsylvania, where approximately 10 percent of the population
in each area is Hispanic. Figures 1 and 2 contain regional maps from the 2000 U.S.
Decennial Census. In Figure 1, Boulder, Colorado, areas with higher percentages of
Hispanics are scattered throughout the region. There are two areas with populations
comprised of more than 50 percent Hispanics located near Longmont and Lafayette.
These areas are not located close to one another. Conversely, in Reading, Pennsylvania,
an MSA with the same fraction of Hispanic individuals as Boulder, areas with greater
than 50 percent Hispanic populations adjoin each other around the city of Reading.
While simply using the fraction of individuals that are Hispanic as the measure of
network quantity would treat these two MSAs equally, clearly there is likely to be more
within group interaction among Hispanics in Reading, where areas with large Hispanic
populations are clustered around each other. Therefore, I argue that these measures are
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more precise than the ones used in BLM (2000). For comparison, I estimate models
using the simple proportion of the MSA that belongs to a group.
Of the 19 housing segregation measures calculated by the US Census Bureau, I
select two measures that are consistent with the network effects hypothesis. The 19
Census measures were originally proposed in Massey and Denton (1988). The authors
propose five classifications of measures: measures of evenness, measures of exposure,
measures of centralization, measures of concentration, and measures of clustering. Of the
five classes of measures, clustering and concentration best reflect the number of potential
contacts that a given individual could have with members of her own group within the
MSA. Measures of evenness are designed to capture the distribution of minority
members across areas. Unfortunately, these measures focus only on distribution and do
not adequately capture the actual numbers of group members in an area. Measures of
exposure reflect the probability of minority group members making contact with
members of the majority reference group white population. The interaction between
minority and majority group members is not the hypothesis tested in this paper.
Measures of centralization reflect the degree to which group members locate near the
center of the city. Network effects can occur anywhere in a metropolitan area, not just in
the central business district, so these measures are not fully consistent with the goal of the
network quantity variable.
The two measures chosen to gauge network quantity are absolute clustering and
absolute concentration. Alternative clustering measures proposed by Massey and Denton
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In this section I use the term "minority" to be consistent with the language used in Massey and Denton
(1988) and in the Census documentation.
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(1988) are "spatial proximity", "relative clustering", and "distance decay interaction."
Spatial proximity and relative clustering compare clustering among minority groups to
clustering among the majority reference white population. Thus, it is possible that two
MSAs with similar minority clustering can have different values due to differences in
spatial patterns among whites. This is not desirable for measuring network quantity
because network quantity is supposed to capture interaction within groups, and therefore
should be invariant to segregation patterns among other groups.

Distance decay

interaction measures the probability that a member of one group encounters a member of
her group from a different tract. This measure ignores possible within tract interaction
and therefore is a less desirable measure of the number of potential contacts. Alternative
concentration measures are "delta" and "relative concentration". These measures are also
computed relative to the majority white population and therefore present the same
difficulties as the spatial proximity and relative clustering measures. Formulas for the
measures used, absolute clustering and absolute concentration, are reported in Table 2.
These measures were chosen because they are consistent with the "contact availability"
variables used in other network studies, and the measures are directly comparable across
MSAs.
Clustering measures "the extent to which areal units inhabited by minority
members adjoin one another, or cluster, in space."94'95

Individuals living in more

clustered MSAs should be more likely to have contact with other individuals in their

94

A technical appendix describing these 19 measures from Massey and Denton (1988) is available at
www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/app_b.htrnl.
95

Massey and Denton (1988) use the terms "areal units" and "Census tracts" synonymously.
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racial group than individuals living in less clustered MSAs due to the larger number of
group members in nearby areas. The clustering measure varies from 0 to 1, with higher
values indicating increased clustering among minority groups. The formula is given by:
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where n is the number of census tracts in an MSA, x,- is the size of the minority
population of tract i, and c,y is a distance weight that declines as the distance between
tracts i andy gets larger, where the distance between tracts is measured as the distance
between their centers. This weight is chosen to decline rapidly with distance so as to
approximate contiguity. X is the total minority population of the MSA and U is the total
population of tract i. The second term in the numerator and denominator is designed to
adjust for total MSA land area by summing the distance between all tracts. Holding
constant the total minority population, X, a larger total land area will result in a lower
clustering value.
In equation (1), the numerator of the formula refers to the average number of
minority group members, while the denominator refers to the total population. Measures
from each census tract are weighted by the distance between itself and the other census
tracts, such that having higher proportions of minority group members in nearby tracts
will increase the clustering measure. Higher values of the clustering measure indicate
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will increase the clustering measure. Higher values of the clustering measure indicate
that tracts with above average minority populations tend to be located more closely to
other tracts with above average minority populations.
Massey and Denton (1988) point out that the calculation of this measure is
complex and results in a very large (n x n) set of terms, which makes motivating the
intuition behind the measure challenging. However, it is possible to consider how each
component of the formula affects the value. As (x; IX) increases, the clustering value
increases. This means that having a higher proportion of an MSA's group members in
tract i increases the marginal effect of tract i on the clustering value. As (x/ tj) increases
for a given tract, the clustering measure increases. However, as the distance between
tracts i and 7 increases, this marginal impact of (x/tj) decreases96.
It may be useful to consider a special case in order to motivate the intuition
behind the formula. Consider a Census tract y where all members of the tract are minority
members. In this case, the xy and tj terms will be equal and the "contribution" of this tract
to the clustering measure will be 1, weighted by its distance away from tract /. These
values are calculated for each tract i and all of the other j tracts.

As the number of

minority members in tract j , Xj makes up a larger proportion of the total population of
area/ tj, the clustering measure will increase. As the distance between tracts increases,
the j tracts are given less weight. All else equal, adding minority group members to an
MSA will increase the clustering value. As the sum of the x terms approaches the sum of

Although the measure is computed by summing the x and t values separately (that is, (x/ tj) does not
appear directly in the equation) the intuition still holds. This is true because the effect of a given tract, j , on
the marginal effect of tract i depends on the ratio of the minority to majority population as well as the
distance between the two tracts.
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the t terms (or as the minority population of an MSA comprises a greater share of the
total population of the MSA), the clustering value will approach 1. The value may
approach zero in two cases. If there were no minority group members in an area the
clustering value would be equal to zero. The clustering value will approach (but not fully
reach) zero if tracts containing minority group members are sufficiently separated (or
buffered) by tracts that contain no minority group members, such that the distance weight
reduces the marginal impact of these tracts on the clustering value to approach zero.
In MSAs with high clustering values, group members will be in closer proximity
to other areas with large populations of their own group than in MSAs with lower
clustering values, where areas with above average minority populations will be located
further from one another. Ceteris paribus, having larger clusters of group members in an
MSA should result in more potential for contact and communication between group
members than in areas where group populations are more randomly scattered throughout
an MSA.

Again, consider the case of two MSAs with equal Hispanic populations,

Boulder, Colorado, and Reading, Pennsylvania. Although each MSA contains roughly
10 percent Hispanics, the clustering value for Boulder is 0.059 compared to 0.251 in
Reading. The clustering measure reflects the greater likelihood of interaction among
Hispanics in Reading, even though each area contains the same fraction of Hispanic
individuals.
Another potential measure of network quantity is absolute concentration.
Concentration "refers to the relative amount of physical space occupied by a minority
group in a metropolitan area." This measure varies from 0 to 1, with a value of 1
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indicating that a minority group has achieved maximum spatial concentration.

The

formula is given by:
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where a, is the land area of tract i, ni is the rank of the tract where the sum of the total
population, tj, is equal to the total minority population, X, when the tracts are ranked
from smallest in size to largest. For example, if the total population of the smallest tract
were equal to or greater than the total minority population, the value of ni would be 1.
This suggests that all group members could fit into the smallest tract. T\ is the sum of the
total population in area 1 to «/, and T2 is the sum of the total population in n2 up to area n,
where n2 is defined as the rank of the tract where the sum of the total population, tj, is
equal to the total minority population, X, when the tracts are ranked from largest in size to
smallest. For example, if the total population of the largest tract were equal to or greater
than the total minority population, then xii would be equal to 1.
In equation 2, the numerator of the expression measures the difference between
the average land area inhabited by members of a group less the land area they would
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inhabit under maximum spatial concentration .

The denominator measures the

difference between the land area that group members would inhabit under minimum and
maximum concentration. As groups inhabit less land area, the first term in the numerator
decreases and the measure becomes larger (note that the fraction is subtracted from 1 so
that greater concentration results in a larger concentration measure).

Again, it is useful

to consider a special case. Suppose that members of a group have achieved maximum
spatial concentration in an area. In this case, the two terms in the numerator would be
equal and the value of concentration would be 1 (Concentration = 1-0). In the opposite
case of minimum spatial concentration, the numerator and denominator would be equal,
and the value of concentration would be zero. The first term in the numerator and
denominator would be equal, such that the fraction would be equal to 1. Subtracting this
from 1 leaves a value of zero. Individuals living in more concentrated MS As may also be
more likely to have contact with other individuals from their racial group due to their
closer proximity to other group members. Each measure is computed using non-Hispanic
whites as the reference population, so I have measures only for blacks, Hispanics, and
Asian-Pacific Islanders.
Consider two MS As with an equal fraction of the population that is Hispanic. In
Naples, Florida and Las Vegas, Nevada Hispanics comprise roughly 20 percent of the
total population. However, in Las Vegas, these 20 percent are spread over a larger land
area (concentration value is 0.646) than the 20 percent in Naples (concentration 0.903).
If the probability of making contact with another group member increases as groups
97

Maximum spatial concentration refers to a situation where all members of a group live in the smallest
tracts, and minimum spatial concentration refers to a situation where all members of a group live in the
largest tracts.
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inhabit smaller areas, then there should be a greater likelihood of contact between
Hispanic individuals in Naples than in Las Vegas. Simply using the fraction of the
population that belongs to a group, in this case 20 percent, would treat these two areas
equally in measuring network quantity98.
The hypothesis tested in this paper is that, all else equal, individuals with a greater
availability of potential contacts with members of their own racial or ethnic group will
facilitate the sharing of information, either through direct verbal contact, through learning
by observation, or through decreased stigma.

Clustering is used as a more precise

measure of the availability of potential contacts than a simple fraction or proportion
because clustering takes into account the possibility that group members may congregate
in certain areas within the MSA.

To the extent that individuals spend more time

engaging in activities, such as work, leisure activities, or attending doctor's
appointments, near their residence, having nearby neighborhoods within the MSA with
larger populations of people from their own group should result in a greater likelihood of
contact than if neighborhoods with large populations of people from their own group are
located further away. Concentration is used as a more precise measure of the potential
for contact between group members because, all else equal, if the population of a group
within the MSA occupies less physical space, then there should be a greater likelihood of
interaction between group members than if group members are randomly scattered over a
larger area within the MSA.

Concentration is more difficult to see in a Census racial map. The highest category measuring the
percentage of an area that a group comprises is "50 to 100 percent" and this makes concentration hard to
distinguish since areas of 50 percent and 100 percent composition are depicted equivalently in the map.

188

It is also possible that clustering and concentration may work together to increase
the likelihood of making contacts. If a cluster of neighborhoods occupies less land area,
then its effect on the probability of contact should be even greater. Similarly, if more
concentrated populations tend to locate in neighborhoods close to one another, the
probability of contact will be greater. For example, if there are three neighborhoods in an
MSA that contain all of the group's members, then having these three neighborhoods
located adjacent to one another should result in more contact than if these neighborhoods
are located at opposite ends of an MSA. In either case, the land area occupied by the
group would be the same, but the probability of interaction between individuals from
different neighborhoods would be greater in the former case.
It is also possible that there may be a benefit to interaction between groups. If
Hispanic individuals, for example, are more likely to have information about a particular
program than other groups (perhaps because a greater proportion of the Hispanic
population is eligible for a program), then interaction between blacks and Hispanics or
Asians and Hispanics could be beneficial. This suggests that too much clustering or too
much concentration might not be ideal for spreading information about the availability of
public programs. My estimation strategy will control for these potential cross group
spillover effects.

2.2. Measures of Network Quality

Measuring network quality at the MSA level is impractical with CPS data since
the CPS is not representative at the MSA level for all parts of the country. While it
would be possible to calculate mean enrollment rates for each group at the national level
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as in BLM (2000), I have only three groups in the data compared to the 42 language
groups in BLM (2000). With three groups and two years of data, there would be very
little variation in the quality measure. As an alternative, I calculate enrollment rates for
each racial group at the Census region level". The estimated effects of these regional
enrollment rates may reflect a number of factors, such as regional differences in Medicaid
eligibility levels, the prevalence of employer sponsored insurance, or general attitudes
about enrollment in public programs. Therefore, it will be difficult to attach any specific
economic meaning to the estimated coefficients on the uninteracted network quality
variable.
Moving from the MSA to the region level may alleviate concerns about MSA or
state level unobservables that could lead to correlations between group and individual
enrollment; however there is still a danger that there may be regional unobservables that
could lead to such correlations. For example, employer sponsored insurance is less
prevalent in southern states, which may lead to regional correlations between individual
and group enrollment. The quality-quantity interaction variable is designed to mitigate
this concern by testing for a greater effect of group enrollment on individual enrollment
in areas where individuals have more potential contact with members of their own group
(measured by the network quantity variable). However, it is possible that these regional
factors may also be correlated with the network quantity variable. For example, if regions
with lower rates of employer sponsored insurance also tend to have larger network
quantity values for certain racial or ethnic groups, then the coefficient on the interaction
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There are nine Census regions represented in CPS data: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North
Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, West, and Pacific.
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term will be biased. This will only be a problem to the extent that the impacts of such
regional unobservables are not soaked up by the uninteracted network variables, which
are designed to capture such omitted characteristics that may be correlated with both the
quantity and quality variables.
While it would be possible to compute a measure based on actual enrollment rates
at the MSA or state level taken from another data source, this would produce precisely
the same problem as the early peer effects studies in inferring causality from correlations
between individual and group behavior. If, for example, the Hispanic population in
Massachusetts has a higher enrollment rate than the Hispanic population in Indiana, these
differences could be driven by some omitted or unobservable MSA or state characteristic,
such as more effective outreach and advertising or easier enrollment procedures. Thus,
we will observe higher enrollment among the group as well as an increased likelihood of
enrollment for individuals in the data. This correlation will exist even in the absence of
information sharing through a network. BLM (2000) deal with this problem by using a
quality measure computed at the national level. Due to the small number of racial groups
classified in CPS data, using a national measure is impractical in this study, so I use
regional enrollment rates as an alternative.
As a robustness check, I estimate the models with an alternative measure of
network quality. I construct simulated eligibility instruments, as in Cutler and Graber
(1996) and Currie and Gruber (1997). I take a national random sample of 300 children
from each ethnic group in each year and calculate the percent that would be eligible for
Medicaid by state, s, and year, t, rules with a Medicaid eligibility calculator.

This

measure varies across states and across groups within states based on differences in
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income levels and family composition across groups at the national level.

More

importantly, this measure should not be correlated with regional or individual level
unobservables that might bias the effect of the network quantity variables and therefore
bias the eventual quality-quantity interaction term. To make explicit how this paper
compares to similar papers in the literature, Table 1 compares the set up of this study to
the most closely related papers in the literature, BLM (2000), Aizer and Currie (2004),
and Deri (2005).
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CHAPTER 3
3. DATA AND METHODS
The data used in this study are taken from the March Supplements to the Current
Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1994 and 2000. The year 1994 was the first year
in which the CPS asked a question about the language spoken at home. For each year, I
construct a child-level data set and attach parental characteristics onto each child
observation. Because multiple children can be a part of the same household, the sample
is restricted to only the youngest child in the household. The resulting sample contains
38,756 children from different households. Of these, 27,734 are coded as living in one of
240 MSAs. Of these 27,734 observations, 10,816 are Black, Hispanic, or Asian-Pacific
Islander, the three groups for which I have Census segregation measures. In order to
focus on individuals who are likely to be eligible for Medicaid, the sample is restricted to
families with incomes below 300 percent of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL)100. The
resulting sample contains 14,335 children. Of these, 7,461 are Black, Hispanic, or AsianPacific Islander. The segregation measures use white households as the comparison
group, so I do not have corresponding measures for white segregation. However, all
children, including white children, are used in the estimation in order to absorb potential
sources of bias that may be correlated with the quality-quantity interaction term.

Table 1 on page 1063 of LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) provides eligibility cutoffs for the year 2000.
Only two states, Tennessee (400%) and New Jersey (350%), had eligibility thresholds greater than 300
percent of the Federal Poverty Line. The majority of states were in the 200 percent to 300 percent range.
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3.1. Data Description

Parental characteristics include total family income as well as employment and
education information for mothers and fathers. Child characteristics include the child's
age and whether or not she is enrolled in Medicaid. The CPS data for these years do not
ask specifically about enrollment in the SCHIP program, so Medicaid enrollment is taken
from the question that asks whether the child was covered by Medicaid101. Table 3
contains descriptive statistics for the sample of children from families below 300 percent
of the FPL, broken down by year and ethnic group.
The Census Bureau calculates the segregation measures proposed by Massey and
Denton (1988) every 10 years using decennial Census data. In order to obtain a value for
1994, I linearly interpolate values between 1990 and 2000.

If MSA level housing

measures are not volatile from year to year, then this interpolation is a good
approximation of the segregation measures in 1994. While it would have been preferable
to use data from 1990 and 2000, the CPS did not begin asking about the language spoken
at home until 1994. Data for the years between 1994 and 2000 are not used because the
linearity of the segregation measures would be absorbed by year dummies or a time
trend, so statistical significance might artificially increase due to the larger sample size,
with no additional information being contributed by the segregation variables.

101

Specifically, the Medicaid variable is constructed from two questions in the CPS. The first is a

household level question that asks: "At any time in the previous year were (you/anyone) covered by
Medicaid?" The second is a person level question that asks: "Who was that?" These two responses are
used by CPS to construct a third dichotomous Medicaid variable for each individual. This may miss
children who are enrolled in SCHIP in 2000, and may also miss individuals who are enrolled in Medicaid
managed care programs who believe they are privately insured. As long as these reporting errors are not
correlated with any of the variables of interest in this study, I do not have to worry about biasing any key
coefficients, although the predictive power of the models will be weakened.
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Data on Medicaid enrollment and also demographic, employment, and income
characteristics are taken from the March Supplement to the CPS. However, the March
surveys do not ask about language. In order to obtain the language variable, I match
households' March survey information with their surveys from February or April. The
survey question used to code individuals as being Spanish only speakers is "Is Spanish
the only language spoken at home by individuals age 15 and over?102" Given that
individuals younger than 15 are unlikely to make decisions about health insurance, this
question is ideal for identifying households with significant language barriers to enrolling
in Medicaid. If networks are an important determinant of Medicaid enrollment, then we
might expect any estimated network effects to be magnified for those with language
barriers. This is because language barriers could make the usual channels for obtaining
information, such as English language advertising and outreach efforts, less effective for
those who do not speak English. Thus, interactions with other Hispanic individuals,
particularly those who are bilingual, should be an effective channel through which non
English speakers should be able to obtain information. This is consistent with the finding
of Aizer (2007), who found that proximity to bilingual application assistants increases the
probability of enrollment by 7 to 9 percent among Hispanic individuals.
Tables 4 and 5 list values of the segregation measures for randomly drawn MS As.
Each of the nine Census regions is represented in the tables. While there is little variation
within groups over time in either measure, there is substantial variation both across
MSAs and across groups within MSAs.

Correlation coefficients between black

102

Spanish is the only language variable in the data, so I do not do a similar exercise for Asians or African
Americans.
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concentration and black clustering are -0.01 in 1994 and -0.09 in 2000. For Hispanics,
the corresponding correlation coefficients are larger at -0.48 and -0.34 in 1994 and 2000,
respectively. For Asian-Pacific Islanders, the correlation coefficients are -0.39 and -0.54.
The negative correlations suggest that clustering and concentration are measuring two
distinct spatial patterns. Clustering seems to better reflect the volume of contacts to
which an individual is exposed (in a more precise way than the simple fraction because it
takes into account spatial distribution) while concentration measures the density of group
members within the MSA.
In order to quantify the degree of within-group changes in the measures, I
calculate correlation coefficients between the 1994 and 2000 values for each groups'
measures. This information is reported in Table 6, which also lists the MSAs with the
largest absolute changes between 1994 and 2000. The correlation coefficients support
the qualitative evidence in Tables 4 and 5 regarding the lack of within-group variation
over time. Correlation coefficients for the clustering variable range from 0.951 for the
Hispanic measure to 0.982 for the black measure.

For concentration, correlation

coefficients range from 0.904 for the Hispanic measure to 0.982 for the black measure.
Average changes are very small, generally ranging from 0.01 to 0.02. Clearly, there is
not much variation over time in these network quantity variables. However, recall that
networks are identified by the quality-quantity interaction term. This suggests that the
variation over time in the network variable will be driven primarily by changes in the
quality measure between 1994 and 2000. Due to the lack of variation over time in the
network quantity variable, the baseline models estimated use data only from the year
2000 in order to identify network effects from the cross sectional variation in the network
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variables. I estimate models using both years of data that include state and MSA fixed
effects as a robustness check.
3.2. Estimating Equations

To look for evidence of network effects, I begin by estimating baseline equations
of the following form:
Pr ob{Medicaidi = 1) = Xt'/? + Quantity? mn + Quality g rX + ylBlackNetworkm +
y2HispancNetworkm + y^AsianNetworkm + julBlacki * BlackNetworkm +
ju2HispaniCi * HispanicNetworkm + ju3Asian. * AsianNetworkm +s{
Where:

(Group) Networkm = Quantity m * Quality r

(3)

(4)

Subscripts g, i, m, and r denote racial group, individual, MSA, and Census region
respectively.

Medicaid is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the child is enrolled in

Medicaid and 0 otherwise.

Quantityg)m is the vector of uninteracted segregation

measures for Black, Hispanic, and Asian groups.

Qualityg>r is the vector of group

regional enrollment measures calculated for white, Black, Hispanic, and Asian groups
separately. I also include a set of child-age dummy variables.
If information is more likely to be passed within racial or ethnic groups, then we
should observe an additional impact of the network variables on individuals from the
same group.

The

estimated

JJ, coefficients

on the Black^Black

Network,

HispaniCi*Hispanic Network, and Asiant*Asian Network variables are therefore the
coefficients of interest. I also include the appropriate interactions between each of the
race dummies and each of the quantity and quality measures. As discussed in BLM
(2000), the effect of the uninteracted quantity measures should capture bias caused by
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endogenous location selection as well as omitted variable bias correlated with the
quantity measures. For example, individuals more likely to use public programs may
choose to live among more individuals of their ethnic group. This would lead to a
correlation between the probability of enrollment in Medicaid and the quantity measure.
If the direct, or uninteracted, effect of the quantity variable is driven by some form of
bias, network effects can be identified by observing a differential effect for groups in
areas with higher enrollment rates (and therefore more information contained within the
network).
In a second specification I look for a differential effect of the network measures
for children whose parents speak only Spanish. If network effects are responsible for any
observed significant effects, they should be more important for people with significant
language barriers.

As discussed previously, advertising and outreach could be less

effective among individuals who speak only Spanish, and there will also be greater
difficulty in communicating with a large portion of the native population. Individuals
who do not speak English may be more recent immigrants who would benefit to a greater
degree from information sharing than individuals who have lived in the country for a long
period of time and may already be aware of the programs offered by the government. If
networks are responsible for spreading information throughout the population, these
effects should be more pronounced among individuals more likely to benefit from
stronger networks and less likely to benefit from advertising, outreach, or any other
omitted characteristic that may increase enrollment for native speakers. Aizer (2007)
finds that proximity to a bilingual application assistant increases enrollment by 7 to 9
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percent for Hispanic individuals. This suggests that language is a barrier to enrollment
that networks may help to overcome.
3.3. Robustness Checks

As an initial robustness check, I estimate the baseline equation using both years of
data (1994 and 2000). This will allow for the inclusion of state, MSA, and year fixed
effects. However, as explained in Chapter 3.1, because the network quantity variable
does not vary much over time, attempting to identify network effects using within groupwithin MSA variation over time may be asking too much of the data. If the results are
similar to the baseline estimates, then it is reasonable to conclude that any effects found
in the baseline estimation are not the result of time invariant MSA or state level
characteristics that are correlated with the quality-quantity interaction term.
As a second robustness check, I estimate the baseline equation using the
simulated eligibility instrument described in Chapter 2.2 as the measure of network
quality. Even though the simulated eligibility instrument is only a proxy for enrollment,
enrollment and eligibility are correlated103. More importantly, this state level policy
variable should not be correlated with smaller scale regional or individual unobservables
that might bias the quality-quantity interaction term. In order for the interaction term to

I explore the strength of the correlation between eligibility and enrollment in a few ways. First, I run a
simple regression of individuals in my data of enrollment on the simulated eligibility measure. This returns
a coefficient estimate of 0.58 with a t-statistic of 37.02. Second, I regress actual state level enrollment
rates, taken from the Green Book, on the simulated eligibility measure and obtain a point estimate of 0.02
with a t-statistic of 29.56. The correlation coefficient between enrollment among individuals in the data
and the simulated eligibility measure is 0.22. The Green Book online version is available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmprints/green/index.html.
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be biased, one would have to argue that states set Medicaid policy based on something
correlated with the residential housing patterns of their MS As.
To verify that the estimated effects are stronger for those more likely to be
eligible for Medicaid, I construct a "straw man" test of the baseline estimates by
estimating the model on children who are from families with incomes above 300 percent
of the FPL. These children are less likely to be Medicaid eligible, so observing any
significant network effects would cast doubt on the validity of the baseline estimates. It
is still possible that some children from higher income families could enroll in Medicaid.
Eligibility for Medicaid is based on monthly income, and the income data in the CPS
refer to the entire year. Individuals could lose a job or experience a temporary decrease
in income that would make them eligible for Medicaid for a period during the year.
Recall that the CPS question asks whether the individual was covered at any point during
the previous year. It is likely that higher income individuals, who tend to be better
educated, may be more aware of available public programs than lower educated
individuals. Higher income individuals also may have stronger preferences for health
insurance for their children which also make these higher income individuals more likely
to enroll their children in Medicaid. Nevertheless, eligibility rates are higher among
lower income households and therefore network effects should be more pronounced for
these households.
In a final set of robustness checks, I explore the extent to which the results of this
study are affected by the chosen methodology. The methodology used in this study
differs from that used in BLM (2000) in two ways. First, the methodology used in this
study allows for potential cross group effects, including effects on white children, in
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order to soak up any MSA level omitted characteristics that may be correlated with the
quality-quantity interaction term.

This is accomplished by separately entering each

group's network variable into the equation and then identifying the within-group network
effect with an own-group interaction term.

Second, this study allows for different

estimated network effects for each racial group. To determine the extent to which the
results of this study are a product of these departures from the BLM (2000) methodology,
I estimate models similar to those estimated in BLM (2000). First, I estimate a model
where the quality, quantity, and interaction variables from an individual's own group are
matched onto each individual, such that the network variable is given by:
Networkgmr = Quantitygm * Qualitygr

(5)

Subscripts g, m, and r denote racial group, MSA, and region. Since Network varies
across groups within MSAs, MSA fixed effects are included in these regressions.
However, because quantity measures are not available for white children, these models
are estimated only on the subsample of Black, Hispanic, and Asian children. As a
corollary to this direct replication of the BLM (2000) methodology, I next estimate
models that allow for differential effects by group.
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CHAPTER 4
4.

RESULTS

Table 7 contains results of the baseline estimation. Column (1) contains results
using the simple proportion of group members as the measure of network quantity,
column (2) contains results using clustering as the measure of network quantity, and
column (3) contains results using concentration as the measure of network quantity. The
control variable coefficients, reported in Table Al, have the expected signs. Having
parents who are not employed increases the probability of enrollment in Medicaid, while
having parents who are employed either part time or full time decreases the probability of
enrollment. The probability of enrollment also decreases with education. Having a
parent with less than a high school education increases the probability of enrollment,
while the probability of enrollment declines for parents with some college, or a college
degree or higher. Residing in a single female headed household is positively associated
with enrollment, while residing in a single male headed household is negatively
associated with enrollment.
The coefficients on the "Black;*Black Network", "Hispanicj*Hispanic Network",
and "Asianj*Asian Network" variables give the differential own-group effects for each of
the groups. Among the nine own-group interactions, only the coefficient on the Asian
network variable constructed with the concentration measure is statistically significant.
The magnitude of 50.93 is very large relative to the other point estimates and is likely a
product of the small Asian sample size (N = 244). To test for the presence of influential
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outliers, I calculate dfbetas for this variable. Observing a dfbeta that is greater than the
threshold value of 2 divided by the square root of n would indicate that the observation is
an influential outlier. I then look at the distribution of these influential outliers across
MSAs. Although the influential outliers show no clear pattern across MSAs, dropping
the 31 influential outliers from the estimation turns the "Asianj*Asian Network"
coefficient point estimate negative and insignificant (t = 0.96). Other than this one
unstable result, no significant network effects are present in the baseline estimation.
If networks are an important determinant of Medicaid enrollment, then we
should expect a greater effect of the Hispanic network measures on individuals who
speak only Spanish. Spanish only speakers could be more recent immigrants who would
benefit to a greater degree from information sharing than individuals who have lived in
the country for a long period of time and may already be aware of the programs offered
by the government. If networks are responsible for spreading information throughout the
population, these effects should be more pronounced among individuals more likely to
benefit from stronger networks and less likely to benefit from English language
advertising, outreach, or any other omitted characteristic that may increase enrollment for
native speakers. To test this hypothesis, I interact the dummy variable for Spanish
language with the Hispanic network variables. Of the 6,073 observations in the data in
the year 2000 and from families below 300 percent of the FPL, 433 reside in a household
where Spanish is the only language spoken by adults. These 433 observations are fairly
evenly spread over all of the MSAs. MSAs with the largest numbers of Spanish speakers
are Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA (90 observations) and New York, NY (32
observations). Numbers of observations in other MSAs range from 1 to 21 (Chicago, IL).
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To test for differential effects on Spanish only speakers, I interact the Spanish
dummy variable with the own-group Hispanic interactions. The Spanish dummy is also
interacted with the Hispanic quality measure and the Hispanic network quantity
measures. The differential effect of networks on Spanish only speakers is given by the
coefficients on the "Spanishj* Hispanic Network" variables. Results from this exercise
are in Table 8. The coefficient on the "Spanish;* Hispanic Network" constructed with the
fraction measure is positive and significant at the 10 percent level, while the coefficients
on the "Spanishi* Hispanic Network" variables constructed with the clustering and
concentration variables are positive and significant at the 1 percent level.104 While the
differential network effects on Spanish speaking households suggested by the coefficients
on the "Spanishj* Hispanic Network" variables are positive and significant, I cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the overall effect of networks on Spanish speaking
households (given by the sum of the "Hispanicj*Hispanic Network" and "Spanishj*
Hispanic Network" coefficients) is statistically different from zero in any of the
models105. However, the positive and significant coefficients on the "Spanish;* Hispanic
Network" variables suggest that whatever is driving the negative point estimates of the

These coefficient estimates are robust to dropping MSAs with the largest numbers of outliers: Chicago
IL, Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA, and New York, NY. It is troubling the "HispaniCi*Hispanic Network"
coefficients are negative and significant at the 10 percent level in the models using the fraction and
clustering measures, but these negative effects disappear when observations from Massachusetts are
dropped from the estimation while the size and significance of the "Spanishj* Hispanic Network"
coefficients are maintained. I was unable to link this effect to a specific MSA in Massachusetts, and
dropping the entire New England region produces similar results to dropping Massachusetts. I also
experiment with adding multiple network measures into the same model. Results are typically weaker, and
including two network measures in the same equation results in twice as many interaction terms, which
might be slicing the data too thin.
105

1 can reject the equality of the coefficients ("HispaniCi*Hispanic Network" = "Spanishj* Hispanic
Network") in the Fraction and Clustering regressions, and I can reject that the joint effect
("HispaniCj*Hispanic Network" = "Spanish;* Hispanic Network"=0) is equal to zero in all three models.
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"Hispanicj*Hispanic Network" coefficients is less relevant for Spanish speaking
households, possibly due to network effects. Even though the overall effect of networks
on Spanish speaking households is not statistically different from zero, the positive
coefficient estimates on the "Spanish;* Hispanic Network" variables still may suggest the
presence of network effects, but the evidence is considerably weaker than if the sum of
the effects of the two network variables had been statistically significant.
Results from the baseline estimation show no significant network effects when
networks are defined along racial or ethnic lines. However, there is weak evidence that
network effects may be important among individuals who speak only Spanish. This
suggests that networks operate primarily through language, or that network effects
defined simply by race or ethnicity are not strong enough to identify econometrically at
the MSA level. To test the robustness of the differential Spanish language effects, I first
estimate models using both years of data (1994 and 2000) to determine whether the
estimates are robust to the inclusion of State, MSA, and year fixed effects106. Results
from the repeated cross section estimation are similar to the results from the baseline
estimation with a few exceptions. In the repeated cross section, the coefficient on the
"Hispanicj*Hispanic Network" variable constructed with the concentration measure is
positive and significant at the 10 percent level. As before, the coefficients on the
"Hispanicj*Hispanic Network" variables constructed with the fraction and clustering
measures are negative and significant at the 10 percent level

. Among the three

"Spanishi* Hispanic Network" variables, none is significant at conventional levels, but

106

State fixed effects are included since some MSAs cross state lines.

107

Dropping Massachusetts once again eliminates the significance of these coefficient estimates.
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the "Spanish;* Hispanic Network" variables constructed with the fraction and clustering
measures approach statistical significance at the 10 percent level (t = 1.56 and t=1.63,
respectively). As discussed in Chapter 2.2, given the lack of variation over time in the
network quantity variables, it is not unexpected that the results would become weaker
with the inclusion of state, year, and MSA fixed effects. Again, the strongest evidence of
network effects occurs among Spanish speaking households, but the evidence is weak
because the sum of the "Hispanici*Hispanic Network" and "Spanish;* Hispanic
Network" coefficients is not statistically different from zero in any of the models.
As an additional check of the robustness of the results reported in Table 8, I
estimate the models using the simulated eligibility instrument as the measure of network
quality. The coefficients on the "Hispanicj*Hispanic Network" variables constructed
with the fraction and clustering measures are negative, but in this model only the
coefficient on the network variable constructed with the fraction measure is significant at
the 10 percent level. As in the pooled cross section, the coefficients on the "Spanish;*
Hispanic Network" variables are positive but are not statistically significant. T-statistics
for the coefficient estimates are 1.12, 1.53, and 1.42 for the "Spanish;* Hispanic
Network" variables constructed with the fraction, clustering, and concentration measures,
respectively. Thus, the results are weaker when using this alternate measure of network
quality, but this may be a product of the fact that simulated eligibility is only a proxy for
actual enrollment rates.

As before, I cannot reject that the sum of the

"Hispanic;*Hispanic Network" and "Spanish;* Hispanic Network" coefficients is equal to
zero in any of the models.
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To verify that the estimated differential effects of networks on Spanish speaking
households is stronger for those more likely to be Medicaid eligible, I conduct a "straw
man" test by estimating the models using the 7,930 children from families above 300
percent of the FPL. Of the 7,930 children from families above 300 percent of the FPL,
92 reside in households where Spanish is the only language spoken by the adults. Results
from this exercise are reported in Table 11. The coefficients on the "Spanish;* Hispanic
Network" variables are negative for all three of the network measures. However, it is
troubling that the coefficients on the "Hispanic;*Hispanic Network" variables are positive
in all three models. These estimates are significant at the 1 percent level in the models
that use clustering and concentration to construct the network variable. These effects are
driven entirely by individuals between 300 and 400 percent of the FPL living in New
York108. Estimating models on children above 400 percent of the FPL reduces the size
and significance of both "Hispanic;*Hispanic Network" coefficients. The coefficients on
the "Spanish;* Hispanic Network" become positive in these models but are not
statistically significant. Similarly, dropping New York from the estimation eliminates the
significance of the "HispaniCi*Hispanic Network" coefficients in all three models, while
the "Spanish;* Hispanic Network" coefficients remain virtually unaffected. I conclude
that the Spanish language results in Table 8 are robust to this exercise, although this is
not unexpected given the small number of observations from Spanish speaking
households.

Of the 1,854 children from families with incomes between 300 and 400 percent of the FPL, 163 (87
percent) are coded as having been enrolled in Medicaid at some point during the year. The state with the
largest number of enrollees from families in this income range is New York (23 observations).
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Given that the only evidence of network effects thus far is the differential Spanish
language results, I consider the possibility that these estimated effects may be driven by
the choice of model specification.

If the results are robust to the choice of model

specification, then we would expect them to appear when simpler models are estimated,
such as those found in BLM (2000). These models do not include white children in the
estimation due to the absence of quantity measures and do not allow for potential cross
group effects. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 12. The coefficient on
the "Network" variable, now restricted to be equal for all three groups, is insignificant for
all three network quantity measures, and the coefficients on the "Spanish,* Network"
variables are negative and not statistically significant.
To consider the possibility that network effects differ by group and that the
restriction of equality is responsible for the insignificant coefficients on the "Spanish^
Network" variables, I estimate similar models that allow for differential own-group
effects109.

Results of this exercise are reported in Table 13. In these models, the

coefficients on the "Spanishj* Hispanic Network" variables become positive in all three
cases, but the only statistically significant effect occurs when the "Spanishj* Hispanic
Network" variable is constructed with the concentration variable (t = 1.98). However, the
fact that the "Hispanic Network" variable is not statistically different from either the
"Asian Network" or "Black Network" variables in any of the models highlights the
sensitivity of the Spanish language results in these simpler models. Given the lack of

109

To do this, I separately enter variables for each group's network. For example, the "Black Network"
variable is equal to the "Network" variable from the previous exercise if the child is black, and zero
otherwise. This setup is algebraically equivalent to interacting the Network variable from the previous
exercise with two of the three race dummies. However, in the chosen setup the coefficients on the Network
variables are compared to a baseline effect of zero, which allows for easier interpretation of the results.
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statistical differences between the three network measures, we would expect the Spanish
language interactions to be similar in both specifications.

The results of these two

versions of the BLM (2000) estimation suggest that the Spanish language results found in
my earlier models hinge on allowing for cross group effects and including white children
in the estimation to help soak up unobserved MSA level characteristics.
Overall, I do not find evidence of network effects as a determinant of Medicaid
enrollment.

The strongest evidence is found when looking for differential network

effects among individuals who speak Spanish.

These results become only slightly

weaker when models are estimated with a repeated cross section and an alternative
measure of network quality. Although I observe a positive and significant differential
effect of networks on Spanish speaking households in the baseline model, I cannot reject
that the overall effect, given by the sum of the "Hispanic; *Hispanic Network" and
"Spanish;* Hispanic Network" coefficients is non-zero.

Further, these results are not

robust to different model specifications, such as the simpler models estimated in BLM
(2000), and this casts doubt on their validity. Therefore, the conclusion that networks are
important among individuals who speak only Spanish is tenuous.
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CHAPTER 5
5.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have explored the role of social networks in determining Medicaid
enrollment. I do not find any evidence to suggest that network effects are an important
determinant of Medicaid enrollment when networks are defined along racial or ethnic
lines, and I find only Weak evidence that network effects are important among individuals
who speak only Spanish.

This may imply that networks operate primarily through

language, but the evidence is suggestive at best.

The results for Spanish speaking

individuals become weaker in the exercises designed to test the robustness of the results,
the overall (rather than the differential) effect is not statistically different from zero, and I
do not find similar language effects when estimating models similar to those estimated in
BLM (2000).
The results of this study draw attention to the difficulty in uncovering network
effects in an econometric analysis. Despite the use of three alternative measures of
network quantity and two alternative measures of network quality, I do not find evidence
that network effects explain the cross community variation in Medicaid enrollment.
Using the housing measures of residential clustering and concentration, which should
model more accurately the size and strength of an individual's network, does not generate
results that are qualitatively different from those found when using the simple proportion
of the population in an individual's reference group.

Similarly, estimating simple

models, such as those in BLM (2000), and more complex models designed to control for
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unobserved MSA level characteristics that may be correlated with the network variables
does not help to identify any significant network effects.
While it is possible that the MSA is too broad of a geographic definition of
networks to be able to precisely estimate the effect of networks on Medicaid enrollment,
moving to a smaller geographic area would leave the analysis prone to the types of
omitted regional factors that drove the baseline results in Aizer and Currie (2004).
Alternatively, it could be the case that the only network effects strong enough to be
identified in an econometric analysis are those that operate through language, such as
those found in BLM (2000) and Deri (2005). Whatever the case may be, despite my
thorough analysis, I do not find evidence to support the network effects hypothesis with
respect to child enrollment in Medicaid. Although factors such as residential housing
patterns and the racial composition of communities are not themselves policy
instruments, a better understanding of the role that social networks play in spreading
information about the availability of public programs would be useful information that
could help to guide policy regarding outreach efforts and the advertising of public
programs.
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Table 1: Summary of Network Effects Studies
BLM (2000)

Aizer and Currie
(2004)

Deri (2005)

This Study

PUMA

Zip Code

Census Sub
Division
(CSD)

MSA

Measure of
network
quantity

% in PUMA in
language group

% in zip code in
ethnic group

% in CSD in
language
group

Census spatial
housing pattern
measures

Measure of
network
quality

Mean
enrollment
nationally by
group

Group
enrollment at the
zip code level

Utilization at
a national
level

Enrollment rates
calculated at the
Census region
level

Outcome

Welfare
enrollment

Publicly funded
prenatal care use

Healthcare
utilization

Medicaid
enrollment

Data

Public Use
Micro Samples
(PUMS) 2000

California
administrative
data 1989-2000

Variation

Cross sectional

Panel

Panel

Cross sectional;
Panel

Results

Evidence of
network effects
across
language
groups

Correlations
between
individual and
group behavior
are a result of
regional omitted
variables

Evidence of
network
effects across
language
groups

Evidence of
network effects
among Spanish
only speakers

Geographic
definition of
networks

Current
Canadian
Population Survey
National
Population
1994 & 2000;
Health Survey Decennial Census
1994-1999
Segregation
Measures 1990 &
2000

Notes: Summary of similar network effect studies
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Table 2: Segregation Measures

(Absolute Concentration

£
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<<
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"

fa
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r,

Absolute Clustering

X

x,

«

I

B

V"

( —*- S

v

/ ) _ ( _ _

c

n

_

n

S

c „ )

Definitions
Term i
in

Definition

jxj

jthe number of areas (census tracts) in the metropolitan area, ranked smallest to
jlargest by land area
(the minority population of area i

|t;

(the total population of area i

jX

[the sum of all x, (the total minority population)

jT

jthe sum of all t, (the total population)

ia*

(the land area of area i

pi

rank of area where the sum of all t; from area 1 (smallest in size) up to area ni is
equal to X
;the sum of all t; in area 1 up to area ni

jn2
;T2

jrank of area where the sum of all tj from area n (largest in size) down to area n2
•{is equal to X
sthe sum of all tj in area n2 up to area n

iCii

jthe exponential transform of -djj [= exp(-djj)]

jdij

jthe distance between area i and area j centroids, where djj = (0.6ai)0.5

Source: United States Census Bureau 2007. Housing Patterns:
http://wwwxensus.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/app_b.html
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Medicaid

White
1994
0.25

2000"
0.29

1994
0.49

2000
0.43

1994
0.40

2000
0.40

Asian-Pacific
Islander
1994
2000
0.22
0.36

(0.43)

(0.45)

(0.50)

(0.50)

(0.49)

(0.49)

(0.42)

(0.48)

0.40

0.37

0.34

0.32

0.11

0.13

(0.18)

(0.19)

(0.18)

(0.21)

(0.08)

(0.10)

0.89

0.89

0.77

0.77

0.84

0.83

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.19)

(0.21)

(0.21)

(0.21)

Clustering

Concentration

Mom Full
Time
Mom Part
Time
Mom Doesn't
Work
Dad Full
Time
Dad Part
Time
Dad Doesn't
Work
Mom < High
School
Mom High
School
Mom Some
College
Mom College
Plus

Hispanic

Black

0.51

0.36

0.46

0.48

0.34

0.36

0.48

0.42

(0.50)

(0.48)

(0.50)

(0.50)

(0.48)

(0.48)

(0.50)

(0.49)

0.09

0.18

0.07

0.11

0.05

0.11

0.05

0.16

(0.28)

(0.39)

(0.26)

(0.31)

(0.23)

(0.31)

(0.23)

(0.37)

0.41

0.46

0.47

0.41

0.60

0.53

0.47

0.42

(0.49)

(0.50)

(0.50)

(0.49)

(0.49)

(0.50)

(0.50)

(0.50)

0.51

0.45

0.23

0.19

0.47

0.50

0.55

0.52

(0.50)

(0.50)

(0.42)

(0.39)

(0.50)

(0.50)

(0.50)

(0.50)

0.08

0.04

0.03

0.01

0.05

0.04

0.05

0.05

(0.28)

(0.19)

(0.18)

(0.12)

(0.22)

(0.19)

(0.23)

(0.23)

0.41

0.51

0.73

0.80

0.48

0.46

0.40

0.43

(0.49)

(0.50)

(0.44)

(0.40)

(0.50)

(0.50)

(0.49)

(0.50)

0.17

0.20

0.23

0.24

0.49

0.52

0.21

0.26

(0.37)

(0.40)

(0.42)

(0.43)

(0.50)

(0.50)

(0.41)

(0.44)

0.36

0.37

0.34

0.40

0.27

0.26

0.32

0.26

(0.48)

(0.48)

(0.47)

(0.49)

(0.45)

(0.44)

(0.47)

(0.44)

0.30

0.32

0.31

0.28

0.16

0.15

0.23

0.19

(0.46)

(0.47)

(0.46)

(0.45)

(0.37)

(0.36)

(0.42)

(0.39)

0.17

0.09

0.09

0.05

0.05

0.03

0.22

0.21

(0.37)

(0.29)

(0.28)

(0.21)

(0.21)

(0.18)

(0.42)

(0.41)
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Cont. Table 3

Dad < High
School
Dad High
School

0.39

0.50

0.69

0.75

0.67

0.71

0.33

0.38

(0.49)

(0.50)

(0.46)

(0.44)

(0.47)

(0.45)

(0.47)

(0.49)

0.24

0.23

0.14

0.13

0.18

0.16

0.21

0.23

(0.43)

(0.50)

(0.35)

(0.34)

(0.38)

(0.36)

(0.41)

(0.42)

Dad Some
College

0.20

0.17

0.10

0.08

0.09

0.08

0.16

0.20

(0.40)

(0.38)

(0.30)

(0.27)

(0.29)

(0.26)

(0.37)

(0.40)

Dad College

0.18

0.09

0.06

0.03

0.05

0.03

0.28

0.19

Plus

(0.38)

(0.28)

(0.24)

(0.16)

(0.22)

(0.16)

(0.45)

(0.39)

Age

6.14

6.30

6.49

6.61

6.02

5.99

6.14

7.00

(5.11)

(5.11)

(5.12)

(5.28)

(5.19)

(5.00)

(5.07)

(5.16)

2,117

2,032

1,374

1,571

1,577

1,914

2,080

2,015

Family
Monthly
Income
Regional
Enrollment
N

(1,238) (1,117) (1,117) (1,061) (1,155) (1,210) (1,356) (1,187)

0.16

0.14

0.45

0.35

0.47

0.33

0.18

0.20

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.06)

(0.05)

(0.04)

(0.09)

(0.08)

(0.05)

4,474

2,400

1,561

1,073

1,914

2,356

313

244

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Data are from the 1994 and 2000 Current
Population Surveys. The sample includes children from the youngest child in each
family and contains families living in identifiable MS As with incomes below 300 percent
of the Federal Poverty Line.
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Table 4: Clustering Measures
MSA
Boston, MA

Black Clustering
1994
2000
0.32
0.33

Hispanic Clustering
1994
2000
0.14
0.12

Asian C ustering
1994
2000
0.07
0.06

Rochester, NY

0.29

0.32

0.10

0.12

0.02

0.02

Chicago, IL

0.63

0.63

0.36

0.38

0.06

0.06

Kansas City, MO

0.38

0.36

0.05

0.08

0.01

0.01

Baltimore, MD

0.54

0.53

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

Biloxi, MS

0.06

0.05

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.02

Fort Worth, TX

0.24

0.21

0.16

0.21

0.03

0.04

Tuscon, AZ

0.02

0.03

0.18

0.22

0.01

0.01

San Diego, CA

0.20

0.19

0.24

0.30

0.14

0.15

Notes: Clustering measures for randomly drawn MS As for each racial group in each
year. Each Census region is represented. The range is [0,1].

Table 5: Concentration Measures

MSA
Boston, MA

Black Concentration
1994
2000
0.94
0.95

Hispanic Concentration
1994
2000
0.94
0.94

Asian Concentration
1994
2000
0.92
0.91

Rochester, NY

0.95

0.94

0.93

0.92

0.94

0.94

Chicago, IL

0.95

0.94

0.94

0.91

0.96

0.95

Kansas City, MO

0.98

0.97

0.96

0.96

0.97

0.97

Baltimore, MD

0.91

0.91

0.92

0.93

0.93

0.93

Biloxi, MS

0.94

0.93

0.93

0.94

0.97

0.96

Fort Worth, TX

0.97

0.96

0.92

0.91

0.98

0.98

Tuscon, AZ

0.97

0.98

0.74

0.74

0.98

0.97

San Diego, CA

0.90

0.91

0.78

0.74

0.94

0.93

Notes: Concentration measures for randomly drawn MS As for each racial group in each
year. Each Census region is represented. The range is [0,1].
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Table 6: Changes in Segregation Measures 1994 to 2000
Hispanic Clustering
Correlation: 0.951
Min Change: 0
Max Change: 0.397
Avg Change: 0.021
# No Change: 15
Hispanic Concentration
Correlation: 0.904
Min Change: 0
Max Change: 0.134
Avg Change: 0.020
# No Change: 5
Black Clustering
Correlation: 0.982
Min Change: 0
Max Change: 0.197
Avg Change: 0.018
# No Change: 14
Black Concentration
Correlation: 0.982
Min Change: 0
Max Change: 0.131
Avg Change: 0.012
# No Change: 6
Asian Clustering
Correlation: 0.974
Min Change: 0
Max Change: 0.083
Avg Change: 0.010
# No Change: 19
Asian Concentration
Correlation: 0.966
Min Change: 0
Max Change: 0.056
Avg Change: 0.012
# No Change: 3

Change Rank
1
2
3
4
5

MSA
Las Vegas, NV
Laredo, TX
Yakima, WA
Las Cruces, NM
Yuma, AZ

Change
0.397
0.362
0.192
0.162
0.159

1
2
3
4
5

El Paso, TX
Miami, FL
Goldsboro, NC
Alexandria, LA
Benton Harbor, MI

0.134
0.109
0.095
0.091
0.079

1
2
3
4
5

McAllen, TX
Salinas, CA
Robles, CA
Greenville, NC
Kankakee, IL

0.197
0.107
0.103
0.101
0.089

1
2
3
4
5

Punta Gorda, FL
Fort Myers, FL
Miami, FL
Brazoria, TX
Sheboygan, WI

0.131
0.121
0.098
0.090
0.083

1
2
3
4
5

Honolulu, HI
Orange County, CA
Middlesex, NJ
McAllen, TX
Houston, TX

0.083
0.065
0.043
0.036
0.035

1
2
3
4
5

Laredo, TX
Oakland, CA
Santa Cruz, CA
Orange County, CA
Gadsden, AL

0.056
0.054
0.052
0.052
0.051

Notes: This table reports the MS As with the largest absolute changes in the segregation
measures for each group between 1994 and 2000. Descriptive statistics of the absolute
changes are reported below the name of the measure in the first column.
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Table 7: Within Group Network Effects for Individuals Below 300% of the FPL in
the Year 2000
Variable
Clustering
Concentration
Fraction
Black Enrollment
-0.114
2.60
-0.368
(1.06)
(0.35) .
(0.95)
Blackj*Black Enrollment
1.24*
-1.64
0.007
(0.50)
(0.01)
(1.82)
Black Quantity Measure
0.218
-0.173
0.798
(0.69)
(0.83)
(0.27)
Blackj*Black Quantity
-1.13
0.863
-0.642
(1.20)
(0.53)
(0.99)
Black Network
-0.604
-2.72
-0.043
(0.02)
(0.63)
(0.91)
Blackj* Black Network
2.34
2.75
-2.08
(1.03)
(0.64)
(0.86)
Hispanic Enrollment
-0.022
0.135
0.477
(0.14)
(0.76)
(0.31)
1 23***
Hispanicj*Hispanic
1.27
Enrollment
(3.33)
(0.86)
(4.34)
Hispanic Quantity Measure
-0.172
0.103
-0.577
(0.72)
(0.21)
(1.28)
HispaniCj*Hispanic
0.705**
-0.022
0.879*
Quantity
(0.04)
(1.88)
(1.98)
Hispanic Network
1.41
0.021
-0.345
•
(0.22)
(0.99)
(0.03)
-0.358"
ll]^\iniC|' Ihspjiiic
"-1.W
-1.46
(0.22)
V-LWOlk
(1.35)
(1.32)
-0.033
Asian Enrollment
-13.47***
0.221
(0.12)
(0.72)
(3.65)
2
j
^
*
*
*
Asianj*Asian Enrollment
-46.37***
2.69***
(3.35)
(2.84)
(2.62)
-1 47***
Asian Quantity Measure
-2.62***
-0.633
(0.44)
(3.44)
(3.34)
-9 72***
Asianj* Asian Quantity
0.623
3.25
(0.55)
(3.47)
(1.38)
14.34***
6.12**
Asian Network
0.831
(2.45)
(0.11)
(3.70)
Asian,* Asian Network
-4.75
50.93***
-15.86
(0.80)
(3.50)
(1.32)
6,073
6,073
Observations
6,073
0.162
0.162
Adjusted R^
0.163
Notes: Results arefromlinear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. Regressions include
child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. Results for control variables
are reported in the appendix.

Table 8: Spanish Language Effects for Individuals Below 300% of the FPL in the
Year 2000
Variable
Black Enrollment
Blacki*Black Enrollment
Black Quantity Measure
Blackj*Black Quantity
Black Network
Black,* Black Network
Hispanic Enrollment
Hispanicj*Hispanic
Enrollment
Hispanic Quantity
Measure
Hispanicj*Hispanic
Quantity
Hispanic Network
1 lispiinic/ 1 INp;inii
Ncmork
Spanish;
Spanishi*Hispanic
Enrollment
Spanishj*Hispanic
Quantity
Spanish,* Hispanic
Nciwoik

Asian Enrollment
Asianj*Asian Enrollment

Asian Quantity Measure
Asiani* Asian Quantity

Fraction
-0.370
(1.06)
-0.003
(0.00)
-0.183
(0.28)
-1.13
(0.99)
-0.004
(0.00)
2.72
(U.H5)
-0.019
(0.12)
1.26***
(4.58)
-0.556
(1.22)
0.974**
(2.16)
1.32
(0.92)
" -:.4i" :
0.020
(0.28)
-0.138
(0.63)
-0.561
(1.40)
2.45*
(1.81)
0.223
(0.72)
2.70***
(2.85)
-0.644
(0.45)
3.24
(1.37)

Clustering
-0.131
(0.41)
1.26*
(1.85)
0.195
(0.61)
0.889
(1.22)
-0.540
(0.56)
-2.16
(l.')6)
" 0.141
(0.79)
1.22***
(3.62)
-0.161
(0.61)
0.823**
(2.37)
-0.012
(0.02)
-1.%*
(1.80)
0.077
(1.11)
-0.417**
(1.99)
-0.700**
(2.28)
2.98***
"(3.48)
-0.038
(0.14)
-4.98
(0.86)
_1 4-7***
(3.35)
0.670
(0.59)

Concentration
2.59
(0.94)
-1.58
(0.48)
0.805
(0.83)
-0.632
(0.52)
-2.73
(0.91)
2.30
(0.63)
0.465
(0.30)
1.14
(0.76)
0.089
(0.18)
0.027
(0.05)
-0.333
(0.21)
-0.3')2
10.24)
0.211***
(4.32)
-0.254
(0.70)
-0.542***
(4.37)
1.30***
(2.73)
-13.39***
(3.61)
-46.0***
(3.31)
-2 59***
(3.40)
-9.64***
(3.43)
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Cont. Table 8
Asian Network
Asian;* Asian Network
Observations .
Adjusted R^

0.892
(0.12)
-15.84
(1.32)
6,073
0.164

6.09**
(2.44)
-4.97
(0.86)
6,073
0.164

14.26***
(3.67)
50.54***
(3.46)
6,073
0.165

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage.
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
Results for control variables are reported in the appendix.

Table 9: Within Group Network and Spanish Language Effects for Individuals
Below 300% of the FPL in the Years 1994 and 2000
Variable
Fraction
Clustering
Concentration
Black Enrollment
-0.162
-0.258*
-1.09
(1.66)
(0.79)
(1.12)
Blacki*Black
0.500
0.696**
2.34
Enrollment
(1.15)
(1.37)
(2.08)
Black Quantity Measure
-2.25*
0.633**
-1.42*
(2.09)
(2.15)
(1.81)
Black,*Black Quantity
-0.507
0.014
0.621
(0.73)
(0.05)
(0.77)
Black Network
-0.290
0.894
0.756
(0.62^
(0.88)
(0.67)
-1.7S
Black,* Black Network
-0017
ii.wdS
id.OM
(0 ^IM
(0.82)
Hispanic Enrollment
0.070
-0.036
1.59
(0.44)
(0.21)
(1.14)
0.974***
Hispanicj*Hispanic
-1.65
0.998**
Enrollment
(3.62)
(1.34)
(4.81)
Hispanic Quantity
-2.88***
-0.808*
0.715
Measure
(1.68)
(1.19)
(2.63)
0.541*
Hispanicj*Hispanic
-0.670
0.766**
Quantity
(1.87)
(2.12)
(1.51)
Hispanic Network
2.40**
-1.59
3.50**
(2.07)
(1.08)
(2.37)
Hispanic,* Hispanic
-1.49*
2.45*
-2.48**
Network
(1.82)
(2.34)
(1.79)
Spanishj
-0.041
0.003
-0.058
(0.80)
(0.07)
(1.20)
0.015
0.454
Spanishi*Hispanic
0.072
Enrollment
(0.45)
(0.09)
(1.14)
-0.185
-0.236**
Spanishj*Hispanic
-0.212
(0.72)
(2.39)
Quantity
(0.77)
0.241
1.13
1.35
Spanishj* Hispanic
(0.51)
(1.56)
(1.63)
Network
-0.122
-0.831
Asian Enrollment
0.575
(0.74)
(0.37)
(0.26)
1 47***
1.97
'
Asian;*Asian
1.36***
Enrollment
(4.16)
(0.88)
(2.97)
-0.119
-0.409
Asian Quantity Measure
-0.519
(0.52)
(0.14)
(0.38)
0.170
0.180
Asian,*Asian Quantity
0.096
(0.22)
(0.33)
(0.14)

Cont. Table 9
Asian Network
Asian,* Asian Network
Observations
Adjusted R2

0.575
(0.26)
-0.384
(0.13)
14,335
0.235

-0.021
(0.02)
-1.18
(0.28)
14,335
0.235

0.812
(0.34)
-0.677
(0.29)
14,335
0.235

Notes: Result are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage.
Regressions include age, MSA, and State fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the MSA level. Results for control variables are reported in the appendix.

Table 10: Spanish Language Effects for Individuals Below 300% of the FPL in the
Year 2000 Using the Simulated Eligibility Instrument as the Network Quality
Measure
Variable
Black Simulated
Instrument
Blackj*Black Simulated
Instrument
Black Quantity Measure
Blackj*Black Quantity
Black Network
Black,* Black Network
Hispanic Simulated
Instrument
HispaniCj*Hispanic
Simulated Instrument
Hispanic Quantity
Measure
Hispanici*Hispanic
Quantity
Hispanic Network
Hispanic,* Hispanic
Network
Spanish;
Spanishj*Hispanic
Simulated Instrument
Spanishj*Hispanic
Quantity
Spanish,* Hispanic
Network
Asian Simulated
Instrument
Asians* Asian Simulated
Instrument
Asian Quantity Measure

Fraction
3.96**
(2.20)
0.452***
(20.03)
0.832
(1.22)
-1.23
(0.95)
-1.57
(1.24)
1.87
(0.77)
-5.45**
(2.15)
0.726
(1.21)
-1.09
(1.41)
1.57**
(2.08)
1.58
(1.12)
-2.49*
(1.78)
0.142**
(2.17)
-0.305***
(2.83)
-0.482
(0.78)
1.30
(1.12)
-0.277
(0.13)
0.050
(0.05)
2.06**
(2.05)

Clustering
4.80***
(2.98)
0.453***
(21.01)
0.265
(0.96)
-0.620
(0.99)
-0.350
(0.69)
1.37
0.13)
-5.61**
(2.22)
0.624
(1.28)
-0.464
(0.90)
1.10**
(2.14)
0.395
(0.41)
-1.46
(1.52)
0.143**
(2.31)
-0.359***
(3.47)
-0.546
(0.86)
1.49
(1.53)
-1.05
(0.53)
1.04
(1.00)
1.88
(1.28)

Concentration
2.81
(1.45)
0.450***
(20.36)
-0.013
(0.02)
-0.506
(0.81)
-0.208
(0.14)
1.57
0.31)
-5.40**
(2.25)
0.316
(0.18)
1.17
(1.38)
-0.774
(0.73)
-1.83
(1-18)
1.20
(0.60)
0.187***
(3.16)
-0.157
(0.93)
-0.471*
(1.66)
0.726
(1.42)
-4.77
(1.39)
9.07
(1.49)
-2.17**
(2.33)

Cont. Table 10
Asian**Asian Quantity
Asian Network
Asian* Asian NetworkObservations
Adjusted Rz

-2.28
(1-27)
-7.32**
(2.20)
7.42
(1.11)
6,073
0.177

-1.77
(1.04)
-6.31
(1.54)
4.07
(0.75)
6,073
0.179

2.56
(1.41)
6.59**
(2.23)
-7.68
(1.16)
6,073
0.175

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage.
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
Results for control variables are reported in the appendix.

Table 11: Straw Man Test for Spanish Language Effects for Individuals Above
300% of the FPL in the Year 2000
Variable
Fraction
Clustering
Concentration
Black Enrollment
0.074
0.159
0.156
(0.54)
(0.17)
(1.25)
Blackj*Black Enrollment
0.946
2.74
0.552
(1.32)
(0.92)
(0.79)
Black Quantity Measure
-0.020
-0.021
0.076
(0.08)
(0.40)
(0.07)
Black;*Black Quantity
1.09
-0.035
0.778
(0.72)
(0.06)
(1.13)
Black Network
-0.081
-0.207
0.010
(0.12)
(0.01)
(0.39)
Black,* Black Network
-2.71
-0.316
-2.78
(0.91)
(0 IS)
(0.80)
Hispanic Enrollment
0.106**
0.116**
0.826*
(2.04)
(2.24)
(1.70)
HispaniCj*Hispanic
0.045
-1.30*
-0.316
Enrollment
(0.27)
(1.52)
(1.75)
Hispanic Quantity
0.247
0.052
0.231
(1.47)
Measure
(1.48)
(0.69)
Hispanicj*Hispanic
-0.523**
-0.481
-0.767***
Quantity
(1.56)
(2.75)
(2.03)
-0.855*
Hispanic Network
-0.928*
-0.336
(1.73)
(1.50)
(1.69)
1.80**
Hispanic,* Hispanic
1.66
2.39***
(2.85)
Network
(1.64)
(2.06)
Spanish;
-0.003
-0.008
-0.028
(0.05)
(0.13)
(0.51)
1.28***
Spanishj*Hispanic
-0.089
-0.088
(3.51)
(0.76)
Enrollment
(0.68)
0.163
Spanishj*Hispanic
0.588
0.990**
(2-12).
(1.36)
Quantity
(0.88)
-1.86***
-1.85
Spanish,* Hispanic
-0.681
(0.29)
(3.49)
Network
(1-16)
-0.142
-1.33
Asian Enrollment
-0.223*
(1.00)
(1.87)
(1.49)
9.68
-0.665*
Asiani* Asian Enrollment
-1.77
(1.07)
(1.89)
(1.08)
-0.309
-0.111
Asian Quantity Measure
-0.729
(1.34)
(0.40)
(1-12)
2.11
-1.20
Asianj*Asian Quantity
-1.78
(1.15)
(1.58)
(1.07)

Cont. Table 11
Asian Network
Asian,* Asian Network
Observations
Adjusted R2

4.14
(1.53)
8.82
(1.04)
7,930
0.057

0.850
(0.63)
5.67
(1.53)
7,930
0.061

1.30
(0.94)
-10.66
(1.12)
7,930
0.058

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage.
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
Results for control variables are reported in the appendix.

Table 12: Replication of Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) Model for
Individuals Below 300% of the FPL in the Year 2000 with Spanish Language Effects
Variable
Black

Fraction
-0.208s***
(3.75)
-0.182***
(3.22)
0.141***
(5.81)
0.217***
(10.66)
0.159***
(3.64)
0.128***
(4.87)
0.028
(1.39)
-0.082***
(3.28)
-0.087**
(2.44)
0.023
(0.73)
-0.039
(1-27)
-0.139***
(3.92)
0.102***
(2.78)
-0.113***
(3.04)
0.959***
(3.21)
0.195
(0.56)

Clustering
-0 191***
(2.89)
0.117
(0.30)
0.142***
(5.86)
0.217***
(10.76)
0.160***
(3.66)
0.127***
(4.88)
0.028
(1.38)
-0.082***
(3.26)
-0.082**
(2.42)
0.024
(0.73)
-0.037
(1.19)
-0.134***
(3.80)
0.105***
(2.82)
-0.111***
(3.00)
(3.23)
0.117
(0.30)

Concentration
-0.215***
(3.65)
-0.184***
(2.98)
0.140***
(5.82)
0.218***
(10.66)
0.159***
(3.66)
-0.128***
(4.91)
0.026
(1.31)
-0.082***
(3.26)
-0.088**
(2.46)
0.023
(0.70)
-0.041
(1.31)
-0.136***
(3.83)
0.102***
(2.77)
-0.114***
(3.10)
-0.855
(0.66)
-0.294
(0.74)

\cu\ork

-1.26
11-D8)

-0.933
(0.95)

1.77
(1.21)

Spanishj

-0.367***
(2.92)
0.381
(1.04)

-0.316*
(1.71)
0.310
(0.60)

-0.190
(0.37)
-0.073
(0.13)

Hispanic
Mom works part time
Mom doesn't work
Dad works part time
Dad doesn't work
Mom < high school
Mom some college
Mom college plus
Dad < high school
Dad some college
Dad college plus
Single Female Headed
Household
Single Male Headed
Household
Regional Enrollment
Quantity Measure

Spanishj*Quantity

i AT***
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Cont. Table 12
Spanishi*Enrollment
Spanish,'Network
Observations
Adjusted R2

1.00***
(2.93)
-«»ll»4
lO.Wn
3,673
0.234

0.860*
(1.66)
-(».11~
(H.08)
3,673
0.234

1.13
(0.62)
-i)2iX
(0.12i
3,673
0.233

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage.
Regressions include age, State, and MSA fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the MSA level.

Table 13: Replication of Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) Model for
Individuals Below 300% of the FPL in the Year 2000 with Spanish Language Effects
and Allowing for Different Network Effects by Group
Variable
Black Enrollment
Black Quantity
Black Network
Hispanic Enrollment
Hispanic Quantity
Hispanic Network
Asian Enrollment
Asian Quantity
Asian Network
Spanish;
Spanishj*Hispanic
Quantity
Spanishj*Hispanic
Enrollment
Spanish1'lli"'P.inic
Network
Observations
Adjusted Rz

Fraction
0.496
(0.48)
-1.14
(0.59)
2.40
(0.45)
0.870**
(2.19)
-0.027
(0.04)
-0.517
(0.27)
2.91**
(2.45)
3.43
(1.32)
-18.13
(1.32)
-0.221
(1.58)
-0.013
(0.02)
0.602
(1.51)
0 9",4
10.55)
3,673
0.233

Clustering
1.57*
(1.84)
0.620
(0.74)
-2.20
(0.98)
1.09**
(2.32)
0.157
(0.27)
-1.08
(0.67)
2.09**
(2.21)
0.702
(0.48)
-5.93
(0.83)
-0.110
(0.58)
-0.247
(0.42)
0.255
(0.45)
1..V,
(0.8K)
3,673
0.233

Concentration
2.58
(0.62)
0.617
(0.38)
-1.68
(0.36)
i
0 79i***
(2.74)
0.322*
(1.67)
-0.059
(0.17)
-25.67
(1-39)
-5.51
(1.48)
29.09
(1.50)
-0.085
(1.04)
-0.162
(1.40)
0.608**
._ (2J1)
0.657"
ll.«H)
3,673
0.233

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage.
Regressions include age, State, and MSA fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the MSA level. Results for control variables are reported in the appendix.
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Figure 1: Racial Map of Boulder, Colorado
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Figure 2: Racial Map of Reading, Pennsylvania

F '

-LAlirtELOALE--

*
I

hiitial Scale Map

Hispanic Population
o 1 0%
o 2 0%
20
o 3 0%
o 5 0%
5 0% :o 10 0%
10.0( :o 25.0%
25,0% to 50.0%
50 0% to 100 0*.
2000 Census

0.5

1 0

-WHHHLLD
'
—
_
" . -WYONilSSIj
-WEST WYOMlbSIN

'—
-KE
'-SHILLI'v.GTON.

mMBMrnm
.4

• FRYING HILLS

Source: http://merlot.caliper.com/maptitude/census2Q00maps/map.asp
(Accessed online 6/18/07)

APPENDIX
TABLE Al: CONTROL VARIABLES FOR RESULTS IN TABLE 7
Variable
Black
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific
Islander
Mom works full time
Mom doesn't work
Dad works full time
Dad doesn't work
Mom < high school
Mom some college
Mom college plus
Dad < high school
Dad some college
Dad college plus
Single Female
Headed Household
Single Male Headed
Household
White Enrollment
White;* White
Enrollment

Fraction
0.350
(1.25)
-0.161
(1.40)
-0.140
(0.68)
-0.138***
(8.25)
0.080***
(4.92)
-0.143***
(4.61)
0.003
(0.10)
0.065***
(3.64)
-0.046***
(2.71)
-0.074***
(3.31)
0.052**
(2.07)
-0.045**
(2.00)
-0.114***
(4.91)
0.054*
(1.88)
-0.113***
(4.22)
-0.056
(0.85)
1.60*
(2.49)

Clustering
-0.267
(1.05)
-0.219*
(1.73)
-0.103
(0.56)
-0.144***
(8.56)
0.075***
(4.59)
-0.150***
(4.73)
-0.001
(0.03)
0.068***
(3.87)
-0.046***
(2.71)
-0.071***
(3.20)
0.052**
(2.05)
-0.043*
(1.94)
-0.111***
(4.79)
0.054*
(1.87)
-0.116***
(4.31)
-0.023
(0.03)
0.875
(1.43)

Concentration
0.646
(0.60)
-0.093
(0.20)
9.16***
(3.41)
-0.141***
(8.34)
0.073***
(4.43)
-0.143***
(4.58)
0.002
(0.06)
0.064***
(3.59)
-0.047***
(2.80)
-0.077***
(3.60)
0.051**
(2.01)
-0.045**
(2.01)
-0.112***
(4.66)
0.054*
(1.89)
-0.115***
(4.25)
-0.812
(1.44)
1.10*
(1-69)

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage.
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.

TABLE A2: CONTROL VARIABLES FOR RESULTS IN TABLE 8
Variable
Black
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific
Islander
Mom works full time
Mom doesn't work
Dad works full time
Dad doesn't work
Mom < high school
Mom some college
Mom college plus
Dad < high school
Dad some college
Dad college plus
Single Female
Headed Household
Single Male Headed
Household
White Enrollment
Whitej* White
Enrollment

Fraction
0.352
(1.25)
-0.165
(1.45)
-0.142
(0.69)
-0.140***
(8.31)
0.079***
(4.73)
-0.145***
(4.66)
0.002
(0.05)
0.062***
(3.46)
-0.046***
(2.72)
-0.074***
(3.33)
0.050*
(1.91)
-0.044**
(2.00)
-0.114***
(4.89)
0.056*
(1.95)
-0.110***
(4.15)
-0.555
(0.82)
1.59**
(2.45)

Clustering
-0.274
(1.07)
-0.234*
(1.86)
-0.109
(0.64)
-0.144***
. (8.60)
0.075***
(4.43)
-0.150***
(4.81)
-0.004
(0.12)
0.066***
(3.74)
-0.046***
(2.73)
-0.071***
(3.18)
0.050*
(1.89)
-0.042*
(1.92)
-0.111***
(4.77)
0.057*
(1.95)
-0.114***
(4.29)
-0.037
(0.05)
0.886
(1.43)

Concentration
0.629
(0.59)
-0.085
(0.18)
o 09***
(3.37)
-0.142***
(8.45)
0.073***
(4.34)
-0.143***
(8.45)
0.001
(0.03)
0.062***
(3.42)
-0.048***
(2.85)
-0.078***
(3.65)
0.051*
(1.90)
-0.044*
(1.96)
-0.112***
(4.66)
0.056**
(1.97)
-0.113***
(4.23)
-0.831
(1-45)
1.13*
(1.71)

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage.
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.

TABLE A3: CONTROL VARIABLES FOR RESULTS IN TABLE 9
Variable
Black
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific Islander
Mom works part time
Mom doesn't work
Dad works part time
Dad doesn't work
Mom < high school
Mom some college
Mom college plus
Dad < high school
Dad some college
Dad college plus
Single Female Headed
Household
Single Male Headed
Household
White Enrollment
Whitei* White
Enrollment

Fraction
0.160
(1.06)
-0.028
(0.27)
0.060
(0.68)
0.092***
(8.08)
0.210***
(21.05)
0.070***
(4.11)
0 jig***
(7.21)
0.070***
(5.60)
-0.049***
(4.37)
-0.069***
(5.17)
0.017
(1.21)
-0.037***
(3.20)
-0.034***
(2.88)
0.155***
(11.73)
-0.082***
(5.66)
-0.761
(1.23)
1 52***
(3.32)

Clustering
0.053
(0.40)
-0.040
(0.35)
0.055
(0.53)
0.094***
(8.18)
0.211***
(21.14)
0.070***
(4.03)
0ii^***
(7.24)
0.070***
(5.51)
-0.049***
(4.34)
-0.069***.
(5.18)
0.017
(1.22)
-0.036***
(3.16)
-0.034***
(2.88)
0.156***
(11.73)
-0.081***
(5.59)
-0.710
(1.12)
1 ro***
(3.65)

Concentration
-0.566
(0.76)
0.665*
(1.71)
-0.152
(0.29)
0.095***
(8.35)
0.211***
(21.42)
0.069***
(4.00)
0.118***
(7.18)
0.070***
(5.56)
-0.049***
(4.36)
-0.069***
(5.16)
0.017
(1.22)
-0.037***
(3.29)
-0.035***
(2.98)
0.155***
(11.54)
-0.083***
(5.77)
-0.204
(0.34)
1 2i***
(2.70)

Notes: Result are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage.
Regressions include age, MSA, and State fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the MSA level.

TABLE A4: CONTROL VARIABLES FOR RESULTS IN TABLE 10

Variable
Black
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific Islander
Mom works full time
Mom doesn't work
Dad works full time
Dad doesn't work
Mom < high school
Mom some college
Mom college plus
Dad < high school
Dad some college
Dad college plus
Single Female Headed
Household
Single Male Headed
Household
White Simulated
Eligibility
Whitej* White

Simulated Eligibility

Fraction
0.019
(0.11)
-0.126
(0.56)
0.372
(1.32)
-0.125***
(7.07)
0.075***
(4.48)
-0.134***
(4.36)
0.006
(0.17)
0.058***
(3.32)
-0.039**
(2.23)
-0.063***
(2.92)
0.035
(1.32)
-0.041*
(1.83)
-0.117***
(4.92)
0.063**
(2.18)
-0.010***
(4.00)
2.41
(l.H)
0.854
(1.27)

Clustering
-0.063
(0.39)
-0.099
(0.59)
0.128
(0.47)
-0.128***
(7.50)
0.072***
(4.31)
-0.136***
(4.40)
0.004
(0.12)
0.059***
(3.41)
0.038**
(2.23)
-0.065***
(3.01)
0.036
(1.34)
-0.043*
(1.94)
-0.115***
(4.88)
0.060**
(2.01)
-0.102***
(4.04)
2.21
(0.99)
0.873
(1.35)

Concentration
0.121
(0.30)
0.694
(0.82)
-2.14
(1.33)
-0.128***
(7.56)
0.072***
(4.24)
-0.133***
(4.35)
0.008
(0.25)
0.058***
(3.23)
-0.039**
(2.27)
-0.065***
(3.08)
0.035
(1.31)
-0.042*
(1.89)
-0.120***
(5.00)
0.063**
(2.21)
-0.102***.
(4.07)
2.77
(1.08)
2.63*
(1.70)

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage.
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
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TABLE A5: CONTROL VARIABLES FOR RESULTS IN TABLE 11
Variable
Black
Hispanic
Mom works full time
Mom doesn't work
Dad works full time
Dad doesn't work
Mom < high school
Mom some college
Mom college plus
Dad < high school
Dad some college
Dad college plus
Single Female Headed
Household
Single Male Headed
Household
White Enrollment
Whitei* White Enrollment

Fraction
-0.251
(1.02)
0.078
(0.94)
-0.011*
(1.73)
0.023***
(3.23)
-0.003
(0.18)
0.045*
(1.93)
0.071***
(2.89)
-0.009
(1.49)
-0.019***
(2.85)
0.052**
(2.43)
-0.017**
(2.48)
-0.022***
(3.18)
-0.056*
(1.90)
-0.063**
(2.35)
-0.415
(1.07)
0.044
(1.17)

Clustering
0.004
(0.02)
0.237***
(2.83)
-0.011*
(1.73)
0.022***
(3.10)
-0.005
(0.28)
0.042*
(1.81)
0.069***
(2.81)
-0.010
(1.50)
-0.019***
(2.85)
0.056***
(2.62)
-0.016**
(2.40)
-0.021***
(3.17)
-0.057**
(1.97)
-0.061**
(2.28)
-0.688*
(1.88)
0.694*
(1.91)

Concentration
-0.675
(0.73)
0.491**
(2.07)
-0.011*
(1.76)
0.022***
(3.17)
-0.002
(0.14)
0.046**
(1.97)
0.072***
(2.91)
-0.010
(1.53)
-0.020***
(2.89)
0.054**
(2.49)
-0.017**
(2.51)
-0.022***
(3.22)
-0.058**
(1.98)
-0.064**
(2.38)
-0.674
(1.62)
0.638
(1.58)

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage.
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level

TABLE A6: CONTROL VARIABLES FOR RESULTS IN TABLE 13
Variable
Black
Hispanic
Mom works part time
Mom doesn't work
Dad works part time
Dad works full time
Mom < high school
Mom some college
Mom college plus
Dad < high school
Dad some college
Dad college plus
Single Female Headed
Household
Single Male Headed
Household

Fraction
0.332
(0.77)
0.208
(0.82)
0.151***
(5.77)
0.217***
(10.70)
0.160***
(3.65)
-0.031
(0.72)
0.029
(1.41)
-0.082***
(3.28)
-0.087**
(2.42)
0.023
(0.73)
-0.037
(1.19)
-0.133***
(3.67)
0.103***
(2.83)
-0.113***
(3.05)

Clustering
-0.227
(0.63)
-0.039
(0.17)
0.140***
(5.81)
0.217***
(10.60)
-0.160***
(3.60)
-0.032
(0.75)
0.029
(1.43)
-0.082***
(3.26)
-0.084**
(2.31)
0.023
(0.71)
-0.036
(1.16)
-0 131***
(3.68)
0.106***
(2.86)
-0.113***
(2.99)

Concentration
-5.88
(1.50)
-5.48
(1.55)
0.141***
(5.74)
0.218
(10.62)
0.159***
(3.63)
-0.031
(0.70)
0.028
(1.38)
-0.082**
(3.30)
-0.086**
(2.41)
0.021
(0.65)
-0.038
(1.21)
-0.132***
(3.65)
0.104***
(2.83)
-0.114***
(3.09)

Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage.
Regressions include age, State, and MSA fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the MSA level.

